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AUTHOR: 


KING,  HENRY  CHURCHILL 


TITLE: 


AN  OUTLINE  OF  THE 
MICROCOSMUS  ... 

PLACE: 

OBERLIN 

DA  TE : 

[C1895] 


COLUMBIA  UNIVEI^ITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

DIDLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


Master  Negative  # 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


•HISJ^J-L""^^'*'  <^^  PHILOSOPHY 

D193L91 
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King.  Henry  Churchill,  1858-1934. 

An  outline  of  the  mcrocosnus  of  Hermann  Lotze 
by  Henry  Churchill  King...  Based  upon  the  English 
translation.   Oberlin,  Ohio.  Pearce  &  Randolph 
printers  (Cl896j  ' 

viii,  105  p.   23  ^. 


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THE  MICROCOSMUS 


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HERMANN  LOTZE. 


BY 


HENRY  CHURCHILL  KING, 


PROFESSOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY   IN   OBERLIN   COLLEGE. 


BASED  UPON  THE  ENGLISH  TRANSLATION. 


Pbarce  &  Randolph,  Printers, 

OBERLIN,  OHIO. 


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Copyright.  1895, 
By  H.  C.  KING. 


Printed  with  the  full  consent  of  Messrs.  T.  &  T.  Clark,  publishers 
of  the  English  Translation  of  the  Microcosmus. 


GIFT  or 

PWES1DENT  N.  M.  BUTLER 

NOV  26  1937 


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PREFACE. 

This  Outline  of  Lotze's  Microcosmus  has  been  prepared  for  the  use  of  my 
own  classes,  and  at  their  request.     Such  an  outline  seems  almost  essential  to  en- 
able students  to  cover  the  work  in  reasonable  time  and  with  any  thorough  grasp 
of  the  argument.     The  Microcosmus  itself  has  seemed  to  me  to  be  particularly 
valuable  in  bringing  students  to  an  appreciative  discussion  of  the  great  funda- 
mental problems  of  thought,  because  of  the  singularly  broad  and  untechnical 
nature  of  its  discussion.     This  very  character  of  the  discussion,  however,  serves 
often  somewhat  to  conceal  the  precise  course  of  the  argument ;  and  the  great  ex- 
tent of  the  discussion  increases  the  difficulty.     Both  facts  make  a  careful  outline 
of  the  argument  desirable.     And  such  an  outline  is  entirely  possible ;  for  the 
whole  work  is  for  Lotze  a  unit — one  single  connected  inquiry  in  which  every  part 
has  its  place.     The  complete  force  of  the  argument,  even  in  its  smaller  parts, 
still  more  in  its  entirety,  is  unlikely  to  be  discerned  by  a  mere  reading.    The  Out- 
line,  following  all  the  hints  of  Lotze,  aims  to  bring  out  the  connection  of  the 
whole  work.     I  may  hope  that  it  may  prove  not  without  value  for  any  reader  who 
really  wishes  to  master  this  work  of  Lotze,  which  "has  the  double  merit  for  his 
students  of  being  the  completest  expression  of  his  general  views  and  of  revealing 
most  clearly  the  motives  and  convictions  which  guided  his  speculative  endeavor." 
It  is  hardly  possible  that  the  outline  reflects  the  exact  shade  of  Lotze's  thought  at 
each  point;  nor  can  the  outline  be  always  entirely  significant  without  reference 
to  the  text.     The  method  of  the  analysis  is  not  absolutely  the  same  for  all  chap- 
ters ;  for  a  few  chapters  it  seemed  sufficient  to  give  not  much  more  than  a  topical 
analysis;  but  in  general  the  attempt  is  made  to  bring  out  the  argument  with  con- 
siderable fullness.     The  fuller  statements  of  the  subjects  of  the  chapters  are  in- 
tended to  give  a  practical  summary  of  the  entire  work,  and  of  its  most  important 
conclusions.     The  condensed  outline  of  the  whole  aims  to  give  the  connection 
of  the  entire  argument.     The  references  are  of  course  to  the  pages  of  the  English 
translation. 

For  students,  the  outline  of  the  chapters  will  be  most  useful  after  they  have 
carefully  noted  for  themselves  all  Lotze's  own  suggestions  as  to  the  course  of  the 
argument. 

Oberlin  College,  June,  i8gs- 


1 


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I! 


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^ 


BRIEF  SURVEY   OF  THE  ENTIRE   WORK. 

An  Essay  Concerning  Man  and  His  Relation  to  the  World. 

An  Anthropology  which  aims  to  investigate  the  whole  Significance  of  Human 
Life  in  the  great  whole  of  Nature,  showing  by  a  joint  Consideration  of  Individual 
Life  and  of  the  History  of  the  Civilization  of  the  Race,  the  absolute  Universal- 
ity in  Extent  and  the  complete  Subordination  in  Significance  of  the  Mission  of 
Mechanism  in  the  Structure  of  the  World,  especially  so  far  as  concerns  Man — 
thus  showing  the  entire  Harmony  of  the  Mechanical  and  Ideal  Views. 

Introduction  to  the  work. 

A.  Author's  Introduction.     The  aim  of  the  work  is  to  show  the  Harmony  of 
the  Mechanical  and  Ideal  Views,  especially  in  Man,  the  Microcosmus. 

B.  The  Mechanical  View  itself.     Chapters   I-II. 

(I)  Comparison  with  other  Views.     Chapter  I. 
(II)  Statement  of  the  Essential  Features  of  the  View.     Chapter  IL 
I.  General  Survey  of  the  Conditions  of  All  Life,  as  showing  the  Mechanism  of 
Universal  Laws.     Books  I-IH. 

A.  The  Prevalence  of  Mechanism  in  the  Body.     Chapters  III-VI. 
(I)  As  Explaining  the  Basis  of  Life.     Chapter  III. 

(II)  In  the  Mechanism  of  Life.     Chapter  IV. 
(Ill)   In  the  Structure  of  the  Body.     Chapter  V. 
(IV)  In  the  Conservation  of  Life.     Chapter  VI. 

B.  The  Difference  oi  the  Soul,  though  Mechanism  is  present.     Book  II. 

(I)  The  Conception  of  the  Soul.     Chapters  I-II. 

(A)  The  Existence  of  the  Soul.     Chapter  I. 

(B)  The  Nature  and  Faculties  of  the  Soul.     Chapter  II. 

(II)  The  Forms  of  Activity  of  the  Soul,  for  which  Mechanism  will  ac- 
count.    The  Train  of  Ideas.     Chapter  III. 
(Ill)  The  Forms  of  Activity  of  the  Soul  not  completely  explicable  by  . 
Mechanism.    The  Source  and  Justification  of  all  Ideal  Views.   Chap- 
ters IV-V. 

(A)  The  Forms  of  Relating  Knowledge.     Chapter  IV. 

(B)  The  Feelings,  Self-Consciousness,  and  Will.     Chapter  V. 

C.  The    Extent   of  Mechanism    in    the   Relations   of  Mind  and  Matter. 
Book  III. 

(I)  A  more  special  Examination  of  the  Relations  of  Body  and  Soul  in 
Particular.     Chapters  I-III. 

(A)  As  to  the  possible  Connection  of  Body  and  Soul.    Chapter  I. 

(B)  As  to  the  possible  Conception  of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul.     Chap- 
ter II. 

(C)  As  to  the  special  Forms  of  the  Reciprocal  Action  between  Body 
and  Soul.     Chapter  III. 

(II)  Preliminary  Statement  of  the  Possible  Final  Explanation  of  the  Re- 
lations of  all  Mind  and  Matter.     Chapters  IV-V. 


^ 


VI 

(A)  Life  in  all  Matter.     Chapter  IV. 

(B)  Mechanism  leaves  open  all  questions  of  Origin  and  Destiny, 
and  requires  the  Infinite  Substance.     Chapter  V. 

Conclusion  of  Books  I-III.     393-401. 
II.  Special   Consideration   of  Human  Affairs,  as  demanding  the  Ideal  View, 
Books  IV-VIII. 
A.  The  Distinguishing  Characteristics  of  Man.     Books  IV-VI. 

Introduction.     How  far  the  Great  Whole  of  Nature,   in  which  Man 
stands,  requires  the  Ideal  View.     Chapters  I-IH. 

(A)  A  Preliminary  Examination  of  the  Possible  Combinations  of  the 
Mechanical  Explanation  and  the  Ideal  Interpretation  of  Nature. 
We  must  start  from  Reality  itself.     Chapter  I. 

(B)  Just  how  far  the  Mechanical  Theory  can  account  for  Nature. 
We  must  assume  "Inner  Nature."     Chapter  IT. 

(C)  The  Mechanical  View  is  only  a  disguised  expression  for  the 
Real  Unity  of  Nature,  and  requires  the  Infinite.     Chapter  HI. 

(I)  As  to  Body.     Chapters  IV-V. 

(A)  The  Human  Body  is  at  the  Head  of  the  Scale  of  Creatures,  as 
to  the  Capacity  of  Work  and  of  Happiness  (An  Ideal  Standard). 
Chapter  IV. 

(B)  The  Question  as  to  the  Varieties  of  the  Race.     Chapter  V. 
(II)  As   to   Mind.      The   Distinguishing   Characteristic    of   the    Human 

Mind  is  its  Sense  of  a  Universal  Truth  and  Right — the  "Capacity 
of  becoming  conscious  of  the  Infinite."     Book  V. 
Introduction. — How  an  Essential  Peculiarity  of  the  Human  Mind 
would  have  to  be  Thought.     Chapter  I. 

(A)  The  Characteristic  Features  of  Human  Sentience — Every  Con- 
tent has  its  Place,  and  its  Intrinsic  Excellence.     Chapter  II. 

(B)  Human  Language  bears  the  impress  of  a  Universal  Order 
Chapter  III. 

(C)  Human  Intelligence  has  a  Clear  Consciousness  of  Universal  and 
Necessary  Truth.     Chapter  IV. 

(D)  Man  has  an  ineradicable  Sense  of  Duty^  giving  Universal  Re- 
lations.    Chapter  V. 

Conclusion  of  Book  V.     713-714. 
(Ill)  The  Relation  of  Man  to  his  Environment.     The  Influence  of  the 
Universal  and  Uniformly  Acting  Conditions  of  Man's  Life  upon  his 
Development.     They  never  suffice  to  explain  Human  Development 
without  preceding  Predisposition.     Negative  Result.     Book  VI. 

(A)  The  Influences  of  External  Nature.     Chapter  I. 

(B)  The  Influences  of  Man's  Own  Nature.     Chapter  II. 

(C)  The  Influences  of  Progressive  Civilization.     Chapter  III. 

(D)  The  Influences  of  the  most  Important  Features  of  the  Social. 
Order.     Chapter  IV. 

(E)  The  Influences  of  the  Views  held  as  to  the  Nature  and  Destiny 
of  Man.     Chapter  V. 

Conclusion.     The  Religious  View  becomes  the  Starting  Point  of  our 
^  final  considerations.     Our  own  Ends  are  not  clear.     We  need 

to  understand  the  Plan  of  the  Whole. 
Conclusion  of  Books  I-VI.     Volume  II,  119-121. 


I 


Vll 

B.  Man's  Connection  with  the  Whole  of  Reality  and  his  Position  in  that 
Whole.     The  Plan  of  the  Whole  Cosmos,  so  far  as  made  plain.     Books 
VII-VIII. 
(I)  The  Light  thrown  on  the  Plan  of  the  Whole  by  the  Survey  of  Ex- 
ternal History.     Book  VII. 

(A)  The  Creation  of  Man.  Man's  Historical  Connection  with  Ex- 
ternal Nature.  There  is  no  Danger  to  Ideal  Views  here.  Chap- 
ter I. 

(B)  The  External  History  of  Humanity.     Chapters  II-V. 

i.  The  Meaning  of  History.     The  Point  of  View  is  Faith  in 
the  Continued  Existence  and  Sharing  of  all  the  Genera- 
tions.    Chapter  II. 
ii.  The  Forces  that  work  in  History.     These  cannot  Exclude 

Freedom  and  Inner  Nature.     Chapter  III. 
iii.  The  External  Conditions  of  Development  guide  rather  than 

cause  Development.     Chapter  IV. 

iv.   The  Historical  Development  itself  shows  Real  Progress,  a 

Strong  Basis  of  Hope,  but  no  Clear  Goal;  but  this  is  in 

Harmony  with  the  Design  of  the  Earthly  Life.    Chapter  V. 

(II)  The  Light  thrown  on  the  Plan  of  the  Whole  by  the  Results  obtained 

in  Different  Lines  by  the  Progress  of  Civilization — the  Connection 

of  Ideas   which   the   Intellectual  Labor  of  the  Human  Race  has 

gradually  attained.     Book  VIII. 

(A)  The  Gradual  Development  of  Scientific  Knowledge — Logical, 
Scientific,  Philosophic.  There  must  be  no  Identification  of 
Logic  and  Metaphysics,  as  in  a  False  Idealism.  The  Nature  of 
Things,  only  the  Whole  Mind  can  experience.    Chapter  I. 

(B)  The  Development  of  Material  Civilization  is  accompanied  by  no 
proportional  increase  in  the  Happiness  of  Life.     Chapter  II. 

(C)  The  Characteristic  Esthetic  Ideas  of  the  Different  Periods  in 
their  Influence  on  Life.  ^Esthetic  Ideas  have  comparatively 
little  Echo  in  Modern  Life.     Chapter  III. 

(D)  The  Development  of  the  Religious  Life  of  the  Race  shows  the 
Preponderance  of  the  Cosmological  Element  in  Heathendom, 
of  the  Moral  Element  in  Judaism  and  Christianity,  and  in  the 
Present,  the  returning  Preponderance  of  the  Cosmological  Ele- 
ment in  Dogmatics  and  a  less  close  Connection  of  Religion 
with  Life.     Chapter  IV. 

(E)  The  Development  of  the  Political  Life  of  the  Race  shows  in  the 
Modern  Age  much  larger  Recognition  of  the  Individual  Life, 
with  the  Recognition  both  of  Absolute  Natural  Right  and  of 
Historic  and  Legitimate  Right.     Chapter  V. 

III.  Conclusions  as  to  the  Cosmic  Whole.  The  Unity  of  Things.  Possible  Unity 
of  the  Spheres  of  the  Actual,  the  Necessary,  and  the  Ideal.  Reality,  Laws, 
and  the  Good  are  but  the  Content,  Mode  of  Action,  and  End  of  God,  as 
Living  Love.     Book  IX. 

A.  The  Being  of  Things  is  a  State  of  Relatedness,  implying  one  Truth  and 
the  Infinite  Substance.     Chapter  I. 

B.  The  Correspondence  of  the  Real  Intellectual  and  the  Apparent  Spatial 
Places  of  Things.  The  Reciprocal  Action  of  Things  is  the  Sole  Reality, 
Chapter  II. 


vni 

C.  Only  Beings  which  exist  for  Self-Spirits— are  Real.     "All  that  is  Real" 
is  Spiritual.     Chapter  III. 

D.  The  Infinite  is  Personal.     Chapter  IV. 

E.  The  Complete  Unity  of  the  Actual,  of  Eternal  Truths  (Laws),  and  of  the 
Good  in  the  one  Good-in-itself,  Living  Love,  God.     Chapter  V. 

Conclusion  of  Entire  Work:  The  Absolute  Universality  of  Mechanism  and 
Its  complete  Subordination  in  Significance.  The  True  Reality  is  "the  liv- 
ing personal  Spirit  of  God,  and  the  World  of  Spirits  which  He  has  Cre- 
ated."    Volume  II,  727. 


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AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION. 


The    Point   of  View   and   Purpose  of  the  Author,  Especially  as  to  the 
Relation  of  the  Ideal  and  Mechanical  Views. 


I.  The  Defects  of  both  opposing  Views. 

A.  The  "Philosophy  of  the  Feelings,"  necessarily  an  obscure  and  unquiet 
Movement,     vii. 

B.  Defect  of  the  merely   Scientific  View  in  the  "Deification  of  Truth.'* 

VIII. 

(I)  Not  just,  as  an  independent  Estimation  of  its  Value. 
(II)  Not  Calculated  to  produce  Conviction,     ix. 
IL  No  Evasion  of  the  Difficulty  in  the  Conflict  is  possible,     x. 

A.  Practical  Contradiction  involved. 

B.  The  two  Tendencies  cannot  be  kept  apart. 

C.  Old  Contradictions  continually  arise,     xi. 

IIL  The  whole  Conflict  is  due  only  to  terminating  Investigation  prematurely. 

^w  1 X  • 

A.  On  the  Side  of  Science.     Its  own  Fundamental  Elements,  when  thought 
through,  lead  to  the  supersensuous  World. 

B.  On  the  Side  of  the  Ideal  View.     The  advance  of  Science  has  only  ben- 
efited the  Ideal  View. 

(I)  Illustrations. 

(A)  In  Geography. 

(B)  In  Astronomy. 

(C)  As  to  Origin  of  Man. 

(D)  In  Geology. 

(II)  Summary  Conclusion,  as  to  the  Undeifying  of  Nature,— the  Ma- 
crocosm.    XIV. 

(Ill)  But  special  Difficulty  is  felt  as  to  the  Microcosm  of  Man,  in  the  ad- 
vance of  Mechanical  Science,     xv. 

(A)  Here  Mechanism  seems  to  threaten  the  very  existence  of  an 

Ideal  World. 

(B)  Hence  special  Need  of  showing  the  Harmony  of  the  Mechan- 
ical and  Ideal  Views  here. 

(C)  A  personal  Reason  also  for  Lotze. 

IV.  Hence,  the  Purpose  and  Theme  of  the  Book,  is  to  show  that,  in  the  World 
of  Man,  Mechanism  is  indeed  absolutely  universal  in  extent,  but  completely 
subordinate  in  significance,     xvi. 


J 


^  ^ 


BOOK  I. 
THE   BODY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Conflicting  Views  of  Nature. 

The  Attractiveness  and  Defects  of  the  Mythological  and  World-Soul  Views  of 
Nature,  and  the  Considerations  which  have  led  to  the  Mechanical  View  instead; 
and  the  raising  of  the  naturally  suggested  question  of  the  resfllting  conception  of 
Man's  Relation  to  Nature. 

I.  The  Mythological  View  of  Nature  involved  no  such  Universal  Vitalizing  of 
nature  as  is  commonly  assumed.     §  I. 
Introduction. 

The  Attractiveness  of  the  Mythological  View. 
^.  The  Reasons  why  the  Mythological  View  could  not  universally  Vitalize 
Nature.     2. 
<(I)  This  Illusion  is  possible  only  to  the  child. 

(II)  Since  Active  Life   must   build  on  Necessity  in    the  Connection  of 
events. 

B.  In  fact  no   Mythology  has  attempted  such  a    universal   Vitalization    of 
Nature. 

(I)  It  left  out  much  from  its  representation  of  the  Cosmos,  especially 
the  entire  sphere  of  Universal  Laws. 
(II)  Even  in  its  chosen  narrower  field  it  was  unsuccessful.     4. 

(A)  It  was  unable  to  Spiritualize  Matter. 

(B)  It  failed  to  lend  to  events  the  higher  bloom  of  Freedom.     6. 

C.  Thus  Mythology  really  comes  far  short  of  what  it  seemed  to  promise.     7. 
II.  The  World  Soul  View  of  Nature.     §  2. 

Introduction. 

This  view  arose  earlier  than  the  Mythological  and  still  persists. 

A.  The  Genesis  and  Indistinctness  of  the  View.     8. 

(I)  The  Genesis  of  the  View. 
(II)  Its  Indistinctness  in  the  notion  of  Impulse.     9. 

B.  Reasons  for  the  Attractiveness  of  the  View.      10. 

(I)  The  noblest  part  of  life  is  not  always  felt  to  be   definitely  thought 
and  willed. 
(II)  Even  the  definite  and  conscious  Thinking  and   Willing  seem  really 
directed  to  a  distant  and  mystical  summum  bonum.     11. 

(III)  The  Fascination  of  a  Vista  into  the  Infinity  of  a   Nature  working 
unconsciously  in  us. 

(IV)  The  Attractiveness  of  the  Analogy  of  the  relation  of  our  own  Soul 
and   Body.      12. 

C.  The  Disadvantages  of  the  Theory.      13. 

(I)  Even  Philosophy  does  not  remove  its  indistinctness. 
(II)  It  gives  at  best  to  the   parts  of  Nature  only  the   outward  signs  of 
activity  without  inner  Experience. 

D.  Even  the  fullest  statement  of  the  View  has  its  difficulties.     15. 

(I)  The  Complete  Statement,  in  the  Conception  of  an  Infinite  Reason. 
(II)  Its  Difficulties.     16. 


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1 


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(A)  It  has  no  expression  for  the  Essence  of  the  World-Soul. 

(B)  It  leaves  out  much  of  Nature,  especially  failing  to  take  up  into 
itself  the  trivial,  common-place,  actual  world.     17. 

III.  The  Mechanical  View  of  Nature.     §  3.  ^ 

A.  Considerations  leading  to  the  Mechanical  View. 

(I^  The  Influence  of  Machinery. 
(II)  The  Influence  of  the  growing  Dominion  of  Man  over  Nature.     19. 
(Ill)  The  Influence  of  the  further  consideration  that  each  product  is  seen 
to  be  a  part  of  a  whole — of  actually  existing  combinations. 

(A)  In  Inorganic  Nature. 

(B)  In  Organic  Nature.     20. 

i.  The  Vital  Force  is  limited  by  the  given    Material  which  it 

has  to  use. 
ii.  Even  the  Persistence   and  Functions  of  the   Organism  are 
Mechanically  explained.     21. 

B.  Conclusion  as  to  the  Views  of  Nature.     The  gradually  changing  View'of 
Nature.     22. 

(I)  The  Steps  toward  the  Mechanical  View  of  Nature. 
(II)  The  Final  View  reached  extends  Mechanism  over  the  whole  of  Na- 
ture, recognizing  only  the   simple    and  indestructible   forces  which 
perpetually  inhere  in  the  elements.     25. 

IV.  The  Place  of  Man  in  Nature.     §  4. 

A.  The  diminishing  sphere  of  Independent  Human  Life.     24. 

B.  Hence  the  New  Questions  arising.     25. 

(I)  A  persistent  Faith  in   an    Eternal  First  Cause   and   in  free  human 
spirits  has  maintained  itself  against  the  advancing  mechanical  view. 
(II)  Hence  these  problems  of  the  relation  of   the  Ideal  and  Mechanical 
in   Man  are  now  thrust  into  the  fore-ground  and  demand  a  new  ex- 
amination of  Mechanical  Necessity.     26. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Nature  as  Mechanical. 

The  Necessary  and  the  Merely  Probable  (Pliable)  Elements  in  the  Main  Con- 
ceptions of  the  Mechanical  View  of  Nature. 
I.  The  Universality  of  Law — Nature  necessarily  a  Whole.     §  i. 

A.  This  is  the  Fundamental  Conception  of  the  Mechanical  View  involving 
its  Necessary  Elements.     27 

B.  But    individual    Mediate   Inferences    are    not    all   alike    unquestionable; 
the  Pliability  of  Science — its  Probable  (Pliable)  Elements.     28. 

II.  The  Attempt  at  Strict  Determination  of  Effects. 
A.   By  Tracing  to  the  Final  Elements,  Atoms.     §  2. 

(I)   What  is  Necessary  in  the  Conception  of  Atoms.     29. 

(A)   While  recognizing  the  ideal  elements  in  the  world  as  to  origin, 
as   to  process  search  must  be  directed  to  the  single  Real  Ele- 
ments.    30 
^  (B)  This  search  soon  brings  to  the  assumption  of  Atoms, — count- 

less, invisible,  persistent,  unchangeable.     31. 
(II)  The  Probable  (Pliable)  Elements  in  the  Conception  of  Atoms.  32-36. 
(A)  Science  does  not  assume  the  atoms  as  the  Unconditioned.     32. 


(B)  Does  not  infallibly  settle  the  Identity  of  the  Nature  of  Atoms. 

33. 
i.  Varying  Tendencies  at  work  on  this  point. 

ii.  The  Ancient  Atomatic  Theory  was  one  of  identity,  but  in- 
volved an  inexplicable  primary  construction.     34. 

iii.  The  conception  of  the  Non-Homogeniety  of  i^oms  would 
avoid  this  difficulty  and  admit  of  a  consistent  theory.      34. 

(C)  Science  need  not  deny  the  Immateriality  of  atoms.     35. 

B.  By  Determining  the  Universal  Laws  (of  Motion).     §  §  3  and  4  to  p.  45. 
(I)  The  Law  of  Persistence.     §  3. 

(A)  The  Necessary  Elements  as  held  (not  proved  except  by  expe- 
rience).    36. 

(B)  The  Probable  (Pliable)  Elements.     37. 

i.  We  may  assume  a  direct  action  on  each  other  of  the  Inter- 
nal States  of  Atoms. 
ii.  But  experience  must  and  can  give  only  external  relations, 
iii.  Hence  the  capacity  or  necessity  to  produce  a  given  effect 
never  potentially  exists  in  the  nature  of  a  single  atom  or 
body.     38. 

a.  Since  Action  is  always  a  mutual  relation  and  never  a 
perpetually  inherent  power. 

b.  But  practically  we  may  so  speak. 

iv.  Yet  such  a  mode  of  speech  is  possible  only  on  the  suppo- 
sition that  the  internal  states  leave  the  nature  of  the  atoms 
unaltered;  and  in  this  lies  strictly    the  * 'immutability  of 
material  atoms.'*     39. 
v.  This  assumption   of  unchangeableness  is  to  be  taken  as  a 
general  but  not  necessarily  absolutely  universal  property  of 
the  elements  of  nature      40. 
(II)  The  Law  of  the  Composition  of  Forces.     §  4  to  p.  45. 

(A)  The  Necessary  Elements  as  held  (not  proved  except  by  experi- 
ence).    41. 

i.  The  Notion  of  Resultant  Forces. 
ii.  The  Law  of  the  Equality  of  Action  and  Reaction.     42. 

(B)  The  Probable  (Pliable)  Elements. 

i.  There  is  nothing  necessary  in  the  supposition  (made  in  the 
statement  of  this  Law  of  Composition   of    Forces)  of  the 
indifference  with  which  several  different  forces  act  side  by 
side  in  the  same  element  without  occasioning  any  mutual 
disturbance.     43. 
ii.  Hence  the  Internal  States  of  Atoms  may  influence  their  Ex- 
ternal Relations, 
iii.  And  therefore  the  Experienced  Unchangeableness  of    the 
Laws  of  Action   is  not  to  be  regarded  as  absolutely  neces- 
sary.    44 
III.  Concluding  Inferences.     45-49. 

A.  As  to  the  Results  of  Science  in  the  Explanation  of  Nature.      15. 

B.  As  to  the  General   Bearing  of  Mechanical  Dynamics  on    the  Study   of 
Life.     46. 

(I)  Considerations  leading  to  the  reference  of  all  changes  in  a  body 

either  to  Internal  Movements  of  its  parts  or  to  changes  in  its  Cir- 
cumstances. 


(II)  This  leads  to  the  Rejection  of  a  special  Life  Force  in  organisms.    47. 
(Ill)  But  does  not  require  that  the  Final  Elements  should  be  lifeless  points 
devoid  of  any  internal  nature.     48. 


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CHAPTER  III. 

The  Basis  of  Life. 

The  Inferiority  of  the  Vital  Force  Theory  as  compared  with  the  Mechanical 
Theory  as  an  explanation  of  the  Basis  of  Life. 

Introduction.     General  Comparison  of  the  two  Views.     §  I. 
I.  The  Transitoriness  of  the  Body,  chemically  considered,  cannot  be  regarded  as 
especially  favoring  the  Vital  Force  Theory.     §  2. 

A.  The  inference  of  a  special  Vital  Force  from  the  fact  of  the  Decomposition 
of  the  Dead  Body  is  quite  gratuitous.     51. 

B.  There  is  Decomposition  in  the  Living  Body  also.     52-4. 

(I)  Quite  Similar  to  that  in  the  Dead  Body.     52. 

(II)  The  Differences  may  easily  be  due  to  Diverse  Accessory  Circum- 
stances. 

(A)  The  favorable  circumstances  in  the  Living  Body. 

(B)  The  unfavorable  circumstances  in  the  Dead  Body.     53. 

(C)  The  Study  of  Disease  Confirms  this  View. 

(D)  Hence  there  is  no  need  of  a  Special  Vital  Force. 

C.  The  Description  of  the  Perishableness  of  Organic  Bodies  is  exaggerated. 

54. 

D.  The  Effect  of  the  Change  of  Elements  on  Vitality.  Life  survives  the  De- 
composition, even  in  the  living  body,  only  within  certain  manifest  limi- 
tations. 

II.  The  Propagation  of  Life,  and  Growth,  do  not  Require  a  Special  Life  Force. 

§3- 

A.  In  Propagation,  there  is  no  peculiar  Difficulty  in  the  fact  that  the  vital 

force  is  not  impaired.     56-8. 

(I)  This  fact  is  really  in  harmony  with  the  Theory  of  all  Forces.     56. 
(II)  The  real  Simplicity  of  the  Process  calls  for  no  Impairment  of  En- 
ergy.    57. 

B.  In  Growth.     58-60. 

(I)  The  Increase  of  Frame  should  not  involve  Decrease  of  Energy.     58 
-60. 

(A)  The  supposed  Difficulty  is  due  to  the  common  prejudice  that 
an  Organism  is  a  bundle. 

(B)  In  Reality  added  Material  adds  Power.     59. 

i.  Since  the  Elements  are  not  Indifferent  te  the  Task, 
ii.  And  the  Binding  Ligaments  are  the  peculiar  Forces  of  the 
Elements  themselves. 
(II)  No  Special  Force  is  needed  for  the  Direction  of  Material  in  Growth. 
60. 

(A)  Nearly  an  Impracticable  Task. 

(B)  Wholly  Unnecessary. 

III.  Nor  does  the  Peculiar  Harmony  of  the  Processes  of  the  Body —the  Adjust- 
ing Activity  that  accommodates  itself  to  Circumstances — call  for  a  special 
Vital  Force.     §  4. 


A.  The  Facts  are  Exaggerated.     6i. 

B.  A  somewhat  similar  Adjustment  is  possible  even  in  the  case  of  Machines. 
62. 

C.  Moreover   the  Curative  Reaction  is  possible  only  when   the  Essential 
Character  of  the  Internal  Arrangement  is  unaltered. 

IV.  Nor  does  the  Theory  of  the  Vital  "Idea  of  the  Whole,"  as  a  ruling  principle, 
afford  a  tenable  defense  for  the  Vital  Force  Theory.     §  5. 

A.  The  Facts  seem  to  show  rather  a  System  of  physical  Actions  and  Reac- 
tions.    63. 

B.  A  more  General  Consideration  shows  such  a  system  necessary.     64. 

(I)   The  Idea  of  the  Whole  as  Pattern  and  Plan  is  not  Adequate,     64. 

(A)  Since  it  requires  Universal  Laws  for  its  Realization. 

(B)  And  hence  its  Power  is  only  Apparent,  the  real  Power  being 
the  Original  Arrangement. 

(C)  The  Reason  for  the  Original  Arrangement  lies  outside  the  Pres- 
ent  Investigation. 

(II)  Nor  does  the  Idea  of  the  Whole  as  the  Higher  Bond  afford  an  Ade- 
quate Solution.     65-8. 

(A)  Since  the  Bond  is  really  so  a  Reacting  Part.     66. 

(B)  And  there  is  no  Evidence  of  any  such  Superiority  of  any  One 
Part. 

(C)  The  Added  Supposition  that  the  Bond  is  not  necessarily  De- 
pendent on  Physical  Laws  involves  the  Peculiar  Activity  of  a 
Soul. 

(D)  But  even  the  Hypothesis  of  an  Organizing  Soul  is  less  satisfac- 
tory than  the  Mechanical  Theory.     67. 

V.  Conclusion,     g  6. 

A.  The  Differences  between  Machines  and  the  Productions  of  Nature.  68-73. 

(I)  Not  in  the  Capacity  of  Excitation.     68-70. 

(A)  For  in  both  Inorganic  and  Organic  Composite  Bodies,  the  final 
effect  depends  much  on  the  Internal  Connection  of  Parts,  in- 
volving capacity  of  Excitation.     68. 

(B)  This  Capacity  of  Excitation  is  no  less  characteristic  of  the  Sim- 
pUst  Substratum,  since  results  everywhere  depend  also  on  Inner 
Nature.     69. 

(II)  The  Real  Differences  between  Machines  and  Organisms.     70-73. 

(A)  The  Limitations  of  Human  Machines  in  the  Restriction  to 
rigid  Instruments  already  prepared,  in  the  External  Connection  of 
their  Parts,  and  in  that  the  Impetus  is  almost  always  received 
from  without. 

(B)  This  is  all  Different  in  the  Agencies  of  Nature.     71. 

i.  Even  Inorganic  Nature  is  very  Different  from  human  Ma- 
chines. 
ii.  Still  more  Organic  Nature.     72. 

B.  Final  Restatement  of  the  Grounds  for  holding  the  Mechanical  Theory  of 
the  Basis  of  Life.     73-74. 

(I)  Not  from  a  Disregard  of  Ideal  Considerations.     73. 
(II)  But  from  the  Conviction  that  Nature  necessarily  forms  a  Whole. 
(Ill)  And  from  the  Failure  of  the  Theory  of  a  Special  Vital  Force. 


1 


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CHAPTER  IV. 
The  Mechanism  of  Life. 

The  Difference  between  Organic  and  Inorganic  Bodies  as  to  three  of  the  four 
Modes  of  Occurrence  of  Processes  in  the  Body— Constant  and  Periodic  Opera- 
tions, Progressive  Development,  and  Reaction  against  Chance  Impressions.  (Cf. 
Chap.  VI.) 

Introduction. 

A.  Summary  Review  of  Chapters  I.-III,  and  Transition  to  Chapter  IV.     75. 

B.  Introductory  Statement  of  the  four  Modes  of  Occurrence  of  Processes  in 
Living  Bodies.     76. 

I.  The  Differences  between   Organic  and  Inorganic    Bodies  even  in  Constant 
and  Periodic  Operations.     Both  Operations  are  brought  about  by  far  more 
complicated  processes  in  the  Organic.     77~79' 
II.  The  Differences  in  the  Third  Mode  of  Occurrence  of  Processes— Progressive 
Development. 

A.  No  Progressive  Development  in  the  Inorganic,  only  imperfect  anticipa- 
tions (as  in  the  planetary  system),  helping  to  understand  the  Peculiarity 
of  Life.     79-80. 

B.  Progressive  Development  in  the  Organic.     80-98. 

(I)  Requires  External  Influences  for  its  Development. 

(II)  But,  in  particular,  involves  the  Extensive  application  of   Chemical 
"^  Affinities  and  Molecular  Forces.     §  2. 

(A)  Giving  the  Living  Body  the  advantage  of  a  Compact  unchang- 
ing and  yet  not  rigid  but  Movable  Figure.     81. 

(B)  Also  securing  to  the  Living  Body  the  advantage  of  the  Absence 
of  an  exceedingly  intimate  Connection  of  Parts.     82. 

i.  Saving  it  from  endless  Disturbances. 

ii.  Yet  making  possible  the  finest  Connections,  where  and  a$ 
necessary. 

(C)  Bringing  about  at   each   moment  a  new  foundation  for  subse- 
quent Development.     83. 

(D)  And  Helping  to  the  Explanation  of  the  Development  of  Forms 
from  Formless  Germs. 

Introduction.     No  spontaneous  Generation  now. 
i.  The  First  Stages  in  the  Process.     84. 

a.  The  Possible  Production  of  the  Germ. 

b.  The  Mutual  Reaction  of  Conformation  and  Stimuli. 
New  Habits  of  Chemical  Action,  especially  the  Influence  of 
the  enclosing  Tissues  themselves.     85. 
The  Effect  of  Different   Periods  of  Growth   on  Different 
Parts.     86. 

(III)  The  Differences   in   the  large  use  of  Unremitting  Change  of  Ma- 
terial.    §3-5. 
Introduction. 

i.  Much  less  constant  change  of  Material  in  Vegetable  than  in 

Animal  Life.     86. 
ii.  The  Need  of  Constant  Repair  of  Capacities  in  the  Animal 
Body.     87. 
(A)  The  Significance  for  the  general  ends  of  life  of  this  Perpetual 
Change  of  Material.     It  is  the  simplest  means  of  Repair.     §  3. 


11. 


111. 


\ 


9 


I. 


1. 


11. 


111. 


IV. 


11. 


111. 


It  avoids  the  necessity  of  Remedial  Reaction  for  every 
Disturbance,  using  instead  the  stratagem  of  perpetual  Re- 
treat.    89. 

Even  makes  possible  the  Efficacy  of  the  Remedial  Reac- 
tions which  do  occur.     90. 

Yet  it  is  not  so  universal  but  that  it  admits  always  a  Regu- 
lar Nucleus. 

The  Processes  of  the  change  may  themselves  yield  just  those 
Motive  shocks  which  life  requires  for  Development.     91. 
(B)  The  Modg  of  the  change,  that  is,  the  definite  Chemical  Processes 
producing  the  change.     §  4. 
i.  The  Processes  in  the  Vegetable  World  prepare  for  Animal 
Life.     92. 
The  Processes  in  the  Animal  Body.     93. 

a.  The  Progressive  Formation  of  the  Constituents  of  the 
Body. 

b.  The  Retrogressive  Conversion  for  Death.     95. 
The  Various   Functions  of  Water  in    the  Living  Body, — 
Vegetable  and  Animal.     96. 

(C;  The  Organs  of  the  Change — or   the   Resulting   Steps   in  the 
Building  up  of  the  Organism — Cells,  Fibres,  Organs.     §  5. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Structure  of  the  Animal  Body. 

Some  of  the  Main  Features  of  the  Structure  and  Operations  of  the  Human 
Body,  as  employing  Mechanical  and  Chemical  Agencies. 
Introduction. 
I.  The  Bony  Framework.     §  i. 

A.  The  Bones  of  the  Head.     lOO. 

B.  The  Spinal  Column. 

C.  Ribs  and  Pelvis.     loi. 

D.  The  Limbs.     102. 

II.  The  Muscles  and  the  Motor  Nerves.     §  2, 

A.  The  Muscles.     102-105. 

(I)  Their  Structure. 
(II)  Their  Movements.     103. 

(Ill)  Conclusion. — They  show  the  manifest  use  of  Mechanical  Contriv- 
ances.    104. 

B.  The  Motor  Nerves. 

(I)  Their  Structure. 
(O)  Their  Operations  are  due  to  some  Change  in  their  physical  condition, 
ni.  The  Vascular  System  and  Circulation  of  Blood,  as  showing  Mechanical  and 
Chemical  Agencies.     §  3. 

A.  Description  of  the  Structure  and  Mechanical  Operations  of  the  Vascular 
System.     106-108. 

B.  The  Chemical  Processes  in  the  Vascular  System  for  Nutrition  and  Heat, 
108-110. 

rV.  Respiration.     §  4. 

Introduction  to  Remainder  of  Chapter,     iio. 


A.  Description  of  Structures.     110-112. 

(I)  Pulmonary  Circulation,     no. 
(II)  Windpipe  and  Lungs.      III. 

B.  The  involved  Processss. 

V.  Nutrition.     113-118. 

Introductory  Transition. — The  Relation  of  the  Digestive  and  Respiratory 
Systems. 

A.  Digestion.     §  5. 

(I)  Description  of  the  Alimentary  Canal  and  its  Dependencies.     113. 
(II)  The  Process  of  Digestion  in  the  Stomach.     114. 
(Ill)  The  Process  of  Digestion  in  the  rest  of  the  alimentary  canal. 

(A)  The  Liver  and  its  influence  on  Digestion. 

(B)  The  general  Purport  of  the  Chemical  Processes  in  the  reciprocal 
actions  involved  in  Digestion. 

B.  Assimilation.     §  6  to  118. 

(I)  The  Vessels  in  Assimilation.     1 16. 
(II)  The  Involved  Mechanical  and  Chemical  Processes. 
(Ill)  The  Changes  in  the  Blood. 

VI.  Excretion.     118- 120. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Conservation  of  Life. 

A  few  Examples  of  the  Physical  and  Organic  Compensation  of  Disturbances 
(the  fourth  Form  of  Occurrence  of  Processes  in  the  Organic  Body,  cf.  Chap.  IV.) 
for  the  Preservation  of  the  Bodily  Form,  and  of  the  Capacity  of  Vital  Operations. 

General  Introduction.     §  i. 

A.  Transition  to  the  Subject.     121. 

B.  Statement  of  the  three   Forms  of  the  Compensation  of  Disturbances. 
122-124. 

(I)  The  simple  Physical.     122. 
(II)  The  Organic. 
(Ill)  The  Psychical.     123. 
I.  The  Simple  Physical  Compensation  of  Disturbances.     §  2. 

A.  Mechanical  Adjustments.     124. 

(I)  Muscular  Movement. 
(II)   Favorable  Relations. 
(Ill)  Circulation  of  the  Blood.  ^ 

B.  Chemical  Adjustments,  especially  in   maintaining  the  Normal  Composi- 
tion of  the  Blood.     125-128. 

(I)  In  directing  the  amoflnt  of  Absorption  and  Renewal  in  the  general 

circulation.     125. 
(II)  In  the  action  on  the  Secretory  Organs,  as  removing  surplus  water 
and  salts  from  the  blood.      126. 
(Ill)  In  the  various  processes  for  the  Removal  of  Organic  Ingredients 
from  the  blood.     127. 

(A)  As  regularly   determined  by   the  Composition   of    the   Blood 
itself. 
'  (B)  In  case  of  Hindrance  of  Secretion  by  some  organ. 

i.  The  organic  ingredients  seek  other  Egress, 
ii.  Substitutory  Processes.     128. 


lO 


II.  The  Organic  Compensation  of  Disturbances.     §  3. 
Introduction.     128-129. 

(I)  The  Need  of  Organic  Compensation. 

(A)  The  Physical  may  be  involved. 

(B)  The  merely  Physical  are  often  inadequate. 
(II)  Preliminary  Survey  of  the  Nervous  System. 

(A)  Cerebro  spinal  System. 

(B)  The  Sympathetic  System. 

A.  Description  of  the  Sympathetic  System  as  the  Chief  Means  for  Organic 
Compensation.      129-131. 

B.  The  Influence  of  the  Sympathetic  System.     131-135. 

(I)  Upon  Various  Organic  Processes. 

(A)  The  Intestines. 

(B)  The  Vascular  Trunks. 

(C)  The  Heart. 

(11)   How  far  it  fills  the  Office  of  Sensory  Nerves.     132. 

(III)  Influence   on   Changes   in    Composition   of  the  Corporeal  Juices. 
Possible  Methods.     133. 

(A)  Change  in  Membranes. 

(B)  Direct  Chemical  Action  of  the  Nerves. 

(IV)  General  Summary  of  the  Influence  of  the  Sympathetic  System  upon 
the  Conservation  of  Life.     134. 

(A)  The  simple  Sympathetic  System  alone. 

(B)  As  supplemented  by  the  Cerebro-Spinal  System.      135. 

(C)  The  necessary  Mental  Supplement  in  Animal  Life. 

III.  Conclusion  of  Book  L— Consequent  General  Sketch  of  Life.     Corroborating 
the  Mechanical  View.     §  4. 

A.  The  Lack  of  Unity  in  the  Living  Body. 

B.  The  Inconstancy  of  the  Living  Body. 

C.  The  Dependence  of  the  Living  Body. 


BOOK  II. 
THE  SOUL. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Existence  of  the  Soul. 

An  Examination  of  the  Three  Chief  Characteristics,  (Freedom  of  Will,  the 
Incomparability  of  Psychical  and  Physical  Processes,  and  the  Unity  of  Conscious- 
ness,) held  to  diff"erentiate  the  Psychic  L=fe  from  the  whole  Course  of  Nature, 
and  so  furnish  Grounds  for  the  Belief  in  the  Existence  of  the  Soul. 

Introduction.     §  i. 

A.  The  Question  Stated.     143. 

B.  The  universal  Prejudice  in   favor  of   the  belief  in    the   Existence  of  the 
Soul  in  opposition  to  experience. 

I.  The  First  Differentiation— Freedom  of  Will.     144-148. 


1       ! 

;  I 


II 


A.  Experience  does  not  prove  the  Fact  nor  the  Value  of  Freedom.    .145-147. 

(I)  The  Incalculableness  of  Conduct  is  in  harmony  with  the  universal 
Phenomena  of  Excitability .     145. 

(A)  The  Fact  of  Incalculableness. 

(B)  Internal  Relations  are  always  Obscure. 

(C)  And  hence  the  Necessary  Connection  seems  broken.     146. 

(II)  The  Ethical  Need  of  Freedom  is  not  Universally  nor  Clearly  Held. 
(Ill)  The  Prevalence  of  Law  in  the  greater  part  of  Psychic  Life  is  ad- 
mitted. 

B.  But  neither  does  Experience  prove  the  Non-existence  of  Freedom.  The 
unbroken  connection  between  mental  phenomena  and  corporeal  changes 
proves  only  that  the  latter  are  a  set  of  conditions.      147. 

II.  The  Second  Diff^erentiation — the  Incomparability  of  Psychical  and  Physical 
Processes.     148-152. 

A.  The  Fact.     148. 

B.  The  Consequent  Necessity  of  Two  Diverse  Grounds  of  Explanation. 

(I)  The  Reason  for  the  Right  of   insisting  on  Diverse  Grounds.     149. 
(II)  The  Right  claimed  only  as  in  Natural  Science. 

C.  The  Hypothesis  of  the  Union  of  the  Psychical  and  Physical  in  the  Same 
Being.     §  3. 

Introduction.     The  Question  stated.     150. 
(I)   Still  a  Double  Being. 
(II)  The  Justification  and  the  Barrenness  of  the  View.     151. 

(A)  Its  Justification  is  that  it  sets  aside  Crass  Materialism. 

(B)  Its  Barrenness.      152. 

i.   It  gives  no  Real  Explanation. 
ii.  Is  at  most  Unfruitful. 

iii.  Out  of  harmony  with  later  Considerations. 
III.  The  Third  Differentiation — Unity  of  Consciousness.     §  4-6. 

A.  What  it  is  not,  and  what  it  really  is.     §  4. 

(I)  Not  that  the  Number  of  Beings   inhabiting   an   Organic  Form  is 
limited.     152. 
(II)  Not  that  we  have  a  Persistent  Consciousness  of  the  Unity  of  our 
being.     154. 

(III)  But  the  Unity  of  a  Being  Conscious  of  Itself.     155. 

(IV)  Yet  not  that  the  Consciousness  of  the  Unity  of  our  Being  is  a  direct 
Guaranty  of  that  Unity.     156-158. 

(A)  What  is  not  the  ground  of  our  Unity.      156. 

(B)  The  Belief  rests  on  the  fact  of  our  being  able  to  appear  to  our- 
selves at  all.     157. 

i.  The  Statement, 
ii.  The  Source  of  Difficulty  is  in  the  loose  use  of  "Appearance." 

B.  Impossibility  of  explaining  Unity  of  Consciousness  as  a  Combination  of 
a  Plurality  of  Eff"ects.     §  5. 

(I)  The  Argument  from  the  Analogy  of  the  Law  of  Composition  of 
Motions  rests  on  an  Inaccuracy  in  its  expression.     158. 

(II)  Strictly  interpreted,  the  Analogy  indicates  that  a  plurality  of  sep- 
arate operations  becomes  one  only  as  the  States  of  one  Body.  159-161. 

(Ill)  Thus  the  Conception  of  a  Soul  is  the  best  Explanation  of  Mental 
Phenomena.     i6i. 
(A)  The  Explanation  of  Consciousness. 


10 

II.  The  Organic  Compensation  of  Disturbances.     §  3. 
Introduction.     128-129. 

(I)  The  Need  of  Organic  Compensation. 

(A)  The  Physical  may  be  involved. 

(B)  The  merely  Physical  are  often  inadequate. 
(II)  Preliminary  Survey  of  the  Nervous  System. 

(A)  Cerebro-spinal  System. 

(B)  The  Sympathetic  System. 

A.  Description  of  the  Sympathetic  System  as  the  Chief  Means  for  Organic 
Compensation.     129-131. 

B.  The  Influence  of  the  Sympathetic  System.      131-135. 

(I)  Upon  Various  Organic  Processes. 

(A)  The  Intestines. 

(B)  The  Vascular  Trunks. 

(C)  The  Heart. 

(II)  How  far  it  fills  the  Office  of  Sensory  Nerves.     132. 

(III)  Influence   on    Changes    in    Composition    of   the  Corporeal   Juices. 
Possible  Methods.     133. 

(A)  Change  in  Membranes. 

(B)  Direct  Chemical  Action  of  the  Nerves. 

(IV)  General  Summary  of  the  Influence  of  the  Sympathetic  System  upon 
the  Conservation  of  Life.     134. 

(A)  The  simple  Sympathetic  System  alone. 

(B)  As  supplemented  by  the  Cerebro-Spinal  System.     135. 

(C)  The  necessary  Menial  Supplement  in  Animal  Life. 

III.  Conclusion  of  Book  I.-Consequent  General  Sketch  of  Life.     Corroborating 
the  Mechanical  View.     §  4. 

A.  The  Lack  of  Unity  in  the  Living  Body. 

B.  The  Inconstancy  of  the  Living  Body. 

C.  The  Dependence  of  the  Living  Body. 


BOOK  II. 
THE  SOUL. 


CHAPTER  J. 

The  Existence  of  the  Sota. 

An  Examination  of  the   Three  Chief  Characteristics,  (Freedom  of  Will   the 
Incomparability  of  Psychical  and  Physical  Processes,  and  the  Unity  of  Conscious- 
ness,) held  to   diff-erentiate  the  Psychic  L^fe  from  the  whole  Course  of  Nature 
and  so  furnish  Grounds  for  the  Belief  in  the  Existence  of  the  Soul. 

Introduction.     §  i. 

A.  The  Question  Stated.     143. 

B.  The  universal  Prejudice  in  favor  of  the  belief  in    the   Existence  of  the 
Soul  in  opposition  to  experience. 

I.  The  First  Differentiation— Freedom  of  Will.     144-148. 


II 

A.  Experience  does  not  prove  the  Fact  nor  the  Value  of  Freedom.     145-147, 

(I)  The  Incalculableness  of  Conduct  is  in  harmony  with   the  universal 
Phenomena  of  Excitability.     145. 

(A)  The  Fact  of  Incalculableness. 

(B)  Internal  Relations  are  always  Obscure. 

(C)  And  hence  the  Necessary  Connection  seems  broken.     146. 

(II)  The  Ethical  Need  of  Freedom  is  not  Universally  nor  Clearly  Held. 
(Ill)  The  Prevalence  of  Law  in  the  greater  part  of  Psychic  Life  is  ad- 
mitted. 

B.  But  neither  does  Experience  prove  the  Non-existence  of  Freedom.  The 
unbroken  connection  between  mental  phenomena  and  corporeal  changes 
proves  only  that  the  latter  are  a  set  of  conditions.      147. 

II.  The  Second  Diff"erentiation — the  Incomparability  of  Psychical  and  Physical 
Processes.     148-152. 

A.  The  Fact.     148. 

B.  The  Consequent  Necessity  of  Two  Diverse  Grounds  of  Explanation. 

(I)  The  Reason  for  the  Right  of   insisting  on  Diverse  Grounds.     149. 
(II)  The  Right  claimed  only  as  in  Natural  Science. 

C.  The  Hypothesis  of  the  Union  of  the  Psychical  and  Physical  in  the  Same 
Being.     §  3. 

Introduction.     The  Question  stated.     150. 
(I)  Still  a  Double  Being. 
(II)  The  Justification  and  the  Barrenness  of  the  View.      151. 

(A)  Its  Justification  is  that  it  sets  aside  Crass  Materialism. 

(B)  Its  Barrenness.      152. 

i.   It  gives  no  Real  Explanation. 
ii.  Is  at  most  Unfruitful. 

iii.  Out  of  harmony  with  later  Considerations. 
III.  The  Third  Differentiation — Unity  of  Consciousness.     §  4-6. 

A.  What  it  is  not,  and  what  it  really  is.     §  4. 

(I)  Not  that  the  Number  of  Beings   inhabiting   an   Organic  Form  is 
limited.     152. 
(II)  Not  that  we  have  a  Persistent  Consciousness  of  the  Unity  of  our 
being.     154. 

(III)  But  the  Unity  of  a  Being  Conscious  of  Itself.     155. 

(IV)  Yet  not  that  the  Consciousness  of  the  Unity  of  our  Being  is  a  direct 
Guaranty  of  that  Unity.      156-158. 

(A)  What  is  not  the  ground  of  our  Unity.      156. 

(B)  The  Belief  rests  on  the  fact  of  our  being  able  to  appear  to  our- 
selves at  all.     157. 

i.  The  Statement. 
ii.  The  Source  of  Difficulty  is  in  the  loose  use  of  *' Appearance." 

B.  Impossibility  of  explaining  Unity  of  Consciousness  as  a  Combination  of 
a  Plurality  of  Effects.     §  5. 

(I)  The  Argument  from  the  Analogy  of  the  Law  of  Composition  of 
Motions  rests  on  an  Inaccuracy  in  its  expression.     158. 

(II)  Strictly  interpreted,  the  Analogy  indicates  that  a  plurality  of  sep- 
arate operations  becomes  one  only  as  the  States  of  one  Body.  159-161. 

(Ill)  Thus  the  Conception  of  a  Soul  is  the  best  Explanation  of  Mental 
Phenomena.     l6l. 
(A)  The  Explanation  of  Consciousness. 


12 

(B)  Even  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  Psychic  Life  in  all  Matter.    162. 
C.  There  is  even  a  Distinct  Contrast  between  Relating  Knowledge  and  the 
Composition  of  Physical  Effects.     §  6. 

(I)  All  our  Ideas  preserve  the  Same  Content  through  all  Vicissitudes. 
163. 

(II)  Especially  does  Comparison  require  Distinction  at  the  very  moment 

of  Relating.     164-165. 
(Ill)   Conclusion  of  Section.      165-166. 
Conclusion  of  Chapter.     The  Supposition  of  the  Existence  of  a  supersensuous 
Soul,  as  distinct  from  the  material  Body,  is  the  best  present  Hypothesis.     §  7. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Nature  and  Faculties  of  the  Soul. 
An  Examination  of  the  Considerations  opposing  and  favoring  the  Doctrine  of 
the  Mental  Faculties,  and  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul  so  far  as  it  can  be  known  to  us. 
I.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Mental  Faculties.     §  1-3. 
Introduction.     How  it  arose.     168. 

A.  Considerations  Opposing  the  Doctrineof  the  Faculties.    Its  Defects  as  com- 
pared  with  the  physical  Doctrine  of  Energy.     §  i. 

(I)  Does  not  define  the  Laws  of  Action.     169. 

(II)  The  mental  Faculties  are  Incomparable  with  each  other.     170. 

(III)  We  are  unable  to  state  precisely  the  Conditions  of  mental  phenom- 
ena.    171. 

(A)  The  Faculties  are  not  Energies  constantly  exercised. 

(B)  Their  Genesis  has  been  too  little  investigated. 

(IV)  Hence  the  Doctrine  has  lost  sight  of  the  proper  End  of  Science— 
the  Search  for  Causal  Connection,  which  would  teach  us  to  discern 
the  future.     172. 

B.  Considerations  Favoring  the  Doctrine.     §  2-3. 

(I)  Negative  Considerations.     §  2. 

(A)  The  Doctrine  of  the  Plurality  of  the  Faculties  is  not  incompat- 
ible with  the  Soul's  Unity,  but  rather  arises  naturally  out  of 
the  very  conception  of  that  Unity.      173. 

(B)  The  Doctrine  is  no  more  Unfruitful  for  the  purposes  of  Explana- 
tion than  the  single  conception  of  the  Unity  of  the  Soul.  Both 
theories  are  compelled  to  accept  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Variety 

-     /  of  Psychic  Manifestations.     174. 

(C)  Nor  is  any  theory  of  Original  and  Derived  Faculties  able  to  set 
aside  the  Plurality  of  the  Faculties  ;  although  the  Derivation  of 
many  of  the  Mental  Powers  may  be  freely  admitted,  e.  g. 
Judgment  and  Imagination.     175. 

(II)  Positive  Considerations.  Impossibility  of  a  Single  Primitive  Fac- 
ulty.  No  Derivation  can  take  us  beyond  the  threefold  division  of 
Thought,  Feeling,  and  Will.     §  3. 

(A)  Statement  of  the  Question,  Is  there  a  single  primitive  Frculty  ? 
177.  ' 

(B)  Examination  shows  that  Thought,  Feeling  and  Will  do  not 
necessarily  involve  one  another.     178. 


J 


13 

(C)  Yet  the  Whole  Soul  is  Active  in  each,  though  in  a  one-sided 
way.      180. 

(D)  Yet,  again,  the  Trinity  of  the  Faculties  may  be  final.     i8i. 
II.  The  Nature  of  the  Soul.     §  4-7. 

A.  The  Nature  of  the  Soul  is  a  constant  Element  in  the  production  of  the 
Higher  Reactions.     The  Soul  is  not  an  indifferent  Stage.     §  4. 

(I)  The  Theory  that  the  Higher  Reactions  are  due  solely  to  Elabora- 
tion of  Simple  Sensations.     181. 
(II)  The  true  theory  of  the  Influence  of  the  Soul  in  these  Higher  Reac- 
tions.    182. 

(A)  The  Statement  of  the  Theory. 

(B)  The   Theory  Illustrated   in  the  Contrast  between   Plant  and 
Psychic  Life.      183. 

B.  The  Mutability  of  the  Soul  and  its  Limits.     §  5. 

(I)  Objection  :  The  Mutability  implied  in  the  preceding  section  is  an- 
tagonistic to  strict  Unity,  which  appears  to  leave  no  room  for  Varia- 
tion.    184. 
(II)  This  Charge  may  be  admitted  and  yet  the  Mutability  is  to  be  held. 
185-188. 

(A)  Else  there  would  be  no  Center  for  Action.     186. 

(B)  This  Mutability  does  not  involve  any  risk  of  a  Meaningless 
Variation. 

i.  Nothing  IS  completely  determined  from  without, 
ii.  The  Inner  Nature  may  be  more  effective  than  all  other  In- 
fluences. 

(C)  There  is,  in  fact,  less  Mutability  in  the  Soul  than  could  easily 
be  Vindicated.     187. 

C.  The  Nature  of  the  Soul  is  to  be  known  only  through  its  Acts.     §  6-7. 

Introduction.      188. 

(I)  This  Limitation  is  equally  true  of  all  other  things.      §  6. 
(II)   Nor  does  it  involve  the  Loss  of  much  that  is  of  Importance.     §  7. 

(A)  The  true  Essence  lies  in  that  which  the  Subject  of  the  Devel- 
opment has  become^  not  in  a  bare  Primitive  Soul.     190. 

(B)  The  Real  Question  sought  to  be  answered — How  the  Soul  came 
to  be — is  Insoluble.     191. 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  Train  of  Ideas. 

An  Examination  of  the  General  Conjectures  which  may  be  gathered  from  a  Re- 
view of  the  Main  Outlines  of  our  Inner  Experience,  in  order  to  reach  a  more 
Definite  Insight  into  the  Laws  of  Psychic  Life  in  the  Train  of  Ideas. 
Introduction  to  Chapter.     §  i. 

The  Peculiar  Difficulties  in  the  Explanation  of  Mental  Life,  as  compared 
with  Bodily  Life,  and  with  Physical  Nature. 

A.  Most  of  the  Conditions  in  Mental  Life  precede  Experience.     193. 

B.  The  Laws  even  of  Present  Experience  are  Obscure.     194. 

C.  Thus  arise  Great  and  Peculiar  Difficulties  in  the  Explanation  of  Mental 
Life. 

I.  The  Examination  of  different  more  or  less  Adequate  General  Conjectures  for 
the  Explanation  of  the  Train  of  Ideas.     §  2-4. 


/" 


14 

A.  Conjectures  as  to  How  Ideas  Persist.     196-197. 

(I)  Not  a  Self-evident  Result  of  a  universal  Law  of  Persistence.    196. 
(II)  Yet  Facts  seem  to  necessitate  the  Assumption  of  this  Persistence. 

197. 
(Ill)  And  it  is  the  Condition  of  any  possible  Mental  Synthesis. 

B.  Conjectures  as  to  How  Ideas  are  Expelled  from  Consciousness,  or  How 
the  Train  of  Ideas  is  determined.     §  2-4. 

(I)  In  general,  we  may  recognize  fully  that  Ideas  are  expelled   from 
Consciousness  by  the  Influence  of  other  Ideas.      197. 

(A)  Experience  shows  this. 

(B)  But  it  does  not  follow  from  the  Unity  of  the  Soul. 

(C)  We  must  therefore  seek  an  Explanation  in  the  Nature  of  Con- 
sciousness.    198. 

(II)  We  are  to  examine,  therefore,  first,  the  Conjecture  of  the  N'arrow- 
ness  of  Consciousness  as  the  Ground  for  the  Expelling  Influence  of 

Ideas.     §  2. 

(A)  The  Shortcomings  of  the  Vulgar  Conceptions  of  the  Nature  of 
Consciousness.      198. 

i.  Consciousness  as  a  Space  of  Limited  Extent, 
ii.   Consciousness  as  a  Light, 
iii.  Even  the  Conception  of  Consciousness  as  an  Exhaustible 
Force  fails  to  explain  the  Alternation  of  Consciousness  and 
Unconsciousness.      199. 

(B)  The  Answer  of  Common  Opinion  to  this  last  Difficulty,  in  the 
Theory  of  the  Persistence  of  Impressions  but  not  of  Conscious- 
ness. 

(C)  An  Examination  of  the  Tacit  Assumption  underlying  this  An- 
swer, viz.:  that  the  Whole  Process  is  a  Sequence  of  two  events, 
an  Impression  and  a  Vital  Reaction.     200-202. 

i.  This  is  true  in  ordinary  composite  Forms  of  Being.  200. 
ii.   In  the  Simple  Nature  of  the  Soul  it  is  at  least  not  neces- 
sary ;  there  may  be  absolute  Simultaneity. 
iii.  The  Appeal  to  Experience  leaves  the  Question  Unsettled. 
201. 

a.  The  Process  of  Sensation  favors  the  Conception  of  Simul- 
taneity— no  unconscious  Psychic  Stimulation. 

b.  But  the  Facts  of  Forgetting  seem  to  imply  Sequence 
rather — some  Reciprocal  Action  between  the  Conscious 
and  the  Unconscious.     202. 

(III)  The  Uncertainty  as  to  the  Narrowness  of  Consciousness  compels 
the  Examination  of  the  more  detailed  Conjectures,  for  explaining 
the  Expelling  Influence  of  Ideas,  made  by  the  two  opposed  Theo- 
ries of  the  Nature  of  Consciousness — The  Theories  of  its  essential 
Narrowness  and  of  its  indefinite  Extent.     §  3-4. 

Introduction  to  Sections  3  and  4.     202. 

The  Two  Opposed  Theories  of  Consciousness. 
(A)  Examination  of  the   Conjectures  made  by  the  Theory  of  the 
Narrowness  of  Consciousness.     §  3. 
Introduction.     203. 

The  Two  Conjectures  to  be  examined— J/r^«^A  of  Ideas, 


i 


|t    : 


l» 


15 

and  Contrast  of  Ideas — both  fail  to  explain  why  Ideas  do 
not  blend.     203. 
i.  Examination  of  the  Conception  of  Degrees  of  Strength  of 
Ideas,  as  explaining  the  Expelling  Influence  of  Ideas.  203- 
209. 

a.  The  possible  Threefold  Meaning  of  Strength  as  applied 
to  Ideas. 

(i)  Amount  of  Content, 
(ii)   Intensity  of  Stimulation — Disturbance, 
(iii)  Influence  on  the  Train  of  Ideas. 

b.  Their  Application  to  Remembered  Ideas  (the  most  favor- 
able case  for  the  Theory  of  the  Narrowness  of  Conscious- 
ness cf.  p.  201)  in  the  Train  of  Ideas.     204-206. 

(i)  The  Second  Meaning  can  have  no  application  here. 

There  is  no  Disturbance  in  Memory  as  such.   205. 
(ii)  The  First  Meaning  is  also  without  application,  since 
Contents  do  not  blend,  and  the  Activity  is  unvary- 
ingly the  same, 
(iii)  While   the   Third   Meaning    assumes    the   Answer 
sought.     206. 

c.  The  very  Conception  of  numberless  Degrees  of  Strength 
or  Clearness  of  Ideas,  making  possible  a  steady  and 
gradual  obscuring,  is  a  Mistaken  Inference. 

(i)   Direct  Observation  of  the  Process  is  impossible, 
(ii)  The  Facts  seem  rather  to  show  many  and  abrupt 
pauses  in  this  obscuration. 

(a)  In  Ideas  of  Simple  Sv^nsation,  the  seeming  Dif- 
ference of  Strength  is  due  to  Altered  Content. 
207. 

(b)  In  Compound  Perceptions,  the  growing  Indis- 
tinctness is  due  : 

1.  Either  to  the  Falling  away  of  certain  Parts. 

2.  Or  the  Loss  of  Connection  with  other  Ideas. 
208. 

d.  Conclusion  as  to  Strength  of  Ideas.  The  Expelling  In- 
fluence of  an  Idea  does  not  depend  on  its  Strength.  209. 

ii.  Examination  of  the  Conception  of  the   Contrast  of  Ideas, 
209-2 1 1 . 

a.  The  Facts  as  to  present  Sensations  do  not  favor  the  the- 
ory of  Contrast,  as  the  Expelling  Influence. 

b.  Self- Observation  as  to  Ideas  proper  does  not  favor  the 
Theory. 

(B)  The  Attempt  to  find  a  more  adequate  Conjecture  for  the  Ex- 
pelling Influence  of  Ideas,  upon  the  Theory  of  the  Indefinite 
Extent  of  Consciousness,  leading  to  the  Assumption  of  a  mov- 
ing Inner  Sense — a  fluctuating  light  of  combining   attention. 

§4. 

Introductory  Transition.     211. 
i.  The  Facts  as  to  the  Indefinite  Extent  of  Consciousness. 
212-213. 


i6 

a.  * 'Narrowness"  of  Consciousness  does  not  seem  to  hold 
true  for  Sensations  proper.     212. 

b.  It  does  seem  to  be  true  as  to  Memory,  which  seems  to 
require  Sequence  in  Ideas. 

c.  Yet  Relating  Knowledge  guarantees  the  Simultaneity  of 
a  Plurality  of  Ideas. 

ii.  The  Condition  of  Extent  of  Consciousness  is  the  Discern- 
ment of  Relations — the  Inner  Sense.     The  Extent  of  Con- 
sciousness is  not  therefore  definitely  fixed  but  depends  upon 
power  in  using  the  Relating  Faculty.     213. 
II.  The  Laws  guiding  the  Train  of  Ideas  are  the  Laws  of  Association  and  Re- 
production.    §  5. 
Transition  and  Introduction.     214. 
The  Laws  of  the  Inner  Sense  have  not  yet  been  stated. 

A.  The  necessarily  Admitted  but  Finally  Inexplicable  Fact  of  the  Associa- 
tion of  Ideas  in  Unconsciousness.     215. 

B.  The  Conditions  under  which  these  Associations  occur,  or  the  Conditions 
of  the  Reproduction  of  Ideas.     216-218. 

(I)  The  final  Condition  is  previous  Association  or  Affinity.     216. 
(II)  This  includes  all  special  conditions. 
(Ill)  The  Direction   of  Mental  Growth  will  determine  which  mode  of 
Reproduction  shall  predominate.     217. 

C.  The  Grounds  of  Decision  between  different  Associations  called  up  (or  the 
Reason  for  the  Expelling  Influence  of  Ideas)  are  a  constantly  altering 
degree  of  Affinity  between  Ideas,  and  a  constantly  changing  degree  of 
Interest. 

D.  This  great  Complexity  of  the  Conditions  produces  the  seemingly  Wanton 
Play  in  the  Train  of  Ideas.     219. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Forms  of  Relating  Knowledge. 

The  Necessity,  Preconditions,  and  Forms  of  Relating  Knowledge. 

I.  The  Necessity  of  Relating  Knowledge.     Knowledge  of  any  Whole  involves 
a  knowledge  of  Two  Kinds  of  Relations.     §  i. 

A.  Relations  involved  in  the  Discernment  of  an  Order  in  Time.     220-222. 
(I)  Both  Ordered  Memory  and  Intelligent  Apprehension  of  a  Whole  re- 
quire some   Systematic   Arrangement  of   the   several   Impressions 
from  the  first.     220. 
(II)  A  Proposed  Explanation  of  the  Nature  of  the  Arrangement,  as  due 
to  Gradual  Diminution  of  the  Impression.     221. 

(A)  Graduation  in  Impressions.  ' 

(B)  Graduation  in  Recollection. 

(Ill)  The  Necessity  for  so  Complex  an  Explanation.     222. 

(A)  Not  simply  to  account  for  the  Order  of  Repetition.  Repetition 
in  the  same  Order  was  to  be  expected. 

(B)  But  such  Repetition  in  Memory  is  not  clear  as  a  Fact. 

(C)  And,  the  Perception  having  been  once  completed,  the  thing  to 
be  explained  was  why  Memory  does  not  now  recall  the  Whole 
at  once. 


i 


\r 


1 

f 


17 

B.  Relations  involved  in  the  Idea  of  a  Connection  of  Ideas,  or  in  Knowledge 
of  a  Change  of  Knowledge.     223-226. 
(I)  Real  Understanding  of  a  Whole  requires  the  Discernment  of  a  Con- 
nection of  Ideas.     223. 
(II)  This  Discernment  of  Connection  or  Knowledge  of  Change  is  not 
Mechanical^  following  inevitably  from  the  Mechanism  of  the  recip- 
rocal Actions  between  the  immediate  Presentations  of  the  Soul. 

(A)  It  does  not  follow  from  the  mere  Notion  of  the  Unity  of  the 
Soul. 

(B)  Nor  from  the  mere  Notion  of  the  Soul,  as  a  Thinking  Being, 
though  this  is  a  plausible  Conjecture.    224. 

(Ill)  But  this  Knowledge  of  Change  of  Knowledge  requires  a  new  and 
distinct  Manifestation  of  Psychic  Energy,  a  comprehensive  and 
Comparative  Consciousness,  an  active  Relating  Knowledge. 

(A)  Even  in  Sense  Impressions,  Knowledge  of  the  Parts  may  give 
no  idea  of  their  Combination  as  a  Whole,  because  of  possible 
Alteration  in  the  Laws. 

(B)  So  in  Knowlege  of  a  Change  of  Knowledge,  there  is  discerni- 
ble a  similar  Alteration  of  Laws,  which  precludes  the  before- 
mentioned  *'Plausible  Conjecture,"  since  this  Knowledge  as- 
sumes Forms  which  are  not  the  simple  products  of  certain  pro- 
cesses in  the  Train  of  Ideas,  but  seem  to  be  contributed  by  a 
new  Phase  of  the  Activity  of  the  Soul  itself.     225. 

II.  The  Preconditions  of  Relating   Knowledge— the  ''Forms*'  which  the  Soul 


contributes.     "Innate  Ideas.' 


2. 


A.  Previous  Conceptions  of  Innate  Ideas.     226. 

(I)  The  Earlier  Conception. 
(II)  Kant's  Conception  of  ''Forms"— Space,  Time,  and  the  Categories. 

B.  The  True  Conception  of  Innate  Ideas.     227. 

(I)  Not  an  Original  Conscious  Possession. 
(II)  But  an  Innate  Tendency  to  develop  certain  Modes  of  Conception. 

C.  These  Modes  of  Conception  cannot  be  derived  from   the  Mechanism  of 
immediate  Cognition.     228. 

(I)  Experience  is  only  the  Occasion  for  their  Arising. 
(II)  They  show  the  real  Unity  of  the  Mind  in  its  Attempt  by  the  Re- 
lating Activity  to  grasp  a  Whole. 
III.    The  Forms  of  Relating  Knowledge,  or  the  Kinds  of  Relating  Activity.  §  3-5 

A.  The  Relating  Activity  in   Sense^  in  the  Apprehension  of  the  World  in 
Space  and  Time.     §  3. 

Introduction.     229. 
(I)  The  Existence  of  Time  Relations  in  the  Soul  is  only  a  Condition  of 
the  Active  Intuition  of  Time  as  a  whole. 
(II)  In  like  Manner,  out  of  the  World  of  Spaceless  Impressions  within 
us,  the  Soul  fashions  actively  the  Intuition  of  Space.     230. 

(III)  Both  Time  and  Space,  thus,  are  evolved  by  the  Mind  from  itself, 
whether  or  not  they  are  also  Objective. 

(IV)  Transition.  The  World  of  Time  and  Space,  so  given,  is  a  Product 
of  Unconscious  Activity,  but  in  fact,  it  is  never  presented  without 
Evidences  of  a  further  Conscious  Activity  of  Thinking.     231. 

B.  The  Relating  Activity  in  the  Understandings  in  the  Apprehension  of  the 
World  in  Thought,     §  4- 


i  I 


i8 

(I)  The  Distinction  of  the  Activity  of  Thought  from  the  Mechanism  of 
Perception  and  Memory,  though  aided  by  them.     232. 

(II)  The  Three  Forms  of  Thinking  Activity.     233-235. 

(A)  The  Concept.     233. 

i.  The  Aid  given  by  the  Mechanical  Course  of  Ideas, 
ii.  The  Distinction  of  the  Concept  as  giving  a  Coherent  Whole. 

(B)  The  Judgment. 

i.  The  Contributing  Acts  of  Perception  and  Memory, 
ii.  The  Distinction  of  the  Judgment,  as  a  Unity  of  Subject  and 
Predicate,  thought  under  certain  Conceptions. 
(D)  The  Syllogism. 

i.  The  Contribution  of  the  Mechanical  Course  of  Ideas, 
ii.  The  Distinction  of  the  Syllogism  as  a  Unity  dependent  on 
the  Thought  of  a  Universal  Law. 
(Ill)  Our  Sense  Apprehension  of  Thought  is  permeated  with  these  Con- 
ceptions, yet  for  any  adequate  view  of  the   Essential  Connections, 
the  Understanding  requires  the  Aid  of  Experience.     235. 
C.  The  Relating  Activity  in  Reason^  in  the  Effort  after  Unifying  Compre- 
hension.    S  5. 
(I)  The  Distinction  between  the  Understanding  and  the  Reason.     237. 

(A)  The  Understanding  does  not  ask  as  to  the  Final  Unity. 

(B)  But  to  seek  the  completely  Unifying  Consciousness  is  the  pre- 
cise Task  of  Reason. 

(II)  The  Limitations  of  Reason.     238. 

(A)  The  Difficulties  of  the  Problems. 

(B)  The  Need  of  the  Aid  of  Science. 


CHAPTER  V. 


Of  the  Feelings,  of  Self  Consciousness,  and  op  the  Will. 

The  Origin,  Forms  and  Constant  Presence  of  Feelings  ;  and  the  Three  Direc- 
tions in  which  Feeling  acts  with  Momentous  Force  upon  our  Mental  Life  as  fur- 
nishing a  Basis  for  Reason's  Determinations  of  Worth,  for  the  Fact  of  Self  Con- 
sciousness, and  for  Will, 

I.  The  Origin  of  the  Feelings.     §  i.   , 

A.  As  a  Fact.     240. 

(I)  They  cannot  be  traced  to  Ideas. 

(II)  But  are  an  Original  Capacity  of  the  Soul. 

B.  Explanation  of  Feelings  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  as  Stimulations  in  Har- 
mony with  the  Soul's  Vital  Evolution,  and  as  Disturbances  of  its  Perma- 
nent Course,  respectively. 

C.  The  Relation  of  this  Explanation  to  Ordinary  Experience.     241. 

(I)  The  Ordinary  Consciousness  is  not  likely  consciously  to  see  or  state 
this  Explanation. 
(II)  Yet  it  is  in  Harmony  with  its  underlying  Convictions. 

(III)  And  its  fuller  meaning  Experience  gradually  defines. 

II.  The  Three  Chief  Directions  of  the  Workings  of  Feeling  on  the  rest  of  our 
Mental  Life.     §  2-5. 
Introduction.     242-244. 

(I)  The  great  Variety  af  the  Forms  of  the  Feelings.     242. 


f 


p.^ 


'9 

(II)  Their  Constant  Attendance  (^not  as  subsidiary  events)  upon  every 
Manifestation  of  Mental  Activity. 

A.  Feeling  as  furnishing  a  Basis  for  Reason's  determinations  of  Worth.    §2. 

(I)  In  iEsthetic  Ideals.     244. 
(II)  In  the  Ideals  of  the  Theoretical  Reason — Feelings  as  influencing 
our  Theory  of  the  Universe. 

(A)  The  Fact  of  this  Influence  even  when  involving  Inconsistency. 

i.  In  case  of  Unconscious  Inconsistency.     245. 
ii.  Even  when  Inconsistency  becomes  Conscious. 

(B)  The  Limitations  in  the  Justification  of  this  Influence. 
(Ill)  In  Ideals  of  the  Practical  Reason.     246-248. 

B.  Feeling  as  Furnishing  a  Basis  for  the  Fact  of  Self-Consciousness.    §  3-4. 
Introduction.     Theories  of  the  Origin  of  Self-Consciousness.     248. 

(A)  Inadequate  Theories. 

i.  Self-Consciousness  as  an  Inborn  Characteristic. 
ii.   Self-Consciousness  as  the  Result  of  Long  Training. 

(B)  The  True   Theory   is   that   Self-Consciousness  is   imperfectly 
known  but  decisively  Discriminated. 

(I)  The  Significance  of  Self-Consciousness.     §3. 

(A)  Not  the  Coincidence  of  Thinker  and  Thought.     249. 
'  (B)   But  that  our  Ego  is  the  Thinker  of  our  own  Thoughts. 

i.  Now  ihis  must  be  Due  to  Immediate  Certainty  as  to  what 
is  ours,  which  cannot  come  from  insight  into  the  Nature  of 
the  Soul. 
ii.  But  does  come  from  Feeling.     250. 

a.  The  simplest  Feeling  is  enough,  but  no  mere  Intelligence 
however  great  is  Sufficient. 

b.  Thus  Self-Consciousness  is  the  Interpretation  of  the  Sense 
of  Self,  and  indirectly  grows  in  Fulness  and  Clearness  of 
Representation,  and  in  Extent.     251. 

(II)  Some  Points  in  the  Delineation  of  the  Growth  of  Self-Conscious- 
ness, bringing  us  to  the  Conception  of  the  Will.  The  Distinction 
of  the  Pure  Ego  from  the  Empiric  Ego.     Transition  Section.     §  4. 

(A)  At  first  Self-Consciousness  Centers  in  the  Body. 

(B)  Then  in  a  Moving  Force  within  the  Body. 

(C)  Then  we  seem  to  find  in  our  Abiding  Disposition  the  True  Ego 
as  distinguished  from  the  Empiric  Ego.     252. 

(D)  But  finally  it  is  felt  that  the  True  Conception  of  the  Ego  re- 
quires at  least  one  point  of  Freedom.     Transition  Paragraph. 

253. 

C.  Feeling  as  Furnishing  a  Basis  for  Belief  in  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  §  5. 

(I)  The  Sphere  of  Volition  is  unquestionably  very  limited.     254-256. 

(A)  The  Impulses  of  Sense  include  no  True  Volition.     255. 

(B)  The  greater  part  of  Customary  Actions  are  without  Real  Voli- 
tion. 

(C)  There  is  Real  Volition  only  where  Distinct  Consciousness  of 
impulses,  and  Deliberation  are  present.     256. 

(II)  Even  if  there  were  an  unbroken  Chain  of  Mechanism,  the  Name 
Will  would  be  needed  to  denote  a  Peculiar  Psychic  Element. 
(A)  The  Existence  of  the  Name  for  a  simple  process  is  itself  an  Ar- 
gument for  the  Reality  of  the  Distinction. 


20 

(B)  The  Peculiar  Element  is  that  of  Approval  or  Intention  which  is 
Conceivable  even  if  the  Will  had  no  Power.     257. 

(III)  Indeed,  Unlimited  Freedom  of  Volition  does  not  at  all  involve  Ex- 
haustless  Capability  of  Performance  ;  the  latter  is  necessarily  very 

Limited. 

(IV)  And  this  Limited  Power  the  Universal  Law  of  Casuality  does  not 

forbid.     259-261. 

(A)  The  Immovable  Conviction  is  against  a  Mere  Blind  and  Neces- 
sary Vortex  of  Events.     259. 

(B)  Moreover  the  Law  of  Causality  Properly  stated  makes  no  such 
Requirement.     260, 

i.  We  need  not  see  in  every  Event  an  Effect  in  the  strict  Me- 
chanical Sense, 
ii.   What  Constitutes  the  Absolute  Authority  of  the  Causal  Law 
is  that  each  Constituent,  once  introduced  into   the   actual 
Course  of  Events,  continues  to  Act  according  to  Universal 

Laws, 
iii.  Hence  the  Universal  Course  of  things  may  at  every  Mo- 
ment have  Innumerable  Beginnings  whose  Origin  lies  out- 
side of  it,  but  can  have  none   not    necessarily  Continued 
within  it,  and  therefore  along  with  unlimited  Freedom  of 
Will  there  may  be  also  a  Limited  Power  of  Absolute  Com- 
mencement. 261. 
Conclusion  of  Book  II.     §  6. 
Conviction  of  the  Difference  of  Psychic  and  Natural  Events. 

A.  The  Difference  summarily  stated  consists  in  the  Fact  that  the  Elements 
are  Different  and  that  the  Modes  of  Energy  are  Different.     261. 

B.  This  Difference  is  Asserted  not  only  against  Materialism  but  also  against 
a  prevalent  merely  Mechanical  View  of  Things.     262. 

C    The  Facts  of  Consciousness  Bear  Constant  Witness  to  the  Magnitude  of 
this  Difference. 


BOOK  III. 
LIFE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Connection  Between  Body  and  Soul. 

The  General  Method  of  Inquiry;  the  General  View  of  Occasionalism  as  to  the 

Connection  between  Body  and  Soul;    and   the  General  Effects  of  this   View  on 

Three  of  the  Questions  Involved   in    the   Connections  between  Body  and  Soul: 

how  Sensations  arise,  Guidance  of  Movements,  Influence  of  the   Soul  on  Bodily 

Form, 

General  Introduction  to  the  Book.     §  I. 
Different  Stages  of  Apprehension  of  the  World;  True  and  Derivative  Stand- 
points. 


•0 


■ 


91 

A.  The  Pressing  Nature  of  the  Questions  Concerning  th2  Connection  of 
Mind  and  Matter  on  account  of  the  many  Interests  Involved.     267. 

B.  These  many  Interests  themselves  Complicate  the  Inquiry  and  seem  to 
call  for  a  Separation  of  the  Involved  Problems — Scientific  and  Philo- 
sophical.    268, 

C.  For  such  a  Separation  of  the  Scientific  and  Philosophic  Problems,  there 
are  weighty  Reasons  and  for  using  chiefly  the  Scientific  Method.    268-273. 

(I)  Preference  for  things  Attainable  Leads  to  the  Scientific  Method.  269. 
(II)  There  is  less  Liability  to   Error  in  the    Scientific  Method;  yet,  our 
inquiry  will  reserve  to   itself  the   Right  of  making  the  Preliminary 
Results  so  obtained  Matter  of  a  more  advanced  Investigation. 
(Ill)  The  Constant  mixing  of  the  two  points  of  view  only  hinders  Clear- 
ness and  Convenience.     The  True  Method  is  to  determine  once  for 
all  the  Limits  of  the  Proper  use  of  the  Ordinary  Modes  of  Concep- 
tion.    271, 
I.  The  General  Theory  of  Occasionalism  as  to   the  Connection  of  Body  and 

Soul.     §  2-3. 

A.  The  Inadequacy  of  the  Opposing  Theory  of  a  Bond  between  Body  and 

Soul.     §  2. 

(I)  Their  Reciprocal  Action  is  itself  the  Bond.     273. 

(II)  The  Question  of  how  they  were  united  at  first  may  be  asked.     274. 
(Ill)  But  any  question   of  a  permanent  Bond  is  Superfluous  and    Con- 
temptible; the  real  question  is  as  to  the  numberless  reciprocal  Re- 
actions. 

B.  Possibility  and  Final  Inexplicableness  of  All  Reciprocal  Actions.     Occa- 
sionalism.    §  3. 

(I)  Insight  into  Details  leaves  all  unsolved  the  Final  Mystery  of  the 
possibility  of  any  Reciprocal  Action,  even  Mechanical.     275. 

(II)  For  all  Mechanical  Working  presupposes  the  Transferability  of 
Motion  and  the  solid  Construction  and  Connection  of  Masses,  in 
both  of  which  is  already  assumed  the  Reciprocal  Action  to  be  ex- 
plained. 

(Ill)  Thus  the  Problem  of  the  Connection   of  Body  and  Soul  is  not  an 
Exceptional  one,  though  they  are  Heterogeneous.     277. 

(A)  There  is  the  same  Final  Inexplicableness  in  all  Connection. 

(B)  This  Inexplicableness  is  not  really  increased  by  the  Dissimilar- 
ity of  Body  and  Soul.     278. 

i.  Since  Homogeneity  does  not  help  to   give  real  explaining 
Conditions,  but  only  to  form  an   Image,  which  can  indeed 
be  given  in  Physical  Re-actions,  but  not,  of  course,  in  the 
case  of  the  Connection  of  Body  and  Soul. 
ii.  The  seeming   Heterogeneity  may  even  here  finally  disap- 
pear.    279. 
iii.  And  in  any  case  the  only  Homogeneity  required  for  an  Act 
of  working  is  the  Homogeneity  of  two  centers  of  Action 
which  is  given  in  the  case  of  the  Soul  and  the  Body. 
(IV)  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  are  no  Reciprocal  Actions  in 

General;  the  inquiry  must  be  directed  to  Particular  Re-actions. 
(V)  The  Consequent  Conception  of  the  Theory  of  Occasionalism.     280- 
281. 


22 

(A)  As  Holding  everywhere  alike,  the  Connection  of  Soul  and  Body 
being  a  single  case  under  this  General  Law. 

(B)  We  may  even  apply  the  Conceptions  of  Ordinary  Life  as  to 
Reciprocal  Action — when  rightly  understood — to  the  Soul, 
since  even  in  the  case  of  Atoms  no  real  Contact  is  supposed. 

IL  The  General  Effects  of  the  View  of  Occasionalism  on  the  Questions  Involved 
in  the  Connection  of  Body  and  Soul.     §  4-5. 

A.  On  Conception  of   How  Sensations   Arise.     The  Bodily  States  are  only 
Occasions.     281-283. 

B.  On  the   Conception  of  the   Guidance  of  Corporeal    Movements   by  the 
Soul.     283-287. 

(I)  Even  in  purely  Voluntary   Motions    the   Will   is  still  only  an  Occa- 
sion.     283-285. 
(II)  This  is  still  more  the  case  in  Involuntary  Movements.     285. 
(Ill)  Conclusion  as  to  the  Guidance  of  Movements. 

(A)  The  Soul  is  not  a  Conscious  Steersman  of  the  Body. 

(B)  The  Will  is  only  Living  Volition;  the  accompanying  Accom- 
plishment is  a  gift  of  the  Universal  Necessity  of  Nature.     286. 

(C)  Thus  the  Soul  only  blindly  Initiates  Movement.     287. 

C.  On  the  Conception  of  the  Influence  of   the  Soul  on  Bodily  Form.     §  5. 

(I)  There  is  no  Conscious  Influence.     287. 
(II)   But  the  Unconscious  Influence  might  be  great  and  Important.    288. 
(HI)  Yet  the  most  that  clear  Experience  seems  to  justify  is  a  General  En- 
noblement or  Degradation. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul. 

The  Seat  of  the  Soul :  the  Various  Possible  Conceptions  ;  the  Development  of 
the  True  Conception  ;  and  the  Value  of  the  Discussion. 
Introduction.     290. 

A.  Why  the  Question  arises. 

B.  The  Simplest  Meaning  of  the  Question  is  that  it  is  an  Inquiry  as  to  the 
Point  whither  all  Impressions  from  without  must  be  transmitted,  and 
whence  in  return  come  the  Impulses  by  which  the  Soul  acts  on  its  Envi- 
ronment. 

I.  Various  Possible  Conceptions  of  the  Space  Relations  of  reciprocally  acting 
Beings.     §  i. 

A.  Theology  gives  us  the  Conception  of  a  Being,  not  merely  in  some  rela- 
tion to  all  the  rest  of  the  Universe,  but  in  an  equally  close  and  Grada- 
tionless  Relation  to  every  Part  of  it.     291. 

B.  Physical  Science,  in  gravitating  Particles,  has  accustomed  us  to  the  Con- 
ception of  Beings  that  reciprocate  action  directly  with  all  Others  Similar 
to  themselves  (and  with  no  others),  but  in  different  Degrees  of  Relation- 
ship with  different  Individuals.     291-292. 

C.  A  Third  Conception  is  possible,  according  to  which  a  thing  would  act 
directly  and  unvaryingly  over  a  Fixed  Extent  of  Space,  but  be  only  in- 
directly in  reciprocal  action  with  all  that  lay  beyond  its  Limits.  292-295. 


23 


I 


.. 


1 


/' 


(I)  False  Assumptions  to  be  avoided  in  this  Conception.     A  Force  must 

not  be  conceived  as  something  always  proceeding  from  a  Working 

Element,  even  when  there  is  no  Second  Element  on  which  it  can  act. 

292. 

(II)  The  Underlying  Assumption  implied  in  this  Third  Cpnception  is, 

that  a  Thing  is  where  it  acts.     293. 
(Ill)  Consequent  Possible  Cases  of  this  Third  Conception.     294. 
II.  The  Application  of  these  Conceptions  in  the  Development  of  the  True  Con- 
ception of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul.     §  2. 

A.  The  Inapplicability  of  the  First  Conception.  The  Soul  is  not  Omnipres- 
ent in  its  Body.     295-297. 

(I)  The  Limited  Sphere  of  the   Soul's  Conscious  Operations  in  the 

Body.    295. 
(II)  The   Soul  is   in  Direct   Reciprocal   Action   only   with  the   Brain. 
There,  accordingly,  it  has  its  Seat,  in  the  Sense  which  the  word 
ought  to  have.     296. 

B.  Insufficiency  (rather  than  Inaccuracy)  of  the  Second  Conception.     297— 

300- 

(I)  This  Conception  would  mean  that  the  Soul  would  exchange  Action 

with  those  Elements  alone,  whose  Effects  approximated  within  an 
imperceptibly  small  Interval  to  the  Point  of  its  Maximum  Action — 
the  only  Place  of  the  Soul's  Direct  Efficacy,  and  hence  its  Exclusive 
Seat.     297. 

(II)  For  this  Conception  there  seems  to  be  no  Anatomical  Ground.  298. 

(IH)  Indeed  such  a  Point  of  Common  Intersection  of  the  Nerves  could 
not  be  an  Indivisible  Point,  but  must  be  a  Cubic  Space.     297. 

C.  The  Third  Conception  only  is  Adequate.  For  even  the  Second  Concep- 
tion, if  it  is  to  mean  anything,  must  be  resolved  into  the  Third,  since  it  is 
exactly  the  Taking  Place  of  Reciprocal  Action  in  a  given  space  which 
constitutes  that  Space  the  Soul's  Seat ;  hence  we  may  affirm  that  the 
Soul's  Seat  is  in  Many  Places  in  the  Brain.     300. 

D.  A  Fourth  Conception — that  of  a  Mobile  Soul — may  be  rejected  as  of 
Little  Value. 

III.  The  True  Conception  of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul,  so  developed,  is  confirmed  by 
the  Consideration  of  certain  Psychical  Phenomena  which  involve  the  Recip- 
rocal Action  of  Soul  and  Body.     §  3-5, 

Introduction.     The  View  now   reached  of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul  requires  one 
further  Modification,  since  what   one  Element  undergoes   from  another  will 
depend  not  only  on  what  that  other  is   permanently,  but   also  on  its  Present 
Temporary  State.     301. 
A.  The  Way  in  which  Movements  Arise.     §  3. 

(I)  Here  the  Soul  can  do  nothing  else  than  produce  or  endure  a  State 
in  itself.  This  State  is  distinguished  only  qualitatively  from  others, 
and  on  the  Quality  depends  not  only  the  Kind  and  Amount,  but 
also  the  Place  of  the  Action  attached  to  it  by  Nature. 

(II)  The  Soul  has  then  simply  to  proclaim  its  States  and  wait  till  what 
is  required  comes  to  pass.     303. 

(A)  Illustrations  of  these  Relations  in  Mimetic  and   Other  Move- 
ments.    304. 

(B)  Details  as   to  the  manner  of  the   Propagation  of  the  Mental 
States  over  the  Bodily  Organs  cannot  be  given.     305. 


24 

B.   Conditions  of  Space  Perception.     §  4-5. 
(I)  The  Theory  of  Local  Signs.     §  4. 

(A)  The  Question.  How,  upon  any  theory,  is  Consciousness  of  a 
Spatial  Order  possible?     306. 

(B)  There  must  be  a  moment  at  which  Situation  in  Space,  in  pass- 
ing into  Consciousness,  reappears  not  as  Situation  in  Space, 
but  as  Perception  of  the  same,  through  Qualitative  Differences 
of  Stimulations.     307. 

(C)  Now  Two  Things  seem  needful  to  a  Distinct  Perception  of 
Space.     308. 

i.  An  Innate  Impulse  to  form  Conceptions  of  Space, 
ii.  And  an  Impetus  proceeding  from  the  Impressions  them- 
selves, which  can  lie  only  in  a  Qualitative  Property  of 
some  Kind  which  the  Impression  acquires,  in  virtue  of  the 
peculiar  Nature  of  the  Place  at  which  it  comes  into  contact 
with  the  Body — a  Local  Sign.     308-309. 

(D)  This  Dependence  of  Space-Perception  upon  Qualitative  Inter- 
nal States  corresponds  with  the  Results  formerly  arrived  at  as 
to  the  Origin  of  Movements.     310. 

(II)  The  Opposed  Theory  that  Space  Relations  pass  as  such  into  the 
Soul,  naturally  held  that  each  Impression  is  conveyed  to  it  by  a  Dis- 
tinct Nerve  Fiber.     §  5. 

(A)  But  such  a  Separation  of  the  Nerve  Fibers  achieves  nothing  for 
an  Explanation  of  Space-Perception. 

(B)  The  Significance  of  the  Unbranched  Nerve  Fibers  is  therefore 
probably  to  be  otherwise  explained.     311. 

IV.  The  Value  of  the  Discussion  of  the  Seat  of  the  Soul.     §  6. 

A.  A  Distinct  Answer  to  the  Question  as  to  the  Seat  of  the  Soul  is  necessary 
to  give  Definiteness  to  our  Conception  of  the  Reciprocal  Relation  of 
Body  and  Soul.     313. 

B.  And  the  View  reached  stands  squarely  opposed  to  the  View  of  the  Om- 
nipresence of  the  Soul  in  the  Body.     3^3-315. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Forms  of  the  Reciprocal  Action  between  Body  and  Soul, 

An  Inquiry  as  to  how  far  the  Body  affords  Helps  to  the  various  Operations  of 
the  Soul;  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  diverse  Forms  of  the  Re- 
ciprocal Action  between  Body  and  Soul,  and  of  incidentally  considering  the 
Functions  of  the  several  Parts  of  the  Brain. 

Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  i. 

The  Conception  of  Organs  of  the  Soul. 

A.  The  Conception  of  the  Brain,  as  Organ  of  the  Soul,  is  an  attempted  es- 
cape from  Materialism.     316. 

B.  But  this  Conception  itself  needs  much  in  the  way  of  Explanation. 

C.  The  Only  Sense  in  which  the  Inquiry  for  Organs  of  the  Soul  seems  justi- 
fied is  as  an  Inquiry  for  a  Circle  of  little   Aids — Organs  only  indirectly. 

317- 

D.  And  this  Inquiry  will  serve  to  bring  out  the  Forms  of  Reciprocal  Action 
of  Body  and  Soul.     318. 


'tis 


25 

I.  In  Sensation.     §  2-3. 

A.  Operations  in  which  the  Soul  does  not  require  Corporeal  Assistance.    318. 

B.  Operations  in  which  the  Soul  does  require  Corporeal  Assistance.  319-323. 

(I)  In  Spatial  Arrangement  of  Perceptions.     §  2. 

(A)  A  Conjecture  as  to  the  Form  in  which  the  need  of  Local  Signs 
is  met,  at  least  in  Sight. 

(B)  This  Conjecture  would  give  the  very  type  of  a  Central  Organ 
of  Space  Perception.     320. 

(II)  In  Feelings  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  accompanying  Sensations.     §  3 . 

(A)  These  are  plainly  affected  by  Bodily  States,  both  as  to  Content, 
and  Intensity.     321. 

(B)  But  the  Limits  of  this  Affection  cannot  here  be  determined, 
and  we  are  left  in  doubt  whether  a  peculiar  Central  Organ  of 
Feeling  is  here  to  be  assumed.     322. 

II.  In  the  Higher  Energies  of  the  Soul.     §  4. 

In  Higher  Intelligence,  and  in  Moral  and  ^Esthetic  Judgment,  the  Coopera- 
tion of  the  Bodily  Functions   consists  only  in  the   unrestricted   Action  of  a 
number  of  preparatory  Organs    being  required  for  the    Realization  of  many 
indirectly  necessary  Prerequisites  of  Operations. 
III.   In  Memory.     §  5. 

Introduction.     The  Significance  of  an  Organ  of  Memory.     325. 

A.  The  Great  Difficulties  of  assuming  a  Special  Organ  of  Memory.    325-327. 

B.  The  Greater  Simplicity  of  the  Theory  of  a  Direct  Retention  by  the  SouL 
327-328. 

(I)  Why  not  assume  a  Single  Process  of   Retention  by  the  Soul  itself. 

327- 
(II)  Indeed,  in  any  case,  Memory  requires  reference  to  the  Soul's  Unity. 

(A)  Even  in  Images  of  Sense-Perception. 

(B)  Still  more,  in  General  Conceptions.     328. 

C.  Nor  does  the   Testimony  of  Experience   favor   such   a   Special   Organ. 
328-332. 

(I)  In  ordinary  Sleep  and  in  Unnatural  Unconsciousness,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary to  consider  that  Consciousness  depends  upon  the  Brain  as  its 
Efficient  Cause,  but  only  that  it  is  hindered  by  the  Disturbance  of 
the  Brain  as  by  a  positive  Obstacle.  328. 
(II)  In  Half-lapses  of  Memory,  it  may  be  granted  that  much  remains 
unexplained,  but  it  seems  possible  to  bring  them  under  the  same 
Theory.     330-332. 

(A)  During  Health.     330. 

(B)  Change  through  Disease  and  Advancing  Age. 

(C)  Remarkable  Disturbances  of  Memory  by  Disease  or   Injuries. 

331. 

IV  In  Bodily  Movements.     §  6. 

A.  The  Soul  does  not  know,  devise,  or  directly  control  the  Mechanism  of 
Movement,  but  some  Organ  of  Movement  must  be  necessary,  in  Compar- 
tive  Indepence  of  the  Soul,  for  the  Protection  of  Life.     332. 

B.  Yet  the  Soul  can  improve  this  Mechanism — especially  in  the  case  of  Man. 

333- 

C.  Though  the  Rarity   of  Meaningless  Movements  in  the  Young,  and  the 

Ease  with  which  Coherent  Movements  are  called  forth,  both  look  for  Ex- 
planation to  a  Central  Organ  of  Movement,  whose  Functions  are: 


26 

(I)  Execution  of  the  General  Movements  of  the  Body.     334. 
•  (II)  The  Direction  of  these  Movements  in  a  Resisting  World.     335. 

(A)  Giving  (by  means  of  its  intertwined  sensory  and  motor  fibers) 
a  Purposive  Reaction  with  Mechanical  Necessity. 

(B)  And  by  taking  account  of  the  Kind  of  Stimulus,  even  giving 
the  Appearance  of  deliberate  Choice. 

D.  But  Practice  and  Habit  can  further  develop  the  Primary  Function  of  the 
Central  (Vgan.     336.- 
(I)  Since  what  the  Corporeal   Organization  could  not  devise,  it  can  re- 
tain. 
(II)   Hence  the    Hypothesis   of  a  Divisible  Soul — itself  inherently  im- 
possible— is  wholly  unnecessary,  even  in  cases  of  decapitation. 
Conclusion  of  the  Chapter.     §  7. 

A.  There  are  Two    Forms  of  Immediate  Help  of  the    Body  to  the  Soul — 
Spatial  Arrangement  of  Impressions  and  Spatial  Movements.     338. 

B.  But  the  Rationalizing  of  Sense-Impressions  is  due  to  the  Soul  alone.    339. 

C.  Hence  the  Functions  of  the  Brain  are  much  simpler  than  are  supposed  by 
Phrenology. 

(I)  We  certainly  cannot  assert  a  Soul  independent  of  the  Body. 
(II)  But  the  Admission  of  Special  Organs  in  different  Parts  of  the  Brain, 
for  particular  Higher  Mental  Faculties,  has  after  all  little  probability 
on  its  side. 

(III)  Yet  even  the  subtler  Peculiarities  of  Mind  are  doubtless  largely  in- 
fluenced by  the  Bodily  Life,  but  not  through  the  Assignment  of 
Special  Organs.     340. 

(IV)  Though  in  the  sense  of  an  indirect  yet  very  powerful  Influence  on 
Menial  Life,  even  the  Cerebral  Hemispheres  may  be  called  Organs; 
while  in  a  more  special  sense,  the  same  name  may  perhaps  be  ap- 
plied to  the  Lower  and  more  definitely  favored  Regions  of  the 
Brain.     341. 

D.  There  is  little  Evidence  for  supposing  the  Body  a  Hindrance  to  the  Soul's 
free  Development.     342. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Life  in  Matter. 

An  Attempt  to  prove  that  the  Universality  of  Mechanism  does  not  rob  the 
World  of  its  Glory,  but  is  even  consistent  with  the  Existence  of  Life  in  all  Mat- 
ter, i.  e.,  with  the  Animation  of  the  whole  W^orld;  and  a  Statement  of  the  Effect 
of  this  View  of  Life  in  Matter  on  the  Conception  of  Body  and  Soul. 

Introduction.     344. 

A.  The  Natural  Protests  against  the  Mechanical  View. 

B.  The  Consequent  Needed  Answer. 

I.  The  Objection,  from    the  Ideal  Point  of  View,  to  the  Mechanical  View  of 
Nature,  as  robbing  the  World  of  its  Glory.     §  i. 
A.  The  Naive  View  of  Nature. 

(I)  This  View  has  final  Confidence  in  the  Reality  of  Sense-Perception, 
and  follows  upon  a  Deep  Need  in  Men.     345. 
(II)  This  Earnestness  in  regard   to   Sense-Perception  only   temporarily 
disappears  in  the  case  of  Accidental  Combinations,  and   Arbitrary 
Forms.     346. 


'  1 


27 

B.  Of  this  Belief  in  the   essential  Significance  of  Sense-Perception   and  in 
the  consequent  Glory  of  the  World,  the   Mechanical  View  seems  to  rob 

us.     347-349- 
(I)  Doubtless  the  Reality   of  the  World   is   utterly  severed]  from  our 

Senses  by  the  Mechanical  View.     347. 

(II)  And  there   can  be   no   successful  Defense  of  the   Reality  of  Sense 

Phenomena  against  that  View.     Sensations  cou/dhave  no  meaning 

in  Things. 

II.  The  Double  Answer  to  the  Objection  to  the  Mechanical  View.     §  2-3. 

Introduction.     The  Complaints  of  the  Ideal  View.     349. 

A.  The  Special  and  Higher  Worth  of  Sense.     349-353- 

(I)  The  Assumption,  underlying  these  Complaints  of  the  Ideal  View, 
that  the  sole  Office  of  Sentience  is  to  present  things  as  they  really 
are  is  not  Scientific,     349. 

(A)  The  Final  Effect  in  a  Chain  of  Processes  is  naturally  Different 
from  the  Beginning.     350. 

(B)  The  Influences  which  have  led  to  this  Assumption — the  Influ- 
ences of  Daily  Life  and  the  peculiar  Interest  of  Science — have 
tended  to  make  us  forget  that  the  World  of  Sensation  is  itself 
one  of  the  Greatest  of  all  Events.     351. 

(C)  In  fact,  the  truer  Conception  would  seem  to  be,  that  the  Essen- 
tial Truth  of  the.  Universe  is  the  Meaning  set  forth  so  as  to  be 
intelligible  to  the  Spirit.     352. 

B.  Life  in  Matter.     353-364. 
Introduction.     353-355. 

(A)  But  the  Answer  just  made  to  the  Idealist's  Complaint  seems 
open  to  the  Objection,  that  Half  the  World  is  still  only 
Means — an  Objection  to  be  fully  met,  only  by  making  Things 
themselves  Conscious.     353. 

(B)  We  are  brought  therefore  to  the  purpose  to  vindicate  the  Exist- 
ence of  Life  in  Matter — the  Exclusive  and  Original  Reality  of 
the  Mental  Sphere.     354. 

(I)  The  Final  Elements  of  All  Matter  are  Unextended  Atoms.    355-360. 

(A)  The  Previous  Discussion  of  the  Mechanical  View  brought  us  to 
the  necessary  Assumption  of  many  independent  Centers  of 
ForcCy  possid/y  Unextended.     355. 

(B)  Considerations  tending  to  prove  that  Matter  is  Unextended. 

i.  There  is  no  Subject  for  the  so-called   fundamental  Proper- 
ties of  Matter. 
ii.  And  if  this  Subject   be  taken    as    Supersensible,  Extension 
cannot  be  a  Property. 

a.  For  Extension  of  Matter  necessarily  implies  the  Relation 
between  Many  single  distinguishable  Points.     356. 

b.  And  hence  cannot  be  attached  as  a  Predicate  to  a  Single 
Element — even  the  Ultimate  Atoms,  since  even  here  Ex- 
tension is  conceivable  only  as  Intensive  Force.     357. 

iii.  The  Possible  Source  of  our  Idea  of  Extension  is  in  the 
Unconscious  Transfer  to  Things,  of  our  Joy  of  Passing 
beyond  Limits.     358. 

a.  The  Possible  Explanation. 

b.  The  Need  of  some  such  Explanation.     359. 


28 

iv.   Moreover  our   Theory  of  Unextended   Atoms   affords  a 
completer  Explanation  of  Phenomena. 

(II)  There  is  thus  admissible  the  Thought  of  an  Inner  Mental  Life  per- 
vading all  Matter— the  Animation  of  the  Whole  World.     §  3. 

(A)  Statement  of  the  View.     360. 

(B)  The  Objection  to  this  Second  Answer  to  the  Idealist's  com- 
plaint that  it  goes  beyond  our  craving  and  requires  more  than 
we  can  believe, — overlooks  the  Beauty  of  the  Simple  Constitu- 
ents of  Matter,  which  is  not  altered  by  Position.     361. 

(C;  Moreover  this   Theory  of  the  Animation  of   the  Whole  is  not 
set  forth  merely  in    answer  to  a    Craving,  but  springs  from  the 
Conviction  of  the  radically  Unthinkable  Conception  of  Some- 
thing Existent  that  never  had  an  Independent  Being. 
(D)  This  View  gives  animation  greater  than  that  imagined  by  My- 
thology, but   has  no    Place  in    Scientific   Conceptions,  though 
satisfying  the  Ideal  Demands.     362-363. 
III.  Result  of  this  Modification  of  our  Previous  View  on  the  Conception  of  Body 
and  Soul.     §  4. 

A.  Soul  and  Body  are  thus  seen  to  be   Homogeneous  Supersensible  Beings, 
and  so  the  Difficulty  of  mutual  Reaction  is  lessened  for  some  minds.    364. 

B.  But  this  does  not  mean  the  Development  of  Body  into  Soul  or  vice  v^rsa. 

(I)  The  One  indivisible  Soul  must  still  be  sharply  contrasted  with  the 

Animated  Body. 
(II)  Since  the  possible  Anima'.ion  of  the  Nerves  is  wholly  without  Sig- 
nificance for  the  Soul.     365. 

(III)  For  the  Nerves  are  merely  Messengers  in  any  case. 

C.  In  fact,  only  the  Beauty  of  the  Body  is  made  more  Intelligible.     366. 

D.  The  Resulting  Image  of  Body  and  Soul  is  that  of  an  Association  of  Many 
Beings  with  a  governing  Soul  rather  than  a  Unity  of  All.     367. 

(I)  This  View  is  more  satisfactory  than  that  of  the  Unity  or  Fusion  of 
the  Soul  with  the  Bodily  Organism. 

(A)  The  Body  would  not  be  more  fully  ours  on    the  latter  Theory, 

(B)  Moreover  any  unnecessary  Blending  of  the  Many  into  the  One 
degrades  the  Dignity  of  Life  and  of  Happiness.     368. 

(II)  Observation  gives  little  Confirmation  to  the  Theory  of  Unity. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Beginning  and  End  of  Soul-Life. 

An  Attempt  to  show  that  the  Mechanical  View  leaves  enlirely  open  all  Ques- 
tions of  Origin  and  Destiny,  and  indeed  itself  is  wholly  dependent,  requiring  the 
thought  of  the  Infinite  Substance  ;  and  an  Inquiry  how  far  we  may  understand 
the  Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Soul  in  particular. 

Introduction. 

A.  The  Suggested  Questions  of  Origin  and  Destiny.     370. 

B.  The  necessarily  great  limitations  of  our  Knowledge  here. 

C.  We  must  see  whether  our  View  leaves  these  Questions  open.     371. 

I.  The  Relation  of  Scientific  Mechanism  to  all  Questions  of  Origin  and  Des- 
tiny.    §  1-4. 


■•*» 


J. 


29 

A.  Scientific  Mechanism  leaves  the  Questions  of  Beginning  and  End  entirely 
open.     §  I. 

(I)  Science  does  not  consider  Beginning  or  End. 
(II)   Science  cannot  anywhere  overstep  these  Boundaries.     372. 

(III)  Hence  we  may  await  its  Results  with  Patience,   and  without  any 
Apprehension  for  a  Religious  View  of  the  Origin  of  Things.  373. 

(IV)  Yet  this  Apprehension  exists,  but  only  from  failure  to  see  the  De- 
pendence even  of  Mechanism  on  God.     374. 

B.  Mechanism  is  itself  entirely  Dependent,  looking  to  the  Infinite  Substance. 

§  2-3 
(1)  The  Attempt  to  regard  Mechanism  as  Independent.     §  2. 

(A)  It  is  Strange  but  Intelligible.     375. 

(B)  The  Inadequacy  for  the  Scientist  of  the  Ordinary  Answer  to 
this  Attempt. 

(C)  The  Scientist  may  even  claim  it  unnecessary  to  acknowledge  the 
Primary  Source  of  the  World  in  God,  making  the  Sway  of  Uni- 
versal Laws  enough.     377. 

(D)  The  Assumption  herein  involved  must  be  examined. 

(II)  The  Examination  of  the  Assumption  (underlying  all  Attempts  to 
hold  the  Independence  of  Mechanism)  that  the  Sway  of  Unchanging 
Laws  determines  all  Reciprocal  Actions,  and  is  alone  necessary  to 
complete  the  Mechanical  View.     §  3. 

(A)  The  Inexplicability  of  the  Transmission  of  Action  between  two 
Indifferent  Elements.     378. 

(B)  A  Realm  of  Laws  cannot  explain  this,  for  Laws  are  but  State- 
ments of  an  Order  discerned  by  Mind  in  Things,  and  cannot 
precede  Things.     379. 

(C)  But  all  these  Relations  and  Laws  can  finally  be  thought  only  as 
existing  in  the  Unity  of  an  Infiniie  Living  Being.     380. 

i.  And  this  Recognition  of  a'l  Infinite  Substance  is  thus  re- 
quired by  every  example  of  Reciprocal  Action — even  the 
simplest  Reactions  of  Mechanism.     381. 
ii.  Moreover  this  Universal  Being  is  not  mere  Bond,  but  the 

Sovereign  Power,  assigning  to  each  Individual  the  Sphere  of 

its  possible  Activity.     382. 

C.  And  this  Theory  of  the  Infinite  Substance  is  fully  in  Harmony  with  both 
the  Conceptions  hitherto  reached — the  Vital  Activity  of  the  Human  Soul, 
and  the  Mechanism  of  Nature.     §  4. 

(I)  The  Relation  of  the  Soul's  indivisible  Being  to  the  several  Forms 
of  its  Action  is  even  the  best  Analogy  of  the  Relation  of  the  Infinite 
Substance  to  Finite  Things.     382. 

(A)  The  Soul  and  its  States.     383. 

(B)  The  Infinite  and  Finite  Things. 

(II)  The  Theory  is  equally  in   Harmony  with  Mechanism  when  rightly 
understood.     384-387. 

(A)  The  contrary  Impression  of  the  Independence  of  Mechanism 
proceeds  solely  from  unconsciously  changing  the  constantly  re- 
curring Actual  Relations  of  Things  into  Necessary  Relations  of 
Thought.     385-387. 
i.  Illustrations.     385. 


30 

ii.  Such  Causal  Connections,  demonstrable  as  undeniable  Facts, 
could  become  intelligible  as  Necessities,  only  if  we  could 
discern  the  Purpose  of  the  Infinite,  and  so  see  them,  not 
merely  as  Facts,  but  as  a  Part  of  the  inherent  Consistency 
of  the  Infinite — which  is  thus  required  for  any  intelligible 
Conception  of  Mechanism  itself.     386. 
(B)  The  Theory  of  the  Infinite  Substance  therefore  has  no  quarrel 
with  Mechanism,  nor  even  with  its  Phraseology,  when  applied 
to  Particulars,  since  Mechanism  itself  is  only  the  true  Efficacy 
of  the  Infinite. 
II.  An  Inquiry  as  to  the  Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Soul,  in  particular.     §  5. 

A.  The  Destiny  of  the  Soul.     387-390. 

(I)  One  Class  of  Arguments  for  Immortality — arguing  from  the  "Na- 
ture of  Things" — falls  into  the  precise  Error  of  the  Defenders  of  the 
Independence  of  Mechanism.  There  is  no  such  Nature  of  Things 
except  as  the  Product  of  the  Creative  Power  itself,  and  the  Pur- 
poses of  that  Power  we  cannot  fully  know.  388. 
(II)  But  this  very  Conception  of  the  Relation  of  the  Finite  to  the  Infin- 
ite Substance  seems  to  require  that  the  Destinies  of  the  Individual 
must  be  accordant  with  the  Dictate  of  the  Whole  ;  and  hence  that 
will  last  forever  which,  on  account  of  its  Excellence  and  its  Spirit, 
must  be  an  Abiding  Part  of  the  Order  of  the  Universe.     389. 

B.  As  to  the  Origin  of  the  Soul.     390-392. 

(I;  The  Infinite  Anterior  History  of  the  Soul  is  Improbable.     390. 
(II)  Nor  does  the  Body  produce  it. 

(Ill)  The  most  probable  Theory  is  that  of  Creation,  upon  the  formation 
of  the  organic  Germ. 

(A)  Statement  of  the  Theory. 

(B)  There  is  more  Unity  and  Simplicity  in  this  Process  than  in  the 
Conception  which  we  can  give  of  it.     391. 

(C)  Yet  it  is  a  dim  Conjecture  at  best,  as  is  most  Knowledge  of  the 
Course  of  the  Spiritual  Order  of  the  Universe,  the  chief  Light 
on  which  is  from  what  ou^ht  to  be. 

CONCLUSION   OF   BOOKS   I.-III, 

A  Review  of  the  Three  Different  Views  of  Nature  previously  considered,  to 
show  their  possible  Reconciliation  in  the  View  now  reached,  and  to  determine  ex- 
actly to  what  Extent,  and  in  what  Sense,  Mechanism  is  held. 

Introduction.     393. 

I.  The  Mythological  View.     393-395. 

A.  Our  Theory  has  all  its  Advantages,  giving  Enjoyment  and  Freedom  ab- 
solutely throughout  Nature.     394. 

B.  While  it  keeps  close  to  the  most  rigorous  Scientific  Study  of  Nature. 

C.  And,  at  the  same  time,  avoids  the  great  Inconsistency  of  the  Mytholog- 
ical View,  by  finding  in  the  acknowledged  necessary  Order  itself  the 
ground  of  Conviction  of  the  one  Creative  Infinite.     395. 

II.  The  World-Soul  View.     395-397. 

A.  The  Theory  we  have  reached  enables  us  to  retain  all  the  fundamental 
Doctrines  of  this  View. 

B.  But  this  View  gives  in  reality  only  a  Soul  of  Nature^  and  therefore  re- 


-•> 


31 

quires  supplementing — if  only  by  the  Conviction  (not  to  be  scientifically 
known)  of  the  Unity  of  Nature  and  the  Sphere  of  Ethics — that  Nature  is 
only  the  Condition  for  the  Realization  of  the  Good.     396, 
C.  But  the  Attempts  of  the  World-Soul  View  to  fully  express  this  Unity  have 
led  only  to  miserable  Shifts.     397, 
III.  The  Mechanical  View.     397-401. 

A.  This  View  is  granted  unreservedly  as  to  the  Relations  of  Finite  Things  in 
Nature. 

B.  But  it  is  denied  as  a  Final  Explanation,  since  the  Dependence  of  all 
Mechanism  is  asserted,  as  the  instrumental  Forms  employed  by  God.  398. 

C.  But  none  the  less  do  we  require  the  Recognition  of  its  Absolute  Validity. 

399- 
(I)   On  Scientific  Grounds. 

(II)  And  in  spite  of  the  Natural  Revolt  of  the  Ideal  View. 

(Ill)  On  the  Ground  of  the  Ideal  itself,  i.  e.  for  the  sake  of  the  Ethical 

Ideal,  which  requires  Man  to  embody  his  ideals  in  External  Forms, 

within  the  firm  bonds  of  a  Necessity  which  he  holds  sacred.   401. 


BOOK  IV. 

MAN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Nature  and  Ideas. 

A  Preliminary  Examination  of  the  Problem  of  the  Possible  Combination  of  the 
Mechanical  Explanation  and  the  Ideal  Interpretation  of  Nature. 

I.  The  Genesis  of  the  Conception  of  the  Ideal  Interpretation  of  Nature  beside 
that  of  the  Mechanical  Explanation.     §  i. 

A.  Our  Confidence  in  our  own  Individuality  leads  us  the  more  readily  to 
grant  Individuality  to  the  Phenomena  of  Nature.     405. 

B.  And  such  an  Admission  is  really  necessary  to  any  true  Unity  in  Nature. 
406. 

C.  And  this  Desire  for  Unity  in  Nature  is  increased  by  the  Thought  of  the 
inevitable  Bearing  of  the  Plan  of  Nature  on  the  Meaning  of  our  own 
Action. 

D.  Such  a  View  the  bare  Conception  of  Mechanism  cannot  satisfy;  the  real 
Creative  Nature  is  felt  to  be  back  of  Laws,  in  the  Original  Selection  and 
Arrangement  of  the  Elements;  and  the  Basis  and  Origin  of  this  Order  is   * 
imperatively  sought.     407. 

E.  To  such  a  Search,  the  Mechanical  View  objects  that  Order  ought  to  be 
felt  to  be  more  natural  than  Disorder. 

F.  But  in  this  Objection  itself,  the  Mechanical  View  has  conceded  the  Ra- 
tional Order  of  the  Primal  Condition  of  the  World;  and  hence  inevitably 
there  arises  beside  the  Mechanical  Explanation  of  Nature  the  Conception 
of  its  Ideal  Interpretation.     408. 


32 

II.  The  Mutual  Independence  of  these  Conceptions,  and  the  Necessity  of  Com- 
bining them.     §  2. 

A.  Their  Possible  Independence  in  all  Particular  Researches.     409-411. 

B.  The  Necessity  of  Combining  them  in  any  Theory  of  the  Universe  that 
aims  at  Completeness.     41 1-4 12. 

III.  Two  Inadequate  Attempts  at  such  Combination.     §  3. 

A.  Purposive  Creation.     412-414. 

(I)  The  Statement  and  Partial  Justification  of  the  View.     412. 
(II)  The  General  Difficulties  involved  in  the  Conception  of  a  Designing 

Activity  when  ascribed  to  the  Divine  Being. 
(Ill)  The  Resulting  Contradiction  in    the  View,  since    it   requires   both 
Creative  Wisdom  and  a  Dark  Background  in  God.     414. 

B.  The  Conception  of  the  "Ideal  in  the  Real." 

(I)  The  Statement  and  General  Defects  of  the  View. 
(II)  The  Great  Defect  is  in  seeking  to  avoid  the  difficulty  by  really  con- 
verting Reason  into    the   Dark  Background.     This   View  is  only 
more  obscure  than  the  other.     415. 

IV.  Any  Adequate  Combination  of  the  Mechanical  Explanation  and  the  Ideal 
Interpretation  of  Nature  must  start  from  an  Exhaustive  Study  of  Nature  as 
a  Fact.     §  4. 

A.  Any  complete  Theory  of  the  Universe  must  have  Three  Starting  Points- 
Laws,  Ideas,  and  Experience.     417. 

B.  But  the  First  Two  must  be  studied  in  the  Last. 

CHAPTER  II. 
Nature  Evolved  from  Chaos. 

A  Detailed  Examination  as  to  just  how  far  the  Mechanical  Theory  in  its  widest 
possible  Conception    can    account  for  a  real   Unity  of  Nature  as   evolved  from 
Chaos  (as  against  the  Objections  of  the  Ideal  View);  involving  a  Statement  of  all 
the  Leading  Usages  and  Modes  of  Operation,  which  Nature  actually  employs. 
I.  The  Possibilities  of  the  Mechanical  View,  as  it  is  Commonly  Conceived,  set 
forth  in  argument  against  the  Ideal  View.     §  1-3. 
A.  Doubt  as  to  the  Supremacy  of  Ends  in  Nature.     §  i. 

(I)  The  Question.     Is   there  a  General  Purposiveness  in  Nature?    411. 
(II)  The  Answers.     420-423. 

(A)  Experience  seems  to  give  a  Mixed  Impression  as  to  any  Exter- 
nal Ends  in  Nature.     420. 

(B)  But  the  Ideal  View  contends  for  the  Recognition  of  Inherent 
Ends  as  lying  in  the  Creatures'  own  Existence.     421. 

(C)  This   Theory  of    Inherent  Ends   is    an    Insufficient    Defense. 
421-423. 

i.  For  to  prove  a  Systematic  Purposiveness  in  Nature  on  this 
theory  of   Ends  would   require  (l)  a  priori  Knowledge  of 
what  Events  and   Forms  are  of  absolute  Worth;  and  (2) 
Proof  that  only  such  form  part  of  Nature.     422. 
ii.  But  in  fact,  the  Theory  usually  assumes  the  Excellence  of 
Things  as  they  are,  and   then   shows  that  the  present  Ar- 
rangements are  adapted  to  produce  them. 
iii.  Such  a  Proof  necessarily   ends   in   a  meaningless   Play  on 
Words. 


<\ 


33 

B.  The  Idealist's  Defense  of  Ends  in  Nature.     §  2.        v 

(I)  To  these  Objections,  the  Ideal  View  replies  that  it  does  not  build 
its  Conviction  of  Purposiveness  in  Nature  on  ordinary  Connections 
of  Cause  and  Effect,  but  on  the  fact  of  the  Combinations  of  Ends, 
for  which  an  undesigned  Convergence  can  hardly  account.     423-425. 

(A)  It  might  grant  the  contention  of  the  Mechanical  View  as  to  a 
single  structural  Relation.     424. 

(B)  But  the  Mechanical  Contention  becomes  incredible,  in  the  case 
of  a  Combination  of  innumerable  such  Relations;  and  this 
occurs  even  in  Single  Organs. 

(II)  Moreover,  granting  Mechanism  as  means,  the  Origination  of  the 
Germs  requires  a  Designing  Consciousness;  and  this  once  admitted, 
we  may  rationally  believe  in  its  Cooperation,  even  where  we  do  not 
see  it.     425. 

C.  The  Attempted  Mechanical  Explanation  of  the  Development  of  Things 
from  Chaos.     §  3. 

(I)  The  Mechanical  View  explains  the  Idealist's  Admiration  of  Nature 
as  unconsciously  due  to  the  thought  of  the  mere  Number  of  Parts, 
and  of  the  Variety  of  Movements,  which  yet  may  be  very  simply  ex- 
plained. 426. 
(II)  The  Idealist  grants  that  this  argument  has  force,  but  maintains  that, 
however  simple  the  original  germs,  the  great  Marvel  still  remains — 
how  just  this  appropriate  Selection  came  to  be, 

(III)  The  Mechanical  View  replies: 

(A)  This  Objection  makes  the   unjustifiable  Assumption  that  other 
*      Selections   were   prevented  from    appearing,    wnereas,  in   fact,  no 

other  than  a  Mechanical  Selection  is  needed.     427. 

(B)  For  a  Development  of  Things  out  of  the  innumerable  Possibil- 
ities of  Chaos  can  be  shown  on  Mechanical  Principles. 

(IV)  The  Ideal  View   replies  that   this  only  explains  a   Mechanical  Ab- 
sence of  Contradiction,  not  the  true  Rationality  of  Things.     429. 

(V)  The  Mechanical  View  replies  that  Experience  shows  no  such  invari- 
able Rationality,  but  only  a  Partial  Rationality  such  as  Mechanism 
can  account  for. 
II.  The  Possibilities  of  the  Mechanical  View  as   Corrected   and  Expanded  (in 
harmony  with  Mechanical  Principles).     §  4-5. 
Introduction.     431. 

The  Idealist  yet  urges  the  monstrous  Improbability  of  the  Meckanical 
Theory  of  the  Universe,  even  if  admitted  possible. 

A.  The  Correction  of  the  Mechanical  View.     432. 

The  Idealist  utterly  denies  the  wholly  unwarranted  Assumption  of  the 
Mechanical  View,  that  the  Original  Condition  contained  Countless  Possi- 
bilities. 

B.  The  Expansion  of  the  Mechanical  View.     432-439. 

The  Mechanical  View  can  still  be  adapted  (in  entire  harmony  with  Me- 
chanical Principles)  to  this  new  conception  of  the  Primitive  State. 

(I)  The  Atoms  need  not  be  assumed  as  Identical. 
(II)  The  Forces  may  be  taken  as  Expressions  of  Inner  States.     433. 

(III)  The  Atoms  may  be  Supersensible. 

(IV)  The  View  may  include   also  an  Inherent  Purposiveness  in  Things 


34 

and  in  their  Operations — a  Principle  of  Progress  Inherent  in  every- 
thing.    434. 

(A)  The  Statement  of  the  Principle. 

(B)  May  be  included  in  the  Mechanical  View  as  a  Part  of  the  Actual 
Nature  of  Things.     435. 

(C)  And  it  is  thus  properly  brought  into  the  Mechanical  View,  since 
Mechanism  must  always  assume  as  matter  of  fact,  a  certain  Na- 
ture of  Things. 

(D)  The  Application  of  the  Principle.     437-439. 

i.  Would  account  even  for  Life.     438. 

ii.  As  may  be  better  understood  by  Comparison  with  Processes 
of    Social  Grouping — the  Inner   States   and  the   Inherent 
Principle  of  Progress   in  the  corporeal  elements   thus  ex- 
plaining both  Life,  and  even  Distribution  into  Genera  and 
Species. 
C.  The  Bearing  of  the  Mechanical  View,  so  corrected  and  expanded   upon 
Ideal  Interests.     §  5. 
(I)  A  Real  Unity  of  Nature  is  still  so  possible.     The  Unity  of  Nature 
considered  as  a  Product  of  manifold  Actions  and  Reactions. 

(A)  A  Unity  gradually  arising  as  in  Society.     440. 

(B)  Such  a  Unity  is  perhaps  as  really  rational  as  a  Primal  Unity. 
(II)  And  there  is  even  possible  the  full  Recognition  of  the  Moral  Ideals, 

as  Facts  of  the  Inner  Nature  of  Souls.     441. 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  Unity  of  Nature. 

The  General  Inferences  as  to  the  Unity  of  Nature  derivable  from  the  Formal 
Unity  of  the  Basis  of  Things  (necessarily  involved  in  the  fact  of  reciprocal  rela- 
tions); and  the  Particular  Inferences,  derivable   from  Actual  Experience,  rather 
than  from  the  Nature  of  the  Supreme  Cause. 
Introduction.     443. 

Transition  from  Chapter  II. 
I.  General  Inferences  as  to  the  Unity  of  Nature  from  the  Formal  Unity  of  the 
Basis  of  Things.     §  1-3. 

A.  The  Unity  of  the  Basis  of  Things.     §  i. 

(I)  The  Mechanical  Theory  itself  everywhere  requires  the  Unity  of  a 
Universal  System  of  Law.     444. 
(II)  And  this  System  of  Law  is  thinkable  only  as  due  to  a  Real  Unity  of 
all  Things — one  actual  Infinite  Being.     445. 

B.  The  General  Inferences  from  this  Unity  of  the  Basis  of  Things.     §  2. 
Introduction.     445-447. 

(A)  We  can  argue  only  from  the  Formal  Unity,  not  from  the  Na- 
ture of  the  Supreme  Cause.     445. 

(B)  This  Formal  Unity  will  give  the  Conception  of  the  Sum  of 
Reality  as  a  Completed  System,  each  part  supplementing  the 
sum  of  the  rest.     446. 

(C)  The  Possible  Applications  of  this  Conception. 

(I)  The  Chemical  Elements  form  a  Complete  System.     447. 
(II)  The  original  Distribution  of  Atoms  must  have  been  under  Law. 


35 


(III)  The  Preservation  of  Unity  in  the  Course  of  Events  is  to  be  as- 
sumed.   448-452. 

(A)  This  requires  Constant  Compensation  of  Disturbances.    448. 

(B)  The  Nature  of  this  Compensation  of  Disturbances.    449-452. 

i.  The  Task  required  is  the  Perpetual  Preservation  of  the  Or- 
der contained  in  the  Meaning  of  the  first  Creation  of  Na- 
ture.    449. 
ii.  The  Way  in  which  this  Task  is  Accomplished  is  through 
the  Inner  States  of  Things.     450. 
iii.  This  renders  possible  the  Conception  of  Miracles.     451. 

a.  The  Possible  Conception.  Altering  the  Inner  States  of 
Things  indirectly  modifies  the  usual  Result  of  the  Law  of 
their  external  Relations. 

b.  This  Conception  is  not  here  to  be  employed.     452. 

(IV)  The  Unity  of  the  Supreme  Cause  seems  further  to  require  a  Pro- 
gressive Development— a  Scries  of  Cosmic  Periods.     452-455. 

(A)  The  General  Conception  of  this  Progressive  Development.  452. 

(B)  The  Extent  to  which  this  Conception  may  be  applied  to  the 
.  Supreme  Cause.     454. 

C.  These  General  Inferences  indicate  the  marked  Limitation  of  our  Knowl- 
edge and  Being.     §  3. 
II.  Particular  Inferences  as  to  the  Unity  of  Nature,  from  Experience,  rather 
than  from  the  Nature  of  the  Supreme  Cause.     §  4-5. 

A.  Not  from  ft  Knowledge  of  the  Nature  of  the  Supreme  Cause.    456-462. 

(I)  Statement  of  this  View.     457. 
(II)  Objection  to  this  View. 

(A)  Objections  to  the  General  Tone  of  the  View,  as  claiming  Appli- 
cation  to  Universal  Nature.     §  4. 

(B)  Objections  to  the  View,  as  applied  to   Terrestrial  Nature,  es- 
pecially to  the  Gradation  of  Animal  Life.     §  5  to  p.  462. 

i.  The  Lower  Animals  may  not  be  mere  Transitional  Forms; 
but  the  Aim  may  have  been  to  give  shape  to  a  Variety  of 
Types  of  Life,  such  as  should  leave  no  element  unenjoyed 
and  unused.  459. 
ii.  And  the  Types  of  Outward  Form  are  not  to  be  considered 
as  the  Ideal  which  Nature  sought  to  realize.     460. 

a.  It  is  True  that  the  Types  exist. 

b.  But  these  Formal  Relations  have  too  little  deep  meaning. 

c.  Hence  Content  is  rather  to  be  regarded  as  the  Cause  of 
the  Typical  Formation,  than  vice  versa.     461. 

B.  But  from  Actual  Experience  of  Phenomena.     462-464. 

(I)  This  shows  Three  Successive  Types  when  Content  is  regarded.    462 
-464. 

(A)  General  Uniformity  in  the  Chemical  Tyipt  of  Composition. 

(B)  General  Uniformity  in  the  Economic  Type  of  the  Animal  King- 
dom. 

(C)  General  Uniformity  in  the  Morphological  Type. 

(II)  Conclusion.  The  Actual  Character  of  Terrestrial  Nature  is  thus  to 
be  taken  as  the  Cause  of  the  Forms  and  Gradations  of  Terrestrial 
Life,  which  are  the  only  Forms  in  which  the  Commands  of  the  high- 
est Ideas  can  be  carried  out  on  Earth.     464. 


36 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Man  and  Brute. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Comparative  Advantages  of  the  Human  Body  and  of 
Animal  Bodies,  showing  that  the  Human  Body  stands  at  the  Head  of  the  Scale 
of  Creatures,  when  estimated  by  Capacity  of  Happiness  and  of  Work. 

Introduction.     465-468. 

Grades  of  Animals  and  their  Significance. 

A.  Position  in  a  Scale  of  Forms  does  not  determine  the  Value  of  a  Creature. 

§1- 

(I)  This  is  the  Outcome  of  the  Previous  Discussion.     465. 
(II)  But  is  Opposed  to  the  Common  View. 
(Ill)   Which  involves  an  Irrational  Idolatry  of  Lifeless  Forms.     466. 

B.  But  the  Real  Measure  of  the  Value  of  a  Creature  is  Capacity  for  Happi- 
ness and  for  Work.  Judged  by  this  Standard,  the  Human  Body  is  at  the 
Head  of  the  Scale  of  Creatures.     The  Theme  of  the  Chapter.     467-468. 

I.  The  Human  Body  has  the  most  Advantageous  Organization  as  to  Size, 
Strength,  and  Length  of  Life.     468-475. 

A.  General  Advantages  of  the  Vertebrate  Animals,  as  compared  with  the  In- 
vertebrate.    468-472. 

(I)  As  to  Size  and  Strength.    468-471. 

(A)  Disadvantages  of  the  Forms  without  any  Solid  Framework.  468. 

(B)  Disadvantages  of  the  Forms  with  External  Framework.  469. 

(C)  Advantages  of  the  Vertebrates  in  the  Possibility  of  a  Body  of 
Considerable  Bulk  and  Strength.     470. 

(II)  Possibility  of  Longer  Life  with  no  frequent  Metamorphoses.    471. 

B.  Advantages  of  Man  among  the  Vertebrates  in  these  Particulars.   472-475. 

(I)  As  to  Size  and  Strength.     472. 
(II)  As  to  Length  of  Life.     473-475. 

(A)  Man  has  Most  Life.     473. 

(B)  Taking  into  account  the  Effect  of  both  Size  of  Body  and  of  the 
Life-Plan  on  Duration  of  Life,  Man's  is  the  most  advantageous 
Organization.     474. 

II.  The  Human  Body  has  the  most  Advantageous  Organization  as  to  the  Out- 
side Necessities  of  Life.     475-480. 

A.  In  Requirements  as  to  Food.    475-479. 

(I)  Man  is  not  restricted  to  either  Vegetable  or  Meat  Diet  for  Preserva- 
tion of  Life.     475. 
(II)  No  important  Modifications  of  Man's  Vital  Activities  follow  consid- 
erable Restrictions  in  either  Quantity  or  Kind  of  Food.    476-479. 

(A)  As  to  Quantity.     476. 

(B)  As  to  Kind.     477-478. 

i.  Indications  in  Animals.     477. 
ii.  As  Applied  to  Man.     We  need  to  Appeal  to  Experience. 

478. 

(C)  The  Appeal  to  Experience  in  Man,  as  to  both  the  Quantity  and 
Kind  of  Food. 

B.  In  Capacity  for  Acclimatization.     480. 

(I)  Man  is  not  dependent  on  One  Kind  of  Food. 

(II)  And  is   Able   to   protect  himself  against  the  Results  of  Climate, 
through  the  Hands.    Transition. 


37 

III.  The  Human  Body  has  the  most  Adv*antageous  Organization,  in  that  the 
Arms  and  Hands  are  left  free  as  Instruments  of  Action — so  necessitating  the 
Upright  Position.     480-489. 

A.  The  Real  Differentiation  of  Man's  Body  from  other  Animal  Bodies  is  in 
the  Free  and  Many-sided  Function  of  the  Arms.     480. 

B.  This  necessitates  the  Upright  Position  in  a  Mammal. — Causes  of  the  Up- 
right Position.     481-486. 

(I)  The  Matter  is  different  in  other  Orders,   481. 

(A)  In  Lower  Orders. 

(B)  In  Birds,  whose  Structure  does  solve  the  Mechanical  Problem 
involved.     482. 

(II)  In  a  Mammal  other  Devices  would  be  necessary — the  Simplest  being 
the  Erection  of  the  Longitudinal  Axis  and  the  resulting  Modifica- 
tions.    483. 

(A)  Formation  of  the  Legs,  especially  their  Bulkiness. 

i.  As  Counterpoise, 
ii.  To  provide  for  Powerful  Muscular  Action. 

(B)  Formation  of  the  Foot,  fitting  Man  alone  for  the  Erect  Posture. 
485. 

C.  The  Question  of  the  Effects  of  this  Upright  Position  on  the  Structure  and 
Operations  of  the  Body.     486-489. 

(I)  No  important  Reaction  on  the  Structure  and  Functions  of  the  In- 
ternal Organs  can  be  ascertained.     486. 
(II)  Even  in  External  Structure  of  the  upper  part  of  the  Body,  we  find 
but  One  Considerable  Distinction — the  Different  Position  of  the 
Maximum  Diameter.     487. 
(Ill)  As  to  the  Formation  of  the  Head. 

(A)  We  can  not  prove  it  to  be  a  Necessary  Result  of  the  Upright 
Position. 

(B)  But  may  see  in  it  that  Variation  which  offered  the  most  distinct 
Expression  of  an  Inner  Life  intended  for  a  higher  destiny. 
Transition.     488. 

IV.  The  Human  Body  is  at  the  Head  of  the  Scale  of  Creatures  in  Beauty  of 
Form,  as  reflecting  the  most  Significant  Inner  Life  and  every  slightest  feature 
of  it  most  distinctly  and  simply.     489-494. 

A.  This  is  not  the  Beauty  of  a  False  Symbolism,  but  True  Beauty.    489-492. 

(I)  A  mere  Symbolism  is  utterly  empty.     489. 
(II)  But  there  is  an  Expressive  Beauty  of  Form.     490. 

(A)  Not  as  though  the  Forms  were  significant  of  themselves. 

(B)  But  as  Manifestations  making  possible  the  Joy  of  Reciprocal 
Existence,  and  so  a  genuine  Beauty  reflecting  Life.     491, 

B.  In  such  a  Genuine  Beauty,  the  Human  Body  Excels.    492-494. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Varieties  op  the  Human  Race. 

A  Discussion  of  the  Problem  of  the  Specific  Unity  or  Diversity  of  the  Human 
Race  ;  an  Investigation  of  the  Possible  Hypotheses  of  the  Origin  of  the  Varieties 
of  the  Race  ;  and  a  Characterization  of  the  Five  Leading  Types, 

Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  i . 


38 

An  Inquiry  as  to  the  Conditions  of  the  Origin  of  Individual  Forms  within  a 

family. 

Introduction.     495. 

A.  Very  inconsiderable  Modifications  of  the  Corporeal  Constitution  occur 
after  Birth  ;  yet  New  Individual  Peculiarities  of  Formation  appear  in  the 
course  of  generations  within  the  Family.     496. 

B.  A  Possible  Theory  to  account  for  these  Variations.     497-505. 

(I)  Obstacles  in  the  way  of  these  Variations  becoming  fixed  and  propa- 
gated. 

(A)  Propagation  by  Seed.     497-499. 

1.  The  Contrasted  Methods  of  Propagation  in  Plants, 
ii.  But  in  the  Higher  Animal  World,  Propagation  is  only  by 
Seed.    498. 

(B)  Crossing  of  different  Species.     499-500. 

(II)  Some  further  Probable  Generalizations  from  Experience  as  to  the 
Influence  of  the  Bodily  Formation  of  the  Parents  on  that  of  the 
Child.  500-502. 
(Ill)  The  Resulting  Probable  Theory  of  the  Origin  of  Individual  Pecul- 
iarities is  that  the  Reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  Pervading  Unity  in 
Organic  Form.     502-505. 

(A)  This  may  account  for  Considerable  Variation  inside  a  Family  in 
the  course  of  generations.    502. 

(B)  And  also  for  Observed  Resemblances  to  Animals.    503-505. 

i.  The  Possible  Application  of  the  Theory.     503. 
ii.  The  Extent  of  these  Resemblances.     504. 
iii.  Yet  it  is  doubtful  how  much  Importance  is  to  be  attached 
to  these  Resemblances.     505. 
I,  A  Discussion  of  the  Problem  of  the  Specific  Unity  or  Diversity  of  the  Race. 
505-511. 
Introduction.     505-507. 

(I)  The  Tenacious  Persistency  of  Species.     505. 
(II)  Two  Possible  Interpretations  of  Original  Unity — a  mere  General 
Type  as  in  Plants,  or  One  Actual  Original  Form.     507. 

A.  Considerations  favoring  an  Actual  Single  Source  of  all  Races.     508. 

B.  Considerations  favoring  a  Number  of  Race  Forms.     509. 

(I)  The  Question  is  one  of  Fact — as  to  the  Possibilities  of  Variation  for 
Nature  in  the  C:ircumstances,  and  these  are  difficult  to  determine. 
(II)  The  Facts  seem  to  indicate  the  Original  Difference  of  a  Number  of 
Race  Forms. 
II.  An  Investigation  of  the  Possible  Hypotheses  as  to  the  Origin  of  the  Race. 

5"-5i^- 

A.  Historical  Observations  on  Man  do  not  seem  to  prove  that  any  Fluctu- 
ating Elements  of  Climate,  Habitat,  etc.,  are  capable  of  bringing  about 
such  extensive  Alterations  in  human  development,  as  are  indicated  in  the 
Race  Forms.     51 1-5 13.  • 

B.  The  same  Result  seems  indicated  by  Observations  in  the  Animal  World. 

513- 

C.  Experience  therefore,  on  the  whole,  is  not  in  favor  of  any  very  Important 
Modifying  Power  in  the  External  Influences  with  which  we  are  at  present 
acquainted.     514. 


I 


• 


39 

D.  And,  in  any  case,  these  Climatic  Influences  are  to  be  regarded  as  merely 
Subsidiary  Conditions,  taking  advantage  of  some  Natural  Tendency  in 
the  Formative  Influence.  514-516. 

(I)  Statement  of  the  Theory.     515. 
(II)  Its  Advantages  in  Explanation. 

III.  Characterization  of  the  Five  Leading  Race  Forms.     §  3. 

A.  The  Negroes.     516-518. 

B.  The  Red  Indians.     518. 

C.  The  Malays.     519. 

D.  The  Mongolians. 

E.  The  Caucasians.    520. 

IV.  Supplementary  Observations.     §  4. 

A.  The  Difficulty  of  accurately  interpreting  the  Significance  of  these  Race 
Types  and  the  Variations  from  them.     520-522. 

{!)  Even  as  to  the  Influence  of  Climate.     521. 
(II)  Or  of  the  Results  of  Crossing. 

B.  The  Notions  of  Species  and  Variety.     522-525. 

(I)  Mere  Names  settle  Nothing.     522. 

(II)  The  Admitted  Fact  of  the  Fruitfulness  of  Intermarriages  between 
the  Races  does  not  at  all  settle  the  question  of  the  original  Unity  of 
the  Race. 
(Ill)  Nor  can  the  term  Variety  carry  with  it  the  Assertion  that  the  Races 
have  been  evolved  from  a  common  Primitive  Stock  by  means  of 
External  Influences.  523. 
Conclusion  of  Book  IV.     §5. 

A.  Transition  to  Book  V.     525. 

B.  Relation  to  Darwinism.     526. 

There  is  no  occasion  for  restatement  in  view  of  this  Theory,  since  these 
Views  have  already  been  anticipated,  and  the  Convictions  with  which  we 
would  meet  their  claims  stated  with  sufficient  Explicitness. 


BOOK   V. 
MIND. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Mind  and  Soul. 

An  Attempt  to  show  how  an  Essential  Peculiarity  of  the  Human  Mind  (as  con- 
trasted with  Animal  Souls)  must  be  thought,  should  the  Examination  of  Facts 
compel  us  to  presuppose  such ;  undertaken  not  in  order  to  settle  Metaphysical 
Questions,  but  merely  to  indicate  the  Point  of  View  of  our  next  Inquiry. 
Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     531-532. 

Three  Questions  proposed  as  to  the  Relation  of  the  Mental  Life  of  Man  to 
that  of  the  Lower  Animals. 


40 


A.  Is  it  possible  to  name  any  preponderantly  Important  Power,  any  definite 
Faculty  added  to  Human  Nature  by  means  of  which  its  Development  is 
carried  far  beyond  the  Limits  of  Animal  Activity?     531. 

B.  Or  if  in  Man  Capacities  common  to  the  Lower  Animals  are  only  carried 
farther,  can  we  point  to  any  Circumstances  that  explain  this  Sudden  Ad- 
vance, announced  by  no  Preparatory  and  Instrumental  Intermediate 
Stages  ? 

C.  Or,  are  we  mistaken  here,  and  do  the  various  Conditions  of  Human  Life 
really  form  a  Series  of  Progressive  Stages  of  Development  that  lead  unin- 
terruptedly from  the  torpor  of  Animal  Life  to  the  Summit  of  Human 
Culture  ? 

I.  The  Conception  of  the  Addition  in  Man  of  the  Rational  Mind  to  the  Sentient 
Soul  of  Animals.     Duality  of  Mind  and  Soul.     §  i. 
Introduction.    532. 

A.  A  Distinct  Conception  of  the  Reciprocal  Relation  of  Mind  and  Soul  is 
possible.     532-534. 

(1)  The  Higher  Nature  of  the  Mind  would  on  the  one  hand  unfold  its 
own  Inner  Life,  on  the  other  exert  a  modifying,  guiding,  and  direct- 
ing Influence  on  the  Action  of  the  Soul,  and  through  it  on  the  Body, 
533- 

(II)  There  is  thus  possible  the  Image  of  a  close  and  not  unfruitful  Con- 
nection of  two  Beings  that  in  distinct  separation  from  one  another 
carry  on  the  mechanical  action  of  Psychical  Reciprocity.     534. 

B.  Considerations  unfavorable  to  this  Conception  of  Duality.  This  Sunder- 
ing of  two  Supersensible  Powers  has  nothing  to  recommend  it  but  the 
Remembrance  of  the  Animal  World.     535. 

II.  The  Possible  Conception  of  the  Essential  Peculiarity  of  the  Human  Mind, 
when  this  Duality  of  Mind  and  Soul  is  set  aside.     Question  i.     §  2-4. 
A.  General  Conception  of  the  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul.     §  2. 

Introduction.     Any  Higher  Faculty  in  Man  is  to  be  thought  not  as  added 
to  the  Stock  of  the  Animal  Soul,  but  as  involved  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Human  Soul  from  its  beginning.     535. 
(I)  The  Soul  is  not  to  be  thought  as  formed  from  a  Psychic  Substance. 
536-540. 

(A)  The  generalizing  process  of  Conception  leads  us  naturally  to 
convert  a  Name,  given  originally  to  Beings  recognized  as  Het- 
erogeneous (though  with  common  form  of  being  and  acting), 
into  a  Name  for  a  Homogeneous  content  or  Nature,  and  so  come, 
e.  g.  to  the  conception  of  material  substance  as  common  to 
things.     536. 

(B)  A  similar  process  in  Psychology  leads  to  the  Conception  of 
Souls  and  of  Psychic  Substance.     538-540. 

i.  The  Conception  of  Souls.     538. 
ii.  The  Conception  of  Psychic  Substance.     539. 

a.  The  End  sought  is  to  secure  a  firm  and  durable  Nucleus. 

b.  Its  Impossibility.     No  changes  in  a  Psychic  Substance 
can  explain  the  Differences  in  Souls. 

(II)  The  Soul  is  not  to  be  thought  as  a  Simple  Quality.     This  gives  no 
adequate  Source  of  the  Variety  in  Mental  Development.     540. 

(III)  But  the  Nature  of  the  Soul  is  to  be  found  in  its  Original  Diverse 
Content.     541-543. 


41 


'II    •> 


(A)  It  is  essential  to  conceive  the  Soul  as  constantly  interposing 
anew  in  all  its  Operations.     541. 

(B)  This  mode  of  conceiving  the  Soul  is  in  harmony  with  the  way 
in  which  we  view  the  Nature  of  other  Things.     542. 

B.  Remarks  as  to  the  Mode  in  which  this  Conception  is  to  be  framed.    What 
is  meant  by  the  Nature  of  the  Soul?     §  3-4. 
(I)  Restatement  of  the  Previous  Conclusion  as  to  the  Nature  of  the 
Soul. — The  Essential  Content  of  the  Soul  lies  in  what  the  Soul  be- 
comes in  the  Course  of  its  Development.  (Cf.  Book  II.,  chapter  ii., 

§6-7.)     543- 
(II)  Supplementary  Considerations.     Can  we  regard  as  the  Original  Con- 
tent of  the  Soul  the  Idea  of  its  Development — the  Idea  within  each 
Soul  that  expands  into  the  Variety  of  Manifold  Activities,  as  into 
its  Natural  Results  ?     544-556. 

(A)  The  Reality  of  the  Idea.     Rest  of  §  3. 

i.  The  Natural  Search  for  a  fixed  insoluble  Core  of  Reality. 

546. 
ii.  In  truth,   •*  Reality  "  is  but  an  Abstraction  from  the  differ- 
ent and  manifold  Real  Things;    the  Real  is  the  Content — 
the  Idea,  embodied  in  a  manner  incomprehensible  by  us,  in 
the  Form  of  Efficacious  Substantiality.     547. 
iii.  The  Nature  of  Things  is  not  Existence  or  Activity.    548. 

a.  The  Notion  involved  of  a  Subjectless  Action  is  unthink- 
able.    549, 

b.  Nor  could  we  form  any  consistent  Conception  of  the  way 
in  which  Things  could  present  themselves  to  us  if  their 
Essence  consisted  wholly  in  Activity. 

(B)  The  Unity  of  the  Idea.     §  4. 

i.  Objections  to  the  Idea  as  necessarily  Complex.    551, 
ii.  Failure  of  the  Theory  of  the  Nature  of  Things  as  a  Simple 
Primitive  Quality.     552-553. 

a.  Either  the  Simple  Quality  is  only  a  new  Name.   552. 

b.  Or  it  gives  no  real  Unity,  since  it  is  without  the  germ  of 
Variety  which  is  indispensable. 

iii.   How  can  the  Content  of  an  Idea  have  the  Unity  which  is 
indispensable  to  the  Existent?    553-555. 

a.  The  Double  Meaning  of  Idea,  as  expressing  first  the  Con- 
tent of  Things,  and  secondly  the  Form  of  the  Thought- 
Image  in  which  we  reproduce  that  Content.     554. 

b.  The  Idea,  in  the  first  sense,  is  capable  of  Original  Unity. 

c.  And  is  especially  Appropriate  to  express  the  Essence  of  a 
Thing. 

(C)  Conclusion  on  the  Idea  as  constituting  the  Nature  of  a  Thing. 
It  is  not  meant  that  Thought  and  Being  are  identical.  Mind 
and  Mental  Life  are  more  than  Thinking.     555. 

III.  Conclusion  of  the  Chapter.     §  5. 

A.  As  to  Man's  Position  in  the  Realm  of  Souls.     556-558. 

(I)  It  is  important  to  Know  not  the  Relative  Position  of  Man  in  a  Scale. 
556. 
(II)  But  his  Actual  Relation  in  Experience  with  other  Beings.     557, 

B.  As  to  Question  II.  of  the  Introduction.     558-561. 


42 

(I)  The  Difficulties  of  a  Definite  Answer. 

(A)  Apart  from  Experience,  the  Answer  could  hardly  be  expected 
from  anything  short  of  the  Final  Results  of  Speculation.     558. 

(B)  The  Appeal  to  Experience  is  liable  to  two  Opposite  Errors.  559. 

i.  Magnifying  the  Differences  between  Men  and  Animals, 
ii.  Overestimating  the  External  Aids  of  Working.     560. 
(II)  Its  Irrelevancy,  since  in  any  case  the  Human  Development  is  the 
Higher,  and  the  possession  of  this  forms  the  Abiding  Distinction 
between  Men  and  Animals. 
C.  As  to  Question  III.,  and  Transition  to  chapter  ii.    561. 

It  is  proposed  to  show  in  the  Further  Inquiry  that  there  are  definite  At- 
tributes or  Characteristic  Habits  of  Working  which  are  common  to  all 
Human  Souls,  and  which  distinguish  Men  from  the  Lower  Animals. 

CHAPTER   II. 

Human  Sentience. 

An  Attempt  to  bring  into  relief  the  Distinctive  Characteristics  of  Human  Sen- 
tience (as  compared  with  that  of  the  Lower  Animals),  both  in  what  it  Receives 
and  in  what  it  impels  Man  to  Do. 

Introduction.     563-564. 

A.  Reasons  for  treating  Sentience.     563. 

B.  The  Physical  Causes  of  our  Sensations  are  not  to  be  considered. 

I.  The  Distinctive  Characteristic  of  Human  Sentience,  as  to  what  it  Receives. 
It  never  apprehends  Impressions  as  mere  indifferent  Content,  but  in  the  ac- 
companying Feeling  becomes  aware,  not  merely  of  their  Value  for  us,  but 
of  an  Intrinsic  Value.     §  1-2. 
Introduction.     564-567. 
A  Theory  of  a  real  Correspondence  of  Stimuli  and  Sensations. 
(I)  A  Misleading  Form  of  this  Theory.     564. 

(A)  Statement  of  the  Theory. 

(B)  Its  Failure  in  that  it  gives  only  Fancies  a<^tf«/ Sensation,  not  the 
peculiar  Fancy  of  Sensation  itself.     565. 

(II)  A  Proper  Application  of  the  Theory,  and  the  true  Form  of  the  Ques- 
tion of  the  Meaning  of  our  Sensations — What  Meaning  does  the 
Sentient  Soul  itself  inevitably  connect  with  these  Processes,  at  the 
Moment  of  their  Performance.     566. 

A.  The  Comparison  of  Animal  and  Human  Sentience.     The  rest  of  §  I. 

(I)  As  concerns  the  Qualitative  Content  of  the  Sensations.    567-568. 
(II)  As  to  the  Accompanying  Feeling.    569-573. 

(A)  In  Man,  emotional  Intensity  declines  in  the  Higher  Senses,  and 
Judgment  becomes  more  prominent.     569. 

(B)  Hence  follows  the  Essential  Distinction  between  Human  and 
Animal  Sentience.  Human  Sentience  becomes  aware  of  In- 
trinsic Value.     570. 

i.  The  Comparison.     571. 
ii.  The  Facts  as  to  Man. 

B.  The  Consonance  of  the  Nature  of  our  Sensations  with  the  Stimuli  to 
which  they  correspond.     §  2. 

(I)  The  Discerning  of  an  Intrinsic  Value  in  Sensations  is  a  Distinctive 


V 


i 


4 


T' 


43 

Feature  of  our  Sentience,  and  of  great  Influence  on  our  View  of  the 
World.     573. 

(II)  Examples.     574-577- 

(A)  Light.     574. 

i.  Puts  all  Things  in  Relations.     575. 

ii.  Just  this  Significance  seems  to  be  given  in  the  Sensations  of 
Radiance  and  Color. 

(B)  Sound  seems  to  give  the  Inner  Nature  of  Things.     577. 
Conclusion  on  the  Meaning  of  Sensations. 

II.  The  Distinctive  Characteristic  of  Human  Sentience  in  what  it  Impels  Man 
to  Do.  It  gives  to  his  Action  a  Form  in  virtue  of  which  it  takes  its  Place  in 
the  special  System  of  an  Order  of  Life  (as  if  discerning  an  Intrinsic  Value), 
not  merely  in  Nature.     §  3-5. 

A.  Esthetic  Judgment.     §  3. 
Introduction  and  Transition.     578. 

(I)  Symmetry  in  Space  and  Time.     We  think  we  can  discern  in  both  an 
Inherent  Order.     579. 
(II)  Mathematical  Aspect  of  Sense  Imagination.     580-581. 

(A)  Man  is  alone  the  Counting  Animal,  in  the  sense  of  discerning 
each  Number  in  its  Place  in  an  Infinite  Series.     580. 

(B)  All  sorts  of  Ideas  as  to  Relations  of  Magnitude  easily  and  early 
find  their  way  into  our  Minds.     581. 

(III)  These  are  but  Illustrations  of  the  ^Esthetic  Judgment  to  which  our 
Phantasy  subjects  the  Forms  and  Events  of  Nature.     582-586, 

(A)  In  the  New  Ordering  of  Natural  Relations.     582-584. 

i.  In  Nature.     582. 
ii.  In  Life.     583. 

(B)  In  Expanding  our  Sentience  in  the  Understanding  and  Sympa- 
thetic Enjoyment  of  Alien  Forms  of  Existence.     584-586. 

i.  The  Notion  of  a  Relationship  never  arises  within  us,  with- 
out some  Feeling  of  Pleasure  or  Pain  appropriate  to  the  Re- 
lationship. 584. 
ii.  Unquestionably  the  Vividness  of  these  Perceptions  is  added 
to  by  our  abiding  Remembrance  of  the  Activity  of  our  own 

Body. 

B.  The  Two  Classes  of  Action,  corresponding  to  the  two  Characteristics  of 

the  iEsthetic  Judgment.     §  4-5. 
(I)  Action  in  which  there  is  an  Expansion  of  our  Sentience.     §4. 
(A)  The  Use  of  Implements.     586-1)90. 

i.  In  the  Use  of  one's  own  Body,  especially  the  Hand,  one  is 
guided  by  a  Feeling  of  Situation  apparently  immediate.  586. 
ii.  As  the  Tool-using  Animal,  Man  is  guided  continually  by  a 
Double  Feeling  of  Contact — as  if  by  an  Extension  of  Sen- 
tience into  the  Tool — on  which  all  Use  of  Implements  de- 
pends. 587-589. 
iii.   Further  Considerations.     589-590. 

a.  An  extraordinary  Amount  of  Assistance  in  the  Investiga- 
tion of  Objects  comes  from  this  Character  of  our  Sense 
of  Touch.     589. 

b.  Not  only  the  Hands,  but  the  Whole  Body  is  capable  of 
Similar  Perceptions. 


I 


If 


44 

c.  These  Phenomena  furnish  a  Natural  Explanation  of  the 
Illusion  of  the  Omnipresence  of  our  Souls  in  our  Bodies. 
(B)  Customs  of  Ornament  and  Dress.     590-595. 
Introduction.     590. 

The  Theory.  Much  of  the  Pleasure  in  Ornament  and  Dress 
arises  from  the  Extension  of  our  Sentience  in  them,  and  the 
consequent  heightened  and  ennobled  Vital  Feeling  of  the 
Wearer. 

i.  Examples  of  Different  Forms  of  Extended  Sentience.    Coi- 
592.  ^^ 

a.  In  the  case  of  a  Rod. 

(i)  Horizontal, 
(ii)  Perpendicular. 

b.  In  the  case  of  a  Ball  suspended  by  a  Thread. 

c.  In  the  case  of  a  Hollow  Vessel. 

ii.   Corresponding  Instincts  in  Dress.     592-595. 

a.  Head  and  Foot-wear.     592. 

b.  Hanging  and  Waving  Drapery.     593-594. 

c.  Clothes  in  the  strict  sense.     594-595. 

(II)  Action  in  which  there  is  a  New  Ordering  of  Natural  Relations. 
Ceremonious  Order.     §  5. 

(A)  In  Movement  of  the  Body.     596. 

(B)  In  all  Social  Arrangements.     597. 
Conclusion  of  the  Chapter.     598-600. 

A.  Summary  of  the  Distinctive  Characteristics  of  Human  Sentience.    598. 

B.  Human  Sentience  is  the  Intensest  and  Richest.     599. 

CHAPTER  III. 
Speech  and  Thought. 

An  Investigation  of  Speech  and  Thought  as  Characteristic  Endowments  of 
Man;  showing  the  Share  of  the  Body  in  the  Formation  of  Speech,  and  the  close 
Relation  of  Speech  and  Thought,  in  that  Thought  comes  to  Manifestation  in  the 
Organization  of  Language,  and  is  aided  by  the  latter  in  its  Operations 

Introduction.     The  Carrying  off  of  Excitation  by  Movement  Generally.     §  i 

A.  In  case  of  Inconsiderable  Stimuli.     601. 

B.  In  case  of  Powerful   Stimuli.     Three  modes  of  transference  of  Excita- 
tion.     602. 

I.  The  Share  of  the  Body  in  the  Formation  of  Speech.     §  2. 

A.  Special  importance  of  the  Change  of   Respiratory  Movements  for   the 
Carrying  off  Excitation.     604. 

B.  The  addition  of  Voice  in  many  Animals. 

(I)  The  Fact. 

(II)  Consequent  Physical  Predisposition  to  Expression  of  Inner  States 
by  Tone.     605. 

C.  The  Reasons  why  only  Man  has  developed  Voice  into  Speech.     No  gen 
eral  Articulation  of  Sounds  in  Animals.     605-613. 

Introduction.     606. 

(I)  Defective  Sense  of  Hearing  in  Animals.     607-610. 
(A)  Lack  of  Susceptibility  for  Harmonic  Intervals. 


\ 


i 


45 

(B)  The  Distinctions  of  Articulate  Speech-sounds  have  for  them  no 
emphatic  ^Esthetic  Value. 

(C)  Hence,  only  Man  shows  Susceptibility  for  an  Objective  Truth 
in  Sounds,  such  as  gives  the  real  sound-material  of  Speech. 
608. 

i.  In  case  of  Vowel  Sounds. 
ii.  In  case  of  Consonant  Sounds.     607. 
iii.  Conclusion. 
(II)  Imperfection  of  Vocal  Mechanism  in  Animals.     610. 

(A)  In  all  Animals  having  Voice,  there  is  probably  some  impulse  to 
Vocal  Expression. 

(B)  But  in  Man  alone  probably  is  there  a  true  Corporeal  Organ  of 
Speech,  as  is  shown  by  comparison  with  Animals.     61 1, 

D.  Even  Modifications  of  Vowels  and  Consonants  in  the  Inflexion  and  Com- 
position of  Words  may  be  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  Organic  Conditions. 
613. 

(I)  Acoustic.     614. 
(II)   Phonetic. 
(Ill)  Grammatical. 
II.  Relation  of  Speech  to  Thought.     §  3-6. 

A.  Speech  begins  Wuh  the  Meaning  attached  to  Articulate  Sounds.     §  3. 

(I)  The  Origin  of  the  Meaning  of  the  Simplest  Words  can  hardly  be 
discerned.     615. 
(II)  The  Origin  of  Expressions  for  Supersensible  Ideas  and  Relation- 
ships.    616. 

{^A)  Due  to  Vigorous  Comparative  Imagination. 
(B)  And  to  the  Influence  of  National  Characteristics.     617. 

B.  Detailed  consideration  of  the   Relation  between  Speech   and  Thought. 

§  4-6. 

(I)  Thought  comes  to  Manifestation  in  the  Organ  of  Speech.     §  4. 

Introduction. 

i.  The   end   of  Speech  is  not   merely  the  Communication  of 

Thoughts,  but  also  of  Feelings.     618. 

ii.  But  such  expression  of  Feeling,  only  so  far  as  it  may  come 

under  the  forms  of  Thought.     619. 

(A)  The  peculiar  nature  of  Thought  as  contrasted  with  the  Train  of 
Ideas. 

(B)  This  peculiar  Activity  of  Thought  comes  to  Manifestation  in 
the  Organization  of  Language.     621. 

i.  Language  separates  the  simple  Elements  of  Thought  in  its 
Distinction  of  the  Parts  of  Speech,  e.  g.,  in    Nouns,  Ad- 
jectives and  Verbs. 
ii.  It  is  no  Objection  to   this   View,  that  the  Distinction  be- 
tween the  Parts  of  Speech  is  not  embodied  in  special  sound- 
forms,  as  the  great  number  of  Syntactical  Forms  of  Lan^ 
guage  show.     624. 
iii.  Even  the  Peculiar  Thought  of  a  Nation  becomes  embodied 
in  its  Language,  especially  in  its  earlier  forms.     625. 
(II)  Thought  is  aided  by  Language  in  its  Operations,  in  spite  of  seeming 
Disadvantages.     §  5  and  6  to  page  638. 


tl 

ll 

i 


46 

(A)  Two  seeming  Disadvantages  in  the  Influence  of  Language  on 
Thought,  which  do  have  real  danger  for  thinking,  and  yet  are 
important  and  necessary,     g  5. 
i.   Importance  of  Names.     627. 

ii.  The  existence  of  a  Multitude  of  Modes  of  Expression  \vith' 
which  Thought  cannot  keep  pace,  especially  the  Substan- 
tializing of  Dependent  Conceptions.     628. 

a.  Statement.     629. 

b.  This  Tendency  is  dangerous  for  our  Thinking,  and  yet 
it  is  indispensable  for  a  full  Apprehension  of  the  World. 
630. 

(B;  Two  further  seeming  Disadvantages,  which  in  general  are  not 
so  at  all,  but  are  Real    and   Valuable  Aids   to  Thinking      8  6 
631-638.  ^'     ^    ' 

i.  The  fact  that  the  Order  of  the  Sentence  is  not  the  order  of 

Thought. 

ii.  The  amount  of  Time  which  Words  occupy.     632. 

a.  This  seems  a  real  hindrance. 

b.  But  wordless  ideation  is  possible.     633. 

c.  Yet  Language  is  here  a  Help  not  a  hindrance.     634, 

(i)  Defensively— The  Objection  here  made  against  Lan- 
guage is  really  an  objection  against  all  human 
Thinking:  for  Language  is  here  but  the  Reproduc- 
tion of  the  necessarily  Discursive  Tendency  of  our 
Thought.     635. 

(a)  Only  Moments  and  Fragments  of  Silent  Insight 
are  possible  to  us. 

(b)  The  finite  mind  must  use  Analogies.     636. 

(ii)  Positively— This  Discursive  Thought  would  remain 
very  imperfect  without  Language.     637. 
(Ill)  Moreover,  Conversation  contributes   much  to   high  Human  Devel- 
opment.     638. 


CHAPTER   IV. 


Knowledge  and  Truth. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Difference  between  Human  Intelligence  and  the  Idea- 
tion  of  Brutes,  as  existing,  not  in  the  Mechanism,  but  in  the  Ideal  Nature  of 
Man's  Mind;  that  is,  not  in  any  peculiar  forms  of  connection,  but  in  the  Pro- 
gressiveness  of  Man's  Nature  as  seen  in  his  immeasurably  Wider  Intellectual  Hori- 
zon,  in  the  Stages  of  Reflection  and  in  the  Attainment  of  both  the  Conception  of 
Truth  and  of  at  least  some  measure  of  Knowledge  of  it. 

General  Introduction  to  the  Chapter,     g  1-2. 

A.  The  Progressiveness  of  Man  as  due  to  the  Peculiar  Nature  of  the  Human 
Soul,     g  I. 

(I)  The  Cooperation  in  all  Progress  both  of  the  Natural  Capacities  of 
the  Mind  and  of  the  Influence  of  Historical  Development.     640. 

(A)  Seen  in  Language. 

(B)  And  Everywhere.     641. 

(II)  Danger  of  Exaggeration  as  to  either  of  the  two  Elements  of  Progress. 


\f 


47 

# 

(III)  The  True  View  of  the  Causes  determining  the  various  levels  of  Devel- 
opment reached  by  the  diff'erent  Animated  Beings.     642. 

(A)  These  Levels  are  not  due  chiefly  to  External  Conditions. 

(B)  But  to  the  Peculiar  Nature  of  the  Psychic  Life  to  be  developed. 
643. 

(IV)  Now  the  Peculiarity  of  the  Human  Psychic  Life  is  precisely  this 
Methodical  Pursuit  of  Development, — Progressiveness.     644. 
B.  The  Necessity  of  the  Conception  of  the  Mechanical  Realization  of  this 
peculiar  Ideal  Nature  of  the  Mind,     g  2, 

(I)  The  Conception  of  the  Ideal  Nature  of  the  Mind.     645. 

(II)  The  Conception  of  how  the  Ideal  Nature  of  the  Mind  acquires  Power 
in  the  Mechanism  of  Development.     646. 

(A)  The  Analogy  in  plant  life. 

(B)  How  far  Applicable  to  the  Mind.    648 

(C)  How  far  Inapplicable.  In  the  development  of  the  mind  there  is 
a  harmony  of  necessary  connection  indeed,  but  also  one  of 
aesthetic  justice,  an  ideal  harmony  referable  to  the  original  con- 
tent of  the  mind.     649. 

(Ill)  This  Theory,  therefore,  completely  reconciles  the  Conflicting  Views 
of  Mental  Life, — the  Mechanical  and  Ideal.     650. 
L  The  Distinctive  Nature  of  Human  Intelligence  in  the  Stages  of  Reflection. 

§3-4. 
Introduction. 

(I)  General  idea  of  the  Distinctive  Nature  of  the  Human  Mind.    652, 
(II)  This  Distinctive  Diff^erence  must  be  thought  in  one  of  two  ways,  as 
the  possession  of  peculiar  Forms  of  Connection,  or  as  greater  Com- 
pleteness or  Many-sidedness  of  Action  in  the  use  of  these  forms  of 
connection — Progressiveness.    653. 

(III)  In  any  case,  for  the  largest  advance,  the  Latter  must  come  in. 

A.  In  the  Second  Stage  of  Reflection,— Recognition  of  Relations   arising 
from  the  Mechanism  of  the  Inner  States,     g  3. 

(I)  The  Distinctive  Diff"erence  does  not  consist  in  the  Existence  of  the 
Stage  itself  nor  in  any  of  the  Relations  involved  in  it.     655. 
(II)  But  in  the  Completeness  and  Many-sidedness  of  the  Action.     The 
Progressiveness  of  Man  in  comparison  with  the  Animal.     656. 

(A)  The  Universal  Human  desire  for  Knowledge.     658. 

(B)  The  Universal  Human  Tendency  to  active  Dominion  over  the 
World.    659. 

(C)  The  Many-sidedness  of  development  in  Man  is  insured  by  his 
long  and  helpless  Childhood.     660. 

B.  In  the  Third  Stage  of  Reflection.    Detaching  the  General  from  the  Partic- 
ular.    §  4. 

(I)  Here,  too,  the  Distinctive  Diff"erence  in  Man  does  not  consist  in  the 
possession  of  peculiar  Forms  of  Connection.     661. 

(II)  But  in  the  Many-sidedness  of  Human  Ideation  here  which  makes  the 
general  image  into  a  law-giving  type  or  an  essential  nucleus  in  pro- 
gressiveness.    662. 

(A)  In  the  region  of  Knowledge.     663-667. 

i.  A  degree  of  Perfection  in  Concepts  is  reached  by  Man  in  his 
progressive  development  which  is  denied  to  Brutes.  663. 


48 

ii.  In  Human  Concepts  also  the  Universal  is  the  formative  law 
of  the  Particular.     666. 
(B)  In  Matters  of  Practice  a  similar  pervading  Sense  of  Order  is 
characteristically  Human.     667. 
II.  The  Distinctive  Nature  of  Human  Intelligence  in  the  Attainment  of  Truth. 

§5-6. 

A.  Coming  to  the  Conception  of  Truth.     §  5. 

(I)  Not  by  Innate  Ideas.     669. 
(II)  If  by  anything  Innate,  then  by  Innate  Judgments. 

(A)  Some  Judgments  seem  necessarily  true.     670. 

(B)  These  are  of  very  various  Origin. 

(C)  All  are  due  rather  to  the  whole  Mind  than  to  mere  Intelligence 
and  are  not  developed  without  Experience.     671, 

(D)  Of  the  very  few  which  may  be  regarded  as  original,  the  Law  of 
Identity  and  the  Law  of  Causality  may  be  taken  as  Examples. 
Whence  comes  their  necessity?     672. 

i.  Not  from  External  Experience — either  Observation  or  Ex- 
periment— nor  from  Internal  Phenomena, 
ii.  But  by  the  Law  of  Identity  itself.     673. 

a.  This  Law  is  a  primaiy  condition  of  any  possibility  of 
connection  between  things. 

b.  The  possible  Conception  of  Truth  so  reslilting  is  dis- 
tinctive of  the  Mind  of  Man  in  its  original  nature.    674. 

B.  Coming  to  the  Knowledge  of  Truth.     The  Development  of  Man's  natural 
Metaphysics.     §  6. 

(1)  Only  a  Gradual  Approximation  to  Truth  is  possible.     675. 
(II)  Since  the  most  Contradictory  Ideas  are  often  associated  together  in 
our  application  of  the  notion  of  Truth.     676.     e.  g. 

(A)  In  the  Application  of  the  Law  of  Identity. 

(B)  In  the  Application  of  the  Law  of  Causality.     677, 

(III)  An  example  of  the  average  height  of  Knowledge  attained  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  Human  Mind  may  be  found  in  the  Organization  of 
Language.  678. 

(IV)  There  is  thus  a  Gradual  Approximation  toward  the  Knowledge  of 
Truth.     680. 

Conclusion  of  Chapter.     681. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Conscience  and  Morality. 

An  Investigation  as  to  how  far  there  is  in  Man,  as  a  Distinctive  Peculiarity  of 
his  Nature,  an  Innate  Moral  Law  which  rules  his  Sentiments  and  a  Spiritual  Rev- 
elation which  Determines  his  Ends,  showing  that  Man  has  an  Ineradicable  Sense 
of  Duty,  but  that  the  Content  of  Duty,  especially  as  to  Ends,  is  developed  only 
by  Active  Co-operation  of  the  Intellect  and  through  Experience. 
Introduction  to  Chapter.     §  1-2. 

A.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Feelings.     §  i. 

(I)  The  various  Forms  of  a  Theory  of  the  World  formed  by  the  Philos- 
ophy of  the  Feelings.     682. 
(II)  All  these  Forms  assume  that  Reality  has  no  meaning  except  as  it  is 


49 

productive  of  Happiness,  whether  the  Feeling  be  Enthusiastic  or 
Despairing.     683. 
B.  The  probable  Meaning  of  Conscience  may  be  discerned  from  the  outset. 

(I)  This  Judgment  of  the  Worth  of  Things  must  Determine  our  Judg- 
ment of  our  own  Worth,  Ends,  and  Duty.     684. 
(II)  From  the  Analogy  of  Knowledge  there  is  probably  no  finished  and 

complete  Ideal  of  Action  as  a  Natural  Endowment  of  Man.     685. 
(Ill)  But  only  an  original  Sense  of  Obligation,  the  Content  of  which  must 
be  developed  through  Experience. 
I.  An  Investigation  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  so  far  as  they  are  related  to  Ethical 
Inquiry.     §  3-4. 

A.  Pleasure  and  Pain  as  Actual  Motives  to  Action.     §  3. 

Introduction.     Only  through  Feelings  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  do  we  pass 

into  the  sphere  of  Action  proper.     687. 
(I)  Pleasure  and  Pain  are  the  actual  Motives  to  Action  in  its  Historical 

Development.    688. 
(II)  The  notion  of  Worth.     689. 

(A)  Indissolubly  connected  with  the  notion  of  Pleasure. 

(B)  The  Austerity  of  Moral  systems  is  wrong  in  denying  this  con- 
nection.    690. 

i.  Kant. 
ii.  Other  Systems. 

a.  No  Worth  in  the  mere  Formal  Submission  to  the  Abso- 
lute.    691. 

(i)  We  must  assume  Feeling  in  God. 
(ii)  A  Conflict  of  Wills  is  not  in  itself  displeasing. 

b.  No  Meaning  can  be  attached  to  a  merely  Formal  Relation 

of  Wills.     692. 

(C)  Whatever  Mechanism  is  employed,  the  Goal  must  be  found  in 
Happiness.     693. 

B.  Pleasure  as  an  Ethical  Principle.     §  4. 

(I)  Pleasures  in  the  nature  of  the  case  are  necessarily  Qualitative,  cor- 
responding to  the  Inherent  Worth  peculiar  to  the  particular  case  of 
excitation.     694. 
(II)   So  conceived.  Pleasure  is  not  simply  Egoistic  nor  without  an  inner 
Principle  of  Judgment.     695-r- 
II.  The  Development  of  Morality.     §  5-6. 

A.   How  the  Impulses  to  Action  (in  Pleasure  and  Pain)  and  the  Conscious- 
ness of  their  Worth  originate.     §  5. 
(I)   Even  in  Emotions  of  Sense  many  conditions  tend  to  make  compar- 
tively  Subordinate  immediate  Physical  Enjoyment.    697. 
(II)  Emotions  of  Self.     698-706. 

(A)  The  gradual  Development  of  the  Emotions  of  Self  and  of  the 
Intensity  of  the  Instincts  of  Love  and  Hatred  at  the  same 
time.     698. 

(B)  Absolute  Egoism  is  theoretically  the  only  Original  Motive  Power. 
700. 

(C)  But  Natural  Egoism  is  necessarily  checked.     701. 

i.  In  Actual  Life, 
ii.  There  is  an  internal  Contradiction  in  Egoism  itself. 


i 


so 

a.  Man's  very  Egoistic  Pride  must  really  contain  the  germ 
of  a  higher  development  in  the  necessary  recognition 
of  some  well-established  ground  of  natural  comparison. 

b.  Even  the  very  Preference  which  the  Egoist  assumes  for 
himself  must  come  under  some  other  general  and  valid 
notion.     702. 

c.  This  hidden  Shackle  of  Egoism  is  soon  transformed  into 
an  external  bond.     704. 

d.  This  Non-Egoistic  Tendency  is  greatly  assisted  by  Man's 
uncvonquerable  impulse  toward  Imitation.     705. 

B.  The  Development  of  Morality  proper.     §  6. 
(I)  Instinctive  Obedience.      706. 

(A)  A  system  of  Traditional  Morality  growing  up  through  Expe- 
rience and  at  first  largely  external  may  give  a  powerful  Sense  of 
Obligation. 

(B)  The  Moral  Worth  of  such  a  Morality  depends  upon  its  Concep- 
tion of  the  Significance  and  End  of  Human  Life.     707. 

(II)  Progress  toward  Conscious  Principles  of  Action.     The  Contribution 
of  Reflection  to  the  Development  of  Morality.     708. 

(A)  Reflection  seeks  first  to  find  the  Reasons  for  appropriate  Action 
in  the  Nature  of  Man. 

(B)  But  later  sees  that  Man's  Factual  Nature  cannot  alone  give  a 
true  idea  of  his  End.     709. 

(C)  And  Religious  Views  may  contain  here  serious  error. 
Conclusion  of  Chapter.     §  7. 

A.  Man  has  an  Original  Sense  of  Duty,  but  (as  in  the  case  of  Knowledge)  its 
Details  come  only  gradually.     710. 

B.  So,  also,  there  is  only  a  Gradual  Extension  of  Morality  over  all  Life,  and 
especially  a  gradually  Deepening  Conception  of  the  Meaning  of  Life 
through  Reflection  and  Experience.    711. 

Conclusion  of  Book  V.  The  Capacity  of  becoming  Conscious  of  the  Infinite 
is  the  Distinguishing  Characteristic  of  the  Human  Mind.     §  8. 


BOOK  VI. 


THE  MICROCOSMIC  ORDER. 

THE    EVER-RECURRING    CONDITIONS    OF    MAN's    LIFE. 


CHAPTER   I. 

The  Influences  of  External  Nature. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Varied  Influences  of  External  Nature  upon  Man,  as 
one  of  the  Ever-recurring  Conditions  of  his  Life;  denying  any  mysterious  Paral- 
lelism between  the  Macrocosm  and  the  Microcosm,  and  showing  that  external 
Nature  has  chiefly  influenced  Man  through  the  perception  of  its  Ordered  Mech- 
anism. 


< 

4 


1 


51 

Introduction  to  the  Book.      History  and  the    Microcosmic  Order.     A  Com- 
parison between  the  Subjects  of  Books  VI.  and  VII.     §  i. 

A.  The  Constant  Elements  in  human  life  are  likely  to  be  overlooked  in 
comparison  with  the  phenomena  of  the  Historic  Progress  of  the  Race.   3. 

B.  Yet  these  Constant  Elements  include  practically  all  the  Springs  of  Emo- 
tion and  constitute  what  we  mean  by  the  Microcosmic  Order.     4. 

C.  To  investigate  this  Microcosmic  Order — the  Ever-recurring  Conditions 
of  Man's  Life — is  the  task  of  the  present  Book.     6. 

I.  An  Investigation  of  the  Eff'ects  of  Cosmic  and  Terrestrial  Influences  on  the 
Human  Soul,  that  is,  an  investigation  of  the  theory  of  a  mysterious  Parallel- 
ism between  the  Macrocosm  and  the  Microcosm.     §  2. 
Introduction. 

(I)  The  Statement  of  the  theory.     7. 
(II)  The  general  Objection  to  the  theory,  as  evincing  a  preference  for 
the    Unintelligible,   either  greatly   exaggerating  admitted  facts   or 
failing  to  trace  any  precise  connections  at  all. 

A.  The  supposed  Reflection  in  Man  of  Day  and  Night.     8. 

B.  The  Reflection  of  the  Seasons,  and  of  Geologic  Ages. 

C.  The  Parallelism  between  Natural  and  Spiritual  Revolutions.     9. 

D.  The  Mirroring  of  Climate  in  the  Character  of  a  people.     II. 

E.  The  Mirroring  of  the  General  Geographical  Character  of  a  Continent  in 
a  people.      12. 

II.  An  Investigation  of  the  more  Direct  Influences  of  External  Nature  upon 
Man.     §  3. 

A.  The  seeming  Proof  of  any  detailed  Reflection  of  the  Natural  Features  of 
a  Country  on  the  Character  of  its  Inhabitants  is  very  deceptive.      13. 

B.  "The  Life  with  Nature."  No  useful  results  in  the  inquiry  can  be  reached 
without  a  study  of  the  Necessary  Conditions  for  any  true  understanding 
of  the  Educative  Influence  of  Nature  on  Man.     15. 

(I)  The  Conditions  of  the  Capacity  for  the  reception  of  the  ^Esthetic 
Worth  of  Nature.     16. 

(A)  The  Culture   of  Social   Life   is   needed  to  give   a   permanent 
charm  to  nature. 

(B)  So  Nature  is  chiefly  enjoyed   as  the  Background  of  the  Work 
•  and  Associations  of  Life.     17. 

(II)  Hence  not  the  ^Esthetic  Worth  of  Nature,  but   the  steady  Immu- 
tability of  the  Mechanism  of  Nature  first   impressed   Man's  Sense 
through  Work,  and  became  here  his  chief  Educator.     19. 
III.  Conclusion  on  the  Relation  of  Man  to  Nature.     Either  »the  supposed  mys- 
terious Parallelism  between  the   Macrocosm  and  the  Microcosm  or  the  sup- 
posed more  direct  Influences  of  External  Nature   upon  Man,  could  have  in 
any  case  little  eff"ect  on    the   Development  of  Man,  in  comparison   with  the 
much  more  Powerful    Motives   coming  from   human  Passions  and  Circum- 
stances.    §  4. 

A.  Either  as  to  his  Bodily  and  Mental  Constitution.     21. 

B.  Or,  still  less,  as  to  his  Moral  Development. 


^ 


52 
CHAPTER   II. 

The  Nature  of  Man. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Influences  exerted  upon  the  Development  of  Men  by 
their  own  Nature,  as  one  of  the  Constant  Conditions  of  their  Life,  especially  by 
Temperament,  Age,  Sex  and  Nationality. 

Introduction. 

A.  The  Certainty  and  Desirability  of  the  Influence  of  our  own  Natures.  24, 

B.  The  Origin  of  the  Varieties  of  Human  Endowment  cannot  be  traced. 
I.  Differences  of  Temperament.     §  1-2. 

A.  The  Meaning  of  Temperament — the  General  Characteristics  of  the 
Course  of  Mental  Life.     §  I. 

B.  A  Consideration  of  the  Four  Main  Types  of  Temperament,  as  naturally 
and  rightly  occurring  in  the  successive  stages  of  the  Life  of  the  Individ- 
ual and  of  the  Race.     §  2. 

(I)  The   Sanguine  Temperament — seen   in  great  Rapidity  in  the  suc- 
cession of  Ideas  and  in  easily  roused  Feeling.     26. 

(A)  Natural  and  Fitting  in  the  Childhood  of  the  Individual  and  of 
the  Race. 

(B)  Its  Disadvantages  when  continued  later.     27. 

(II)  The  Sentimental  Temperament — a  general  propensity  to  give  one's 
self  up  to  Moods,  accompanied  by  a  Theoretical  Vagueness  and  an 
Unwillingness  to  use  Practical  Means.     29. 

(A)  Natural  and  Fitting  in  Youth. 

(B)  -How  this  Temperament  may  Naturally  become  Gently  Melan- 

choly.    31. 

(C)  Its  great  Defect  lies  in  its  Indisposition  to  Serious  Work. 

(III)  The  Choleric  Temperament — Unreceptiveness  for  New  Impressions, 
but  great  Force  and  Endurance  of  Re-action  when  Feeling  is  once 
aroused.      32. 

(A)  Natural  and  Fitting  to  Manhood. 

(B)  Its  Defects  lie  in  its  Tendency  to  Narrowness  and  Prejudice.   33. 

(IV)  The  Phlegmatic  Temperament — Solidness  of  Mental  Life,  with  a 
State  of  Steady  Equanimity.     Natural  and   Fitting   in   Advanced 

Age.     34-36-  • 

C.  Conclusion  as  to  Temperaments.     36. 

Unusually  favorable  Conditions  both  of  Natural  Disposition  and  of  Out- 
ward Circumstances  are  required  for  this  Ideal  Succession  of  Tempera- 
ments. 

(I)  The  Influences  of  Civilization. 
(II)  The   Connection    between  the    Vital  Feelings  which  have  a  Cor- 
poreal and  those  which  have  a  Mental  Origin. 

(A)  Impossible  at  present  to  trace  out.     37. 

(B)  But  many  Observations  show  this  Connection  to  be  very  intimate. 
II.  The  Mental  Differences  of  the  Sexes.     §  3. 

A.  The  Consideration  of  the  Diff'erences  more  closely  connected  with  the 
Body.     39-41. 

(I)  The  Symbolical  Significance  of  the  Bodily  Form. 
(II)  The  Frame  of  Woman  has  less  power  of  work  and  can  hardly  fail 
to  Influence  Organic  Feeling.     40. 


'    9     « 


53 

(III)  Woman  has  a  greater  Capacity  of  Adaptation  to  the  most  Various 
Circumstances. 
B.  The  Diff'erences  in  the  Higher  Mental  Life  of  the  Sexes.     41-47. 
Introduction. 

The  Difficulty  of  Stating  these  Differences.     41. 
(I)  There  is  no  Diff"erence  in  Intellectual  Capacity.     42. 
(II)  The  General  Difference  seems  to  be  that  the  Knowledge  and  Will 
of  Men  aim  at  Generality  those  of  Women  at  Completeness, 

(A)  The  General  Contrast. 

i.  In  Knowledge.     Men  tend  to  emphasize  the  General, — the 

Mechanical,  Women  the  Concrete,  the  Ideal  side, 
ii.  In  Will,  a  similar  Difference  is  to  be  seen.     43. 

(B)  Very  many  Traits  bear  witness  to  this  General  Dissimilarity.    44. 

i.  As  to  the  Mechanical  side  of  Life — Business,  Space,  Time, 
Forms,  and  Law  in  General, 
ii.  As  to  Property.     45. 
iii.  As  to  Truth.     46. 
III.  Differences  of  Nationality.     §  4. 

A.  The  Influences  of  Heredity  are  Manifest.     47. 

B.  Yet  Original  Differences  in   Endowment  here  cannot  be  denied.     48. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Manners  and  Morals. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Influences  of  Advancing  Civilization  upon  Man's  De- 
velopment in  Manners  and  Morals,  as  shown,  negatively,  in  the  Untrustworthi- 
ness  of  Natural  Disposition  and,  positively,  in  certain  Illustrations  of  such 
Development — as  to  the  use  of  Food,  as  to  Cruelty,  as  to  Cleanliness  of  Body 
and  Mind,  as  to  Modesty,  and  as  to  Social  Customs. 

Introduction.     A  High  Moral  State  can  be  Developed  only  gradually.     50. 
I.  The  Untrustworthiness  of  Natural  Disposition  as  a  Guide   to  Moral  Devel- 
opment.    §  I. 
Introduction.     51. 

This  is  to  be  expected  in  case  of  Complex  Social  Relationships  but  it  is 
Equally  True  of  Simpler  and  Earlier  States. 

A.  In  a  State  of  Nature,  there  is  no  Comprehensive  View  of  Life  and  hence 
no  Consistent  Character.     52. 

B.  Among  Civilized  Peoples,  it  is  also  not  their  Natural  Disposition  but 
the  Inherited  Forces  of  Science,  Art,  Law  and  Religion  which  make 
their  Moral  Condition  seem  so  Superior;  though  even  so  there  are  great 
Inconsistencies.     53. 

C.  Moreover  there  is  an  Inevitable  and  Morally  Advantageous  Deficiency  in 
any  Morality,  a  deficiency,  namely,  of  perfectly  clear  Theoretic  Insight 
into  the  grounds  of  the  binding  Validity  of  its  demands.     54. 

II.   Instances  both  of  the  Dawning  Moral  Taste    which  led  Men    gradually  to 
seek  Emancipation  from  the  guidance  of  more  Natural  Insfinct,  and  also  of 
the  Mistakes  to  which  Reflection  was  exposed  in  this  Progress.     §  2-4. 
A.  As  to  Food.     55-59. 

(I)  No  Scruple  as  to  Vegetable  Food.     55. 
(II)  But  often  Scruples  as  to  Animal  Food.     56. 


54 

(A)  The  Limitations  among  Civilized  Peoples. 

(B)  Reasons  for  these  Limitations.     57. 

(C)  The  Tendency  to  Cannibalism. 
(Ill)   Conclusion  as  to  Food.     58. 

The  Development  here  shows  a  gradual  growth  of  the  Sense  of  the 
Inviolability  of  Human  Personality. 

B.  As  to  Cruelty  and  Blood-thirstiness.     59-61. 

(I)  The  Barbarism  of  Various  Periods  of  the  Past.     59. 
(II)  Barbarism  in  the  Civilized  Present.     60. 

C.  The  Simple  Phenomena  in  which  Advancing  Civilization  shows  a  grad- 
ual heightening  of  the  Sense  of  Self-esteem— Cleanliness  of  Body  and 
of  Mind,      g  3. 

(I)  Cleanliness  of  Body— Naturally  Connected  with  the  Endeavor  after 
Order  and  Consistency  in  the  Inner  Life.     61. 
(II)  Cleanliness  of  Mind— The  Inner  Virtue  of  Truthfulness.     62-65. 

(A)  Cases  of  Systematic  Untruth.     62. 

(B)  Petty  Incoherent  Falsity. 

i.  Pervades  all  Strata  of  Civilized  Society. 

a.  Seen  in  the  Prevailing  Inclinations  of  the  Lower  Classes. 
63. 

b.  And  in  the  more  Intelligent  Upper  Classes  as  well. 

ii.  Is  akin  to  that  Impurity  and  Untrustworthiness  of  the  Inner 
Life  which  appears  among  Barbarous  Men. 

a.  The  Barbaric  Tendency  in  the  Subserviency  to  the  Pass- 
ing Mood. 

b.  This  Running  Wild  of  the  Course  of  Thought  and  of 
changes  of  Mood  appears  also  among  Civilized  Nations. 
65. 

D.  Modesty,     g  4. 

(1)  In  its  Stricter  Sense.     65-70. 
Introduction. 

The  Sense  of  Shame  has  a  Natural  Foundation  in  the  Reluc- 
tance of  the  Spiritual  Nature  to  Recognize  its  Indissoluble 
Connection  with  the  World  of  Sense.     65. 

(A)  The  Earlier  Indications  as  to  the  Sense  of  Modesty  are  some- 
what Contradictory. 

(B)  Two  one-sided  but  Mutually  Opposed  Views  in  Civilized  Reflec- 
tion—the Exaggerated  Contempt  for  all  Nature  as  something  in 
itself  Unclean,  or  the  Cool  Assumption  that  everything  which  is 
Natural  is  Pure.     67. 

i.  True  Modesty  is  not  Disparagement  of  Nature. 
ii.  Nor  Exaltation  of  Nature. 

a.  Whether  Impassioned  Voluptuousness.     68. 

b.  Or  Coarse  Realism. 

iii.  But  a  Middle  Path  of  Real  Delicacy  of  Feeling. 

(C)  The  Development  of  Modesty,  as  Determining  the  Limits  of 
Marriage,  rests  upon  a  growing  Sense  of  the  Worth  of  Person- 
ality and  of  the  Individual  Soul. 

(II)  Modesty  in  its  Wider  Meaning.     70-74. 

(A)  The  Realism  of  Self-development  as  the  One  End.     71-73. 
i.  The  Characteristics  of  this  Disposition.     71. 


» 


55 

ii.  Its  great  Defect  is  a  Deficiency  in  that   Submission   and 
Self-sacrifice  which  make  one  Element  of  Morality.     72. 
(B)  The  Idealism  of  Work.     73. 
i.  Its  Characteristics. 

ii.  Its  Danger  Lies  in  the  Tendency  to  too  great  Reserve.  74. 
E.  As  to  Social  Customs.     74-75. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Order  of  External  Life. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Influences  exerted  upon  Man's  Development  by  the 
most  important  and  necessary  Features  of  the  Structure  of  External  Life  in  So- 
ciety, i.  e.  by  Permanent  Settlement,  the  Family  Life,  Society,  and  the  State. 

Introduction  to  Chapter.     Nature  and  Culture,     g  i. 

A.  Comparison  of  the  States  of  Nature  and  Culture.     76-77. 

(I)  The  Complex  Culture  of  modern  civilization  often  seems  useless.  76. 
(II)  Yet  only  Culture  makes  Isolation  endurable. 

B.  The  Thesis  of  the  Chapter.     Only  a  cultured  Civilization  unfolds  before 
us  the  full  Worth  and  Joy  of  every  Moral  Relation.     77-79. 

C.  The  intended  Scope  of  the  Inquiry.     79-81. 

(I)  Not  to  include  the  Origin,  Causes,  or  Obstacles  of  Civilization,  nor 

a  Comparison  of  civilizations. 

(II)  But  the  individual  Features  of  the  Social  Order  most  necessary  to 

Man's  Development — Home,  Possessions,  and  a  Sphere  of  Work; 

Family  Life  ;  Society  ;   Historical  Connection  through  the  State.   80. 

I.  The  Need  of  Permanent  Settlement,     g  2. 

A.  The  Tendency  toward  Permanent  Settlement  through  the  powerful  Im- 
pulse to  Acquisition.     81. 

B.  Diff"erent  Modes  of  Life  very  diff"erently  affect  this  Impulse. 

(I)  The  Hunter's  Life,  not  conducing  to  any  thought  of  collecting  the 
Results  of  One's  Labor,  tends  very  little  to  develop  Social  Union. 
(II)  The  Shepherd's  Life,  with  its  movable  Property,  calling  out  differ- 
ent qualities,  tends  to  develop  the  elements  of  rural  Economy  and 
Society.     82. 

C.  But  the  real  beginning  of  higher  Civilization  is   found  in  the  change  to 
Permanent  Settlement.     84-88. 

'    (I)  Need  first  drives  men  to  permanent  Occupation  of  the  Land.    84. 
(II)  But  Agriculture  has  a  definitely  Educative  Power.     85. 

(III)  It  is  still  more  important  that  the  contrast  between  the  Home  Cen- 
ter in  this  Permanent  Settlement  and  the  Unboundedness  of  the 
external  World  brings  out  most  expressly  the  contrast  between  Na- 
ture and  the  World  of  Mind. 

(IV)  To  this  is  to  be  added,  the  Influence  of  a  Sphere  of  Work — the 
Spiritual  Possession  of  one's  surroundings  through  Work  upon 
them.     86-88. 

n.  The  Need  of  Family  Life,     g  3. 

A.  No  high  Development  of  the  Family  Life  is  possible  among  Hunters.     88. 

B.  The  Influence  of   the  Shepherd's  Life  here  is  more    favorable,  but  it  de- 
pends much  upon  the  Race.     89. 


56 

C.  But  only  Permanent  Settlements  and  the  Sphere  of  Work  which  first 
establishes  itself  in  House  and  Home  form  the  firm  Basis  of  consolidated 
Family  Life.     90. 

III.  The  Need  of  Society.     §  4. 

A.  The  Need  of  others'  Recognition  runs  through  our  whole  Life.     91. 

B.  The  Influence  of  the  Division  of  Labor  in  a  Complex  Society.     92. 

(I)  Its  Advantages  lie  in  its  giving  greater  definiteness  and  force  to 
Universal  Truths,  and  greater  Individuality  to  the  Workers.     93. 
(II)  Its  Dangers  lie  in   the   tendency  to   Narrowness  of  Thought  and 
Bluntness  of  Sensibility,   and  in  the  powerful  Disturbance  of  the 
Stability  and  Security  of  all  Moral  Restraints.     94. 

C.  The  constant  Tendency  toward  a  still  more  complex  Society,  in  the  in- 
creasing Reciprocal  Influence  of  diff'erent  Divisions  of  the  Race,  espe- 
cially through  the  Pursuit  of  Luxuries.     95. 

IV.  The  Need  of  the  State,  as  giving  Historical  Connection  with  the  Past  and 
Future.     §  5. 

A.  The  conflict  between  the  Wants  of  the  Individual  and  the  Mechanism  of 
ordered  Political  Life.  Individual  Hardships  do  not  disprove  the  gen- 
eral Beneficence  of  Civilization.     97. 

B.  The  conflict  between  Subjective  Self- Will  and  the  Obligation  of  an  Ob- 
jective Order.  The  State  has  a  Moral  Basis  in  its  Historical  Continuity 
which  links  Men  indispensably  with  the  Generations  both  of  the  Past  and 
Future.     98. 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  Inner  Life. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Influences  exerted  upon  Man's  Development,  by  the 
Views  of  Life  produced  in  the  Human  Mind  in  the  various  Attempts  to' answer 
the  Questions  of  the  Position  and  Destiny  of  Man,  viz.:  by  the  View  of  Man  as 
a  Transitory  Natural   Product,  by  Superstition,  and  by  Religiousness. 

Introduction.     §  i. 

A.  Doubts  concerning  the  Ends  and  Aims  of  Human  Life.     loi. 

B.  These  very  Questionings  distinguish  Man;  and  the  Influence  of  his  var- 

ious  Answers  to  these  Questionings  forms  the  Theme  of  the  chapter.     103. 

I.  The  View  which  regards  Man  as  a  Transitory  Natural  Product,     g  2. 
Introduction. 

(I)  The  Danger  of  an  a  priori  Over-estimation  of  Human  Worth. 
(II)  Yet,   on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  Natural  Tendency  to  view  Men 
as  Transitory  Phenomena.      105. 

A.  This  View  appears  in  a  twofold  Aspect.      106. 

(I)  The  View,  as  a  Spontaneous  Feeling.      107. 
(II)  The  View,  as  a  Reflective  and  Conscious  Judgment. 

B.  Moral  Greatness  and  Purity  of  Life  are  not  logically  connected  with  this 
View.      108. 

C.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  this  View  has  ever  become  a  really  pervading 
Sentiment  of  the  Whole  Nature,  in  Spontaneous  Thought  and  Action,  as 
well  as  in  Reflection.      109. 

(I)  The  Adherents  either  of  Materialism  or  Pantheism  have  not  seemed 
able  wholly  to  rid  themselves  of  all  idea  of  the  Persistence  of  the 
Ego.     no. 


57 

(II)  The  Facts  seem  to  be  that  the  Unsophisticated   Consciousness  is 
never  quite  free  from  a  Presentiment  of  Something  Supersensuous, 
nor,  on  the  other  hand,  able  to  raise  these  Presentiments  to  a  con- 
dition of  unquestioned  Authority,      in. 
D.  The  Defenders  of  a  Materialistic  View  are  hardly  entitled  to  speak  at  all 
of  Aims  in  Life,  yet  they  reveal  in  many  Manifestations  the  suppressed 
Belief  in  a  World  of  Spiritual  Interests. 
II.  The  Superstitious  View  of  Life.     The  Belief  that  the  Supersensuous  is  im- 
mediately and  mysteriously  Present  in  all  the  most  Insignificant  Affairs.   §  3. 

A.  Diff'erent  Forms  of  its  Manifestation.      113. 

B.  The  View  is  prevailingly  gloomy,  and  yet  involves  unconsciously  a  Higher 
Estimate  of  Finite  Personality,  in  its  emphasis  on  Responsibility.      1 14. 

III.  The  Religious  View  of  Life.     §  4. 

A.  This  View  combines  the  Consciousness  of  our  own  Weakness  with  the 
Belief  that  we  are  called  nevertheless  to  an  Imperishable  Work  in  the 
World.      115. 

B.  But  not  only  the  Difficulty  in  reconciling  the  conclusions  of  Faith  and  of 
Science,  but  also  the  natural  Unsteadiness  of  our  Thoughts  and  Feelings 
hinder  us  in  constantly  maintaining  this  View.     116. 


CONCLUSION   OF   BOOKS  I.-VI. 

I.  Summary  of  Conclusions  from  Books  I.-III.,  and  Chapters  i.-iii.  of  Book 
IV.  The  Result  reached  was,  that  the  Creative  Nature  is  the  first  and  only 
Real,  of  whose  Activity  Mechanism  is  merely  the  Form.     1 19-120. 

A.  Conclusions  of  Books  I.-III. 

B.  Added  Inferences  from  Book  IV.,  Chapters  i.-iii. 

II.  Summary  of  Conclusions  from  Book  IV.,  Chapters  iv.-v.,  and  Books  V.- 
VI.     The  Distinguishing  Characteristics  of  Man.      120-121. 

A.  The  Investigation  of  the  Relation  of  Man  to  his  Environment  gave  the 
negative  result  that  the  Environment  never  suffices  to  explain  Man's  De- 
velopment without  assuming  in  Man  Predispositions  to  Civilization  of  the 
most  special  kind. 

B.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Position  and  Destiny  of  Man  in  the  great 
Whole  of  Reality  has  not  been  made  clear  except  in  particular  parts.  This 
requires  the  Tracing,  so  far  as  possible,  of  the  Plan  of  the  Whole,  in 
Books  VII.  and  VIII. 


58 

BOOK  VII. 
HISTORY. 


CHAPTER  I. 
The  Creation  of  Man. 
An  Investigation  of  the  Question  as  to  the  Origin  of  Man;  showing  that  a 
General  Answer  .s  possible,  but  that  satisfaction  as  to  Details  is  impossible. 
Introduction  to  Chapter.     §  i.  k  . 

A.  Obscurity  of  the  Beginnings  and  Future  of  Man's  Life.     125-126 

(I)   In  the  Individual.      125. 
(II)   In  the  Race.     126. 

B.  The  Attraction  of  the  Theme,  and  the  Need  of  considering  it,  on  ac- 
count  of  the  Difficulties  already  felt  by  many  in  consequence  of  Attempts 
of  Science  to  answer  the  Question  of  the  Origin  of  Man.     126-127 

iTlT  ^^^'''''''"   ^''''''"   '^'  ^"^'"  ''^^'"   by  Creation   and  by 

A.  The  Seemingly  Opposed  Views.      127. 

(I)   Biblical. 
(II)   Scientific.      128. 

B.  But  no  really  necessary  Antagonism. 

(I)   In  any  case,  the  real  Creative  Efficacy  is  only  in  the  fF/Z/of  God. 
(II)  The  Process  therefore  would  be  the  same  to  an  observer,  whether  it 
were  thought  of  as  pervaded  by  the  Creative  Activity  of  God    or  as 
TT    XT       .     °"^y  ^  ^"^^^^^^^^  E^'olulion  according  to  Natural  Law.      120' 
II.  Nor  does  such    a    Harmony  of  Nature  and  Creation   need  to    identify  the 
Sphere  of  Nature  and  the  Sphere  of  History      §  3 
Introduction.     The  Questions  arising.      130. 

A.  The  Great  Error  often  made  by  the  defenders  of  Arbitrary  Divine  Inter- 
ference  is  in  allowing  the  Possibility  of  a  spontaneous  Action  and  Reac 
tion  of  Elements  at  all,  independently  of  God.      130-132 

B.  A  Second  Error  assigns  such  Interference  only  in  Completion  by  Divine 
Aid.      132-133.  ^  A^ivuic 

(I)  The  Objection.  God's  working  n,ay  not  be  restricted  to  the  Forms 
of  Nature's  Activity.  132. 
(II)  The  Answer.  Completion  by  Divine  Aid  must  either  be  according 
to  rule  or  not  according  ,0  rule.  The  first  would  be  included  in  a 
true  v,ew  of  Mature,  and  the  second  would  seem  to  make  God  no 
greater. 

C.  Yet  this  very  Ascription  of  Consistency  to  the  Divine  Activity  is  repug- 

nant to  the  secret  Craving  of  our  Souls,  because  it  seems  to  deny 
any  really  free  living  personal  God,  and  impliedly  any  Freedom  in 
Man.     133. 

/tt!  I^^  ^^^^'''°"-     A"  History  so  seems  meaningless,     n. 
(11)   The  Answer.  ^ 

(A)  The  Distinction  between  the  Sphere  of  Nature  and  the  Sphere 
of  History  may  be  granted,  in  reserving  Freedom  for  the 
inner  Mental  Life.     134. 


•4.. 


I 


i   '4  ^ 


59 

(B)  But  this  does  not  need  that  we  should  mark  off  the  Physical 
Origin  of  Man  as  not  belonging  to  the  Sphere  of  Natural  De- 
velopment.    135. 

(C)  Our  Demands  for  a  Sphere  of  Freedom  in  History  are  still 
wholly  met  in  our  own  Inner  Life,  and  in  such  Guidance  as  can 
take  place  through  Action  and  Reaction  between  God  and  the 
Spiritual  Nature  of  Man.     136. 

III.   The  Genesis  in  Nature  of  Living  Beings  and  of  Man.     §  4. 

A.  In  general,  this  Genesis  may  be  affirmed  to  be  a  Part  of  the  Necessary 
Development  of  Nature.      137. 

B.  But  it  is  impossible  to  satisfy  a  Curiosity  that  extends  to  Details.     138-143. 

(I)  Yet  two  Considerations  deserve  attention   from    those  who  regard 
this  Impossibility  to  set  forth   Details  as  an  Objection   against  the 
•  General  Conclusions  of  Natural  Science.     139. 

(A)  This  Difficulty  in  describing  the  Beginnings  is  common  to  all 
Theories. 

(B)  We  are  accustomed  to  estimate  One  and  the  Same  Idea  very 
differently,  as  a  Conjecture,  and  as  the  Expression  of  a  Fact. 
140. 

(II)  It  is  Useless  to  tarry  longer  over  these  Investigations  into  Origins, 
whether  Astronomical,  Geological  or  Physical.     141-143. 


CHAPTER  n. 

The  Meaning  of  History. 

An  Examination  of  the  Chief  Views  of  the  Meaning  of  History;  showing  the 
Inadequacy  of  the  Theories  which  regard  History  as  the  Education  of  Humanity, 
as  the  Development  of  the  Idea  of  Humanity,  as  a  Divine  Poem,  or  as  of  no 
Worth  in  its  Development ;  and  the  Necessity  (while  not  overestimating  the  his- 
torical element  in  life)  of  Faith  in  a  Real  and  Living  Community  of  the  Plurality 
of  Minds  separated  in  Time,  and  in  the  consequent  Worth  of  History. 

Introduction.  What  is  History?  The  most  Contradictory  Opinions  are  held 
concerning  it.     §  i. 

I.  History  as  the  Education  of  Humanity.     §  2. 

A.  The  Difficulties  of  Carrying  Out  the  View — of  Tracing  any  clear  definite 
Educative  Plan  in  History.      145. 

B.  The  Difficulties  in  the  Application  of  the  View.  Education  is  only  intel- 
ligible to  us  when  a  single  Individual  is  concerned,  in  whom  earlier  Ex- 
periences may  bear  fruit  in  Growth.     146-148. 

(I)  The  Difficulties  in  the  Application  to  Successive  Generations  of 
Men.  The  only  Humanity  common  to  the  Generations  seems  to  be 
the  Concept  of  Humanity,  which  can  neither  experience  anything 
nor  undergo  Education.  146. 
(II)  The  Same  Difficulties  in  the  Application  of  the  Views  to  each  Par- 
ticular Age.     147-148. 

(A)  Each  Age  shows  a  large  Spiritual  Proletariat.     147. 

(B)  This  Fact  is  a  serious  Difficulty  for  a  Theory  of  the  Divine 
Education  of  the  Race. 

C.  The  Difficulties  as  to  the  precise  Reason  for  the  Process.      148-154. 


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6o 

(I)  The  Difficulty  felt  is,  just  Why,  with  Divine  Resources,  an  End 
should  have  been  set  before  us,  which  could  only  be  reached  through 
Historical  Development.  148. 
(II)  The  Answer  proposed  is,  that  Man  must  become  in  Knowledge 
what  he  is  in  Fact.  149. 
(Ill)  But  this  Idea,  which  has  truth  in  the  case  of  the  Individual,  cannot 
be  transferred  to  the  Race. 

(A)  It  would  require  either  a  Vicarious  Development  by  one  for  an- 
other, or  a  Repetition  by  later  Minds  of  the  evolutional  Strug- 
gles of  their  Predecessors.      150. 

(B)  These  Conditions,  in  fact,  seem  not  to  be  fulfilled. 

i.  In  General,  Conscious  Knowledge  is  propagated  either  not 
at  all,  or  most  imperfectly;  only  its  finished  Results  enter, 
as  a  great  Aggregate  of  Prepossessions, 
ii.  In  the  most  favorable  case — that  of  Science.     152-153. 

a.  The  Progress  of  Science  is  not  directly  Human  Progress 
— Advance  in  conscious  Knowledge.      152. 

b.  Nor  the  conscious  Enjoyment  of  the  Beneficent  Effects  of 
Science  left  behind.      153. 

Conclusion.     The  Result,    therefore,    seems   to   be   that  men   grow  to   be 
what  they   are   without  a  Consciousness  of  their  Growth,  and  that   there- 
fore the  notion  of  Education  is  not  applicable  to  the  History  of  the  Race. 
II.   History,  as  the  Development  of  the  Idea  of  Humanity.     §  3. 

A.  The  Theory  characterized.     154-156. 

(I)   Its  Claims.     The  History  of  Mankind  (like  all  genuine  evolution)  is 
but  the  Realization  of  its  own    Concept.     This  Idea  serves  to  ex- 
plain all  the  Processes  of  History.     154. 
(II)  Its  Lacks.      155-156. 

(A)  It  fails  to  explain  all  as  due  simply  to  this  Strict  Development 
of  the  Idea  of  Humanity.     155. 

(B)  It  lacks  a  Definite  Notion  of  the  Relation  of  the  Idea  to  the 
Practical  Means  of  its  own  Realization. 

(C)  And  results  in  a  necessary  sacrifice  of  all  Individual  Life  and 
Joy  to  the  Development  of  the  Universal  Idea  of  Humanity.   156. 

B.  The  Definite  Argument  against  the  Theory.      156-168. 

(I)  It  must  either  remain  wholly  Mystical,  affording  no  clear  insight 
into  the  exact  connection  between  the  Evolution  of  the  Idea  and 
the  Results  of  Individual  Efforts,  and  so  giving  no  real  Solution  of 
the  Problem  of  History.  156. 
(II)  Or  it  must  choose  between  two  Solutions  according  to  the  Definition 
given  to  the  "Mind  of  Humanity." 

(A)  If  the  "Mind  of  Humanity"  is  interpreted  concretely,  as  ex- 
isting onfy  in  the  countless  Multiplicity  of  Living  Men,  the 
Theory  reduces  to  the  common  and  intelligible  View,  that  only 
those  phases  of  Development  are  durable,  which  correspond  to 
the  essential  Sameness  of  the  Nature,  Needs  and  Circumstances 
of  Men. 

(B)  The  Other  Interpretation  of  the  "Mind  of  Humanity"  as  the 
Absolute  or  "the  Universal  World-Spirit"  (really  taken  by  the 
Theory),  either  reduces  to  the  View,  just  mentioned,  of  His- 
tory as  a  Natural  Process,  or  leads  directly  back  to  the  Idea  of 


61 

the  Education  of   Humanity,  or   rather  confusedly  blends  the 
Ideas  of  an  Educational  and  Natural  Process.     158. 
(Ill)  This  Inexactness  of  Thought  is  particularly  to  be  urged  against  the 
Theory  in  its  use  of  the  Idea  of  Phenomenon  or  Appearance. 

(A)  The  necessary  Presuppositions  of  the  Idea  are  a  Being  which 
appears,  and  another  Being  to  whom  it  appears.     159. 

(B)  Now  the  Appearance  of  a  Being  seems  to  us  to  have  real  Value, 
only  when  it  is  not  mere  Process,  but  signifies  the  entrance  of 
something  real  into  a  Consciousness  which  takes  Pleasure  in  it. 
160. 

(C)  The  Theory,  therefore,  must  say  for  whom  this  Appearance  is, 
whom  this  Development  benefits.      161-168. 

i.  Only  Three  Answers  are  possible,  no  one  of  which  is  ade- 
quate.     161-164. 

a.  Not  Mankind  themselves,  for  the  Mass  of  Mankind  show 
no  sense  of  the  Meaning  of  the  Historical  Develop^ 
ment.      162. 

b.  Not  God,  foi  this  would  make  all  the  Sufferings  and 
Strivings  of  Finite  Creatures  only  the  Trappings  of  this 
Process  of  Development,  whose  sole  aim  would  be  that 
it  might  appear  to  God.      161-164. 

c.  Certainly  not  a  Select  Few  among  Men.     164. 

ii.  Nor  can  the  Theory  deny  the  Need  of  Answer,  without 
really  denying  itself,  and  making  the  Development  of  the 
Idea  only  Mechanical  Means, — a  guiding  Clue,  not  the  real 
End  and  Meaning  of  History.      164-168. 

a.  The  attempted  Answer.  The  Idea  is  really  and  effect- 
ively present  in  Things  themselves,  and  in  their  connec- 
tions, and  not  merely  in  the  Consciousness  of  an  Ob- 
server.    164. 

b.  But  this  really  reduces  the  Idea  to  a  part  of  the  Me- 
chanical Means.      165. 

c.  But  just  this  Interpretation,  the  Theory  intends  to  reject, 
finding  in  the  hidden  Self-Development  of  the  Idea  the 
final  Sense  of  History,  the  Supreme  Good  itself,  and  so 
involving  itself  in  the  Superstition  of  a  Veneration  of 
Forms,  to  which  all  the  Real  Value  of  a  joyous  Self- 
conscious  Reality  is  to  be  sacrificed.     166. 

III.  History  as  a  Divine  Poem.     §  4. 

A.  This  View  has  some  weight,  as  a  mere  Comparison.     168. 

B.  But,  as  a  Real  Theory,  it  gives  no  positive  Enlightenment. 

IV.  The  Discussion  of  the  Theory  which  denies   any  Worth    in   the    Historical 
Development.     §  5* 

A.  The  Theory  is  a  real  one  in  both  Thought  and  Practice.     169. 

B.  Discussion  of  the  Theory  itself.     170-172. 

(I)  In  its  Extreme  Form,  is  Self-Contradictory.     170. 
(II)  In  a  more  Moderate  Form.     171. 

(A)  Can  be  logically  held,  the  Value  for  Mankind  of  the  Coherence 
of  History  lessening,  as  the  immediate  Relation  of  each  indi- 
vidual Soul  to  the  Supersensible  World  is  estimated  more  highly. 


mti' 


62 

(B)  And  such  an  Unhistorical  Life  seems  in  fact  to  be  that  lived  by 
most  of  the  Race. 
C.  Supplementing   this   Theory,  with  one    which   makes    possible  the    real 
Unity  of  Humanity  and  the  Worth  of  History.     The  Sense  of  the  Con- 
tinuity of  History— felt  in    every  Age    and  practically  acted  upon— will 
not  admit  a  Denial  of  all  Unity  in  History,  but  rather  requires  the  Belief 
in  an  actual  Community  of  the  Generations.      172-176. 
(I)  The  Evidences  of  the  Sense  of  the  Continuity  of  History.     172. 
(H)  The  Necessity  for  such  a  Belief  in  the   Preservation  of   the  Happi- 
ness  of  All,  lies  in  the    Fact,  that    only  so    can  the  World  itself  ap- 
pear  as  a  Significant  and  Worthy  Whole. 
(HI)  The  inevitable  Condition  of  such  a  Preservation  of  the  Happiness 
of  all  is  to  be  found  only  in  a  Real   and  Living  Community  of  the 
Generations.      173. 

(A)  This  primitive  Faith  alone  enables  the  more   Modern  Views  to 
free  themselves  from  Internal  Contradictions.     174. 

(B)  But  neither  it  nor  our  Empirical  Knowlege  enables  us  to  exhibit 
the  Plan  which  History  follows.     175. 


CHAPTER   HL 

The  Forces  that  Work  in  History. 

An  Inquiry  as  to  the  Forces    that  work  in    History,  as  manifested  both   in  the 
Origii^of  Civilization,  and  in  the  Laws  of  its  Development. 
I.  Theories  as  to  the  Origin  of  Civilization.     §  1-4. 
General  Introduction.     §  i. 

(I)  There  have    been   Two    Opposed  Views   from   the  Beginning-the 

Origin  in  a  Golden  Age,  and  the  Origin  in  Brutal  Savagery.      176. 

(II)  The  View  of  the  Enlightenment  regarded  Civilization  as  the  Arbi'- 

trary  Product  of  Human  Action— the  Product  of  Deliberate  Calcu- 

lations.      177. 

(Ill)  Later  extravagant  Forms  of  the  Theory  of  the  Divine  Origin  of  Civ- 
ilization, though  in  part  justified  in  their  Ideas  of  a  Fall  of  Humanity, 

yet  afford  little  evidence  of  an  Ideal  Primitive  State.     178-179. 
A.   Theories  of  the  Divine  Origin  of  Civilization.     8  2. 

(I)  The  Origin  of  Civilization   is  not  to    be  attributed   to    Intercourse 
with  Angels.      180. 

(II)  Nor  to  an  Influence  of  the  Godhead  upon  the  Human  Mind,  just  as 
Immediate,  though  more  Hidden. 

(A)  Producing  either  an  Alteration  of  the    General    Laws   of  the 
Psychic  Life.     181. 

(B)  Or  an  Alteration  of  the  Moods  and  Receptivity  of  the  Mind 
(III)  Nor  is  the  Nidus  of  the    Primitive    Mental  Condition  to   be   found 

specially  in  the  Religious  Life.  It  is  not  possible,  necessary  or  de- 
sirable that  true  Religion  should  exhibit  the  Course  of  Nature  and 
Human  Freedom,  as  the  immediate  shadow  and  Reflection  of  what 
is  Divine.     182. 

B.  The  Theory  of  the  Organic  Origin  of  Civilization.     §  3. 

(I)   The   Statement  of   the  Theory.     Civilization  is  supposed  to  grow 
necessarily  out  of  the  Innate  Constitution  of  our  Mental  Being,  and 


I 


63 

yet  to  be  the  immediate  Product  of  a  Mind  that  is  common  to  all.    183. 
(II)  Its  General  Difficulties. 

(A)  The  Obscurity  of  the  Facts  as  to  this  Rule  within  us  of  an  Un- 
conscious Necessity. 

(B)  Difficulties  in  applying  the  Conception  to  the  Origin  of  Civili- 
zation.    184. 

(III)^Examination    of  the  Application  of  the  Theory  to  the   Origin  of 
Language  as  a  Special  Example. 

(A)  Even  the  Original  Sounds  must  have  begun  with  Individuals. 

(B)  As  to  the  Origin  of  Words.     185. 

i.  These,  too,  must  have  begun  with  Individuals,  but  the 
probable  Number  of  Individual  Language  Builders  must 
yet  have  been  very  limited, 
ii.  The  necessary  Conditions  are  met  in  gradual  Growth  of  the 
Vocabulary  within  a  Tribe,  and  in  gradual  Transmission. 
186. 

(C)  As  to  the  Origin  of  Grammatical  Constructions,  the  Abundance 
of  Forms  itself  probably  bears  witness  to  many  originally  Di- 
verse Attempts  at  the  formation  of  language. 

(IV)  Conclusion  and  Transition.     In  general,  we  may  conclude  that  no 
Unconscious  Necessity,  but  only  Individual  Living  Minds  are  the 
Centers  of  Action  in  History.     187. 
C.  The  Importance  of  Individual  Persons  in  both  the  Origin  and  the  Devel- 
opment of  Civilization.     Transition  Section.     §4. 
(I)  The  Influence  of  a  few  Mighty  Men.      188. 

(A)  In  the  known  Development  of  History. 

(B)  Hence  probably  also  in  the  Origin  of  Civilization.     189. 

(II)  Civilization  shows  commonly  two  Stages  in  each  Sphere  of  Life 

the  Exercise  of  the  General  Instincts  of  the  Many,  and  Great  Indi- 
vidual Contributions.      189-191. 

(A)  In  our  Relations  to  Nature.     189-191. 

(B)  In  Social  and  Political  Life.     191. 

(C)  In  Religion. 

(Ill)  Yet  this  Power  of  the  Individual  is  necessarily  so  largely  limited  by 
the  required  Receptivity  of  the  Masses,  that  the  historical  Develop- 
ment need  not  lose  all  Logical  Consistency.     191-192. 
II.  Laws  of  the  Historic  Order  of  the  World.     §  5-6. 
Introduction.     192-194. 

(I)  Such  Laws  are  not  inconsistent  with  a  Plan  for  the  Guidance  of 
History.      192. 
(II)  But  there  are  very  great  Difficulties  in  determining  them.     193. 
A.  Laws  supposed  to  rule  within  comparatively  Short  Periods,  indicated  by 
Statistical  Results.     8  1;. 
Introduction.      194. 
(I)  Illegitimate  Application  of  Statistics. 

(A)  Wrong  Use  of  Statistical  Formulae.     195. 

(B)  Making  a  mere  Realization  of  Statistic  Relations  the  Aim  and 
informing  Idea  of  History. 

(II)  The  Legitimate  Application  of  Statistics  to    (i)  Phenomena  which 
we  may  regard  as  being  Subordinate  Ends  of  the  Cosmic  Order,  or 


I 


64 

merely  Means  to  the  Realization  of  Higher  Ends,  and  to  (2)  Phe- 
nomena which  we  may  compare  to  the  Impeding  Friction  which 
must  always  bear  a  certain  determinate  proportion  to  the  size  of  a 
machine)  is  quite  Obscure.  The  Insignificance  of  the  Extent  to 
which  this  additional  Determination  does  away  with  Existing  DiflS- 
culties.     196-202. 

(A)  The  Equality  of  Numbers  of  the  two  Sexes  e.  g.  may  be  reck- 
oned a  Means  for  the  Attainment  of  the  Higher  Ends  of  Life, 
but  the  determinate  Arrangements  by  which  it  comes  about 
continue  quite  Obscure.     197. 

(B)  The  Course  of  the  Spiritual  Life  of  Society  is  still  more  Ob- 
scure. The  Consideration  of  Phenomena  which  may  be  com- 
pared to  Impeding  Friction.      198-199. 

i.  We  are  unable  in  any  scientific  sense  to  treat  the  Sum  of 
unknown  Conditions  as  a  Compelling  Force.      198-199. 

a.  In  General.     198. 

b.  This  may  be  Illustrated  in  Offences  against  Property. 
199. 

ii.  There  is  no  Clear  Harmony  shown  between  the  Validity  of 
such  Statistical  Laws  and  Individual  Freedom  of  Will.  199- 
202. 

a.  The  Statistical  Theory  as  usually  held,  does  most  seri- 
ously limit  Freedom.    199. 

b.  Yet  there  is  no  irreconcilable  Contradiction  between  the 
Assumption  of  Freedom  and  the  Assumption  of  a  limit- 
ing Sum  of  Conditions.     200. 

c.  Still  it  is  wholly  incredible  that  the  Struggle  of  Will  and 
Moral  Consciousness  against  Obstructive  Elements  should 
be  as  exactly  predetermined  with  regard  to  its  Result  as 
these  Statistical  Laws  indicate.     201-202. 

(i)  The  fact  is,  that  these  Laws  do  not  measure  at  all 

the  really  Moral  Elements  in  the  case.     201. 
(ii)  The  Real  Connections  remain  Obscure,  and  hence  we 
seem  to  be  able  only  to  regard  Crime  as  a  kind  of 
Friction  of  Society,  and  so  essentially  constant. 
B.  Supposed  more  Universal  Laws,  partly  very  Unimportant,  partly  not  of 
Demonstrable  Universality.     §  6. 
(I)  The  Law  of  Uniformity  is  practically  only  the  very  Simple  Observa- 
tion that  the  Culture  of  a  Later  Period  is  commonly  a  further  De- 
velopment of  the  Impulses  received  from  Preceding  Periods.  203. 
(II)  The  Law  of  Contrast  is  not  less  Simple. 

(A)  In  General,  it  has  manifest  great  Limitations. 

(B)  In  Individual  Departments  of  Life,  it  has  a  natural  Psycholog- 
ical Basis.     204. 

(C)  Thus  there  arises  the  Alternation  of  Characteristic  Forms  of 
Civilization  in  History.     205. 

(III)  The  Law  of  the  Decay  of  Nations  is  no  settled  Law  of  History.    205- 
207. 

(IV)  The  Question  of  the  Influence  of  Transmission  and  Tradition.    Are 
Similar  Elements  in  the  Customs  and  Legends  of  Different  Nations 


,. 


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6s 

due  to  Transmission  from  one  to  the  other,  or  are  they  all  Indige- 
nous Productions  due  to  the  essential  Sameness  of  Human  Nature? 
207-209. 

(A)  Taken  Broadly,  both  Views  are  to  be  accepted  to  some  extent 
207. 

(B)  But  the  Latter  View  has  more  Limitations  than  are  often  recog- 
nized.    208. 

(C)  Yet  the  General  Scope  of  Tradition  in  History  is  difficult  to  es- 
timate.   209. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

External  Conditions  of  Development. 

An  Examination  of  the  Influences  of  External  Conditions  of  Development  upon 
Mankind,  showing  that,  while  quite  essential,  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  Guiding 
rather  than  Causing  the  Development;  and  illustrating  this  Influence  in  Various 
Unhistoric  Races— Polar,  Polynesian,  Negro,  and  Red. 
Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  i. 
As  to  the  Origin  of  Mankind. 
Introduction.     210-212. 

(I)  History  in  the  sense  of  a  Coherent  Development  connects  but  few 
Sections  of  Mankind.     210. 
(II)  The  Gradual  Development  of  the  Idea  of  Humanity. 

(A)  In  Classic  Antiquity.     211. 

(B)  The  Influence  of  Christianity. 

i.  Christianity  really  first  gave  the  Idea  of  Humanity. 

ii.  But  connected  it  with  the  Hebrew  Account  of  Man's  Origin. 

iii.  The  Doubts  which  have  assailed  this  Account,  in  spite  of  its 

Beauty,  seem  to  call  for  a  brief  Consideration  of  the  Bearing 

of  Theories  of  the  Origin  of  the  Race  upon  our  Philosophic 

View. 

A.  The  Assumption  of  the  Common  Origin  of  Mankind.     212-214. 

(I)  Would  have  no  real  Bearing  on  Moral  Results.     212. 
(II)  Since,  in  fact,  this  Supposed  Unity  has  nowhere  continued  to  oper- 
ate in  History.     213. 
(Ill)  Hence  is  suggested  that  we  should  place  the  Unity  of  Mankind  in 
the  Future  as  an  End  to  be  sought,  rather  than  in  the  Past.    214. 

B.  The  Assumption  of  Plurality  of  Origin,     214-217. 
Introduction.    214. 

(I)  The  Theory  of  two  great  Families— the  Active  White  and  the  Pas- 
sive Black.  214-215. 
(II)  The  Theory  that  the  Diflferent  Families  of  Men  sprang  up  inde- 
pendently of  one  another  at  different  Places.  No  decisive  Judgment 
can  as  yet  be  given  here  ;  hence  it  has  only  been  possible  to  face  the 
Various  Possibilities  and  forecast  the  Consequences  of  all  on  our 
Philosophy. 

C.  Conclusion  as  to  the  Origin  of  the  Race.     No  Ideal  View  is  affected  by 
either  Theory.     217-218. 

I.  An  Investigation  of  the  Seeming  Variety  of  Mental  Endowment  of  the  Dif- 
ent  Races  as  possibly  due  to  External  Conditions.     §  2. 


66 


i 


A.  Objections  from  the  Theory  of  the  Original  Equality  of  All  Men's  Capac- 
ity for  Civilization.    218-220. 

(I)  The  Theory.     218. 
(II)  The  Answer.     The  Theory  imposes  on  Nature  a  greater  Simplicity 
of  Origin  than  Nature  really  has.    Nature  rather  begins  with  all  the 
rich  Variety  of  Creatures  possible.     219. 

B.  But,  though  we  vindicate  the  Possibility  of  the  Assumption  of  Original 
Differences  of  Endowment,  it  should  not  be  thoughtlessly  employed.   220. 

(I)  Such  an  Assumption  does  not  mean  any  absolute  Differentiation. 
The  Difference  is  only  in  Disposition,  not  in  the  Nature  and  Mode 
of  Operation  of  ihe  Mental  Powers  in  general. 
(II)  Whether  these  Varieties  of  Disposition  are  due  to  Original  Endow- 
ment or  to  External  Conditions  Historical  Experience  can  hardly 
decide,  but  Some  Original  Difference  seems  essential.     221. 

C.  The  Objection  of  Moral  Considerations  to  the  Theory,  as  involving  In- 
justice. 

(I)  The  Objection  is  not  without  Weight. 
(II)  Yet  the  Limiting  Power  of  Original  Endowment  is  as  conceivable  as 
the  known  Limiting  Power  of  External  Conditions.     222. 
II.   The  Guidance  of  Development  by  External  Conditions.     §  3. 
Introduction.     222. 

A.  The  Facts  as  to  Man's  Development.  223-226. 

(I)  How  the  Development  of  even  the  Individual  Man  differs  from  all 
lower  Development.  Man  must  find  out  by  manifold  Experience 
Necessary  Ends,  Efficient  Instruments,  and  the  most  useful  Division 
of  Labor.     223. 

(II)  A  Growing  Society  is  obliged  to  appropriate  also  by  well-considered 
Division  and  Combination  of  its  Powers,  the  less  obvious  Utilities 
of  Natural  Products.  Primitive  Nature  seems  ever  to  withdraw  fur- 
ther into  the  Background.  224. 
(Ill)  Hence  it  is  only  when  this  Early  Progress  has  transferred  the  Cen- 
ter  of  Existence  from  the  Natural  World  to  the  Artificial  World  of 
Society  that  distinctively  Human  Life  begins.     225. 

B.  The  Consequent  Natural  Dependence  on  External  Conditions.     226-229. 

(I)  In  this  Development  by  Man  of  the  Complex  World  of  Social  Re- 
lations, External  Circumstances  have  furnished  the  Stimulations 
which  first  called  forth  his  Activity,  the  Guiding  Conditions  which 
fix  the  possible  Aims  and  Content  of  his  Being,  and  the  Material  on 
which  he  works.  226. 
(II)  Hence  the  First  Steps  towards  Development  can  only  be  made  pos- 
sible by  the  Favor  of  Natural  Circumstances,  by  which  also  their 
Direction  is  in  the  first  instance  determined.     228. 

C.  Nevertheless,  External  Conditions  alone  cannot  explain  the  Actual  Course 
of  History.     229. 

III.  A  Brief  Survey  of  Peoples,  whose  Life  is  either  Unhistorical,  or  if  historical 
Interrupted,  showing  that  their  Fate  is  partly,  but  only  partly,  due  to  Exter* 
nal  Conditions.     §  4-5. 

A.  The  Polar  Races  greatly  limited  by  their  Conditions.     231. 

B.  The  Polynesians  lacking  Vivifying  Contact  with  other  Nations.  232-234. 

(I)  Their  General  Characteristics.     232. 
(II)  The  Influence  of  Caste.    233. 


67 

C.  The  Negroes.     234-238. 

(I)  The  Influence  of  Cultured  Nations  produced  no  Civilization  among 
the  Negroes.     234. 
(II)  The  Explanation  of  this  Fact  is  Difficult.     235-238. 

(A)  It  does  not  lie  in  a  Fixed  Limitation  of  Intellectual  Endow- 
ment.    235. 

(B)  Rather,  in  part  at  least,  in  Peculiarity  of  Disposition. 

(C)  Still  more,  perhaps,  in  Special  Circumstances  which  have  hin- 
dered not  only  the  Imitation  of  Foreign  Culture  but  also  an 
Indigenous  Development  of  high  Civilization.     236. 

(D)  Whether  the  Negro  Temperament  is  the  Result  of  these  Cir- 
cumstances, or  whether  there  was  an  Original  Difference  of 
Endowment,  cannot  be  wholly  settled.     237. 

D,  The  Red  Men.     8  c. 

(I)   In  Northern  America. 

(A)  Their  General  Characteristics.     238. 

(B)  Their  Attitude  toward  Civilization.     239-241. 

i.  On  the  Part  of  a  Few  Individuals,  it  was  Hospitable.    239. 
ii.   But  not  on  the  Part  of  the  Most.     240. 
(II)  In  Mexico.     Mexico  shows  a  Civilization  which  may  be  regarded  as 
the  Native  Development  reached  by  the  Genius  of  the  Indian  Race 
under  favorable  Climatic  Conditions.     241-243. 

(A)  Their  Civilization  Characterized.     241. 

(B)  Its  Limitations  bear  witness  to  its  Native  Origin.     242. 
(Ill)   In  South  America.     243. 

(A)  Favoring  Natural  Conditions  enabled  Peru  to  attain  a  remarka- 
bly Flourishing  Civilization. 

(B)  In  Eastern  South  America,  Civilization  was  hindered  by  Natural 
Phenomena. 

E.  Conclusion.     243-244. 

(I)  A  Further  Survey  of  Unhistorical  Peoples  would  only  confirm  the 
Impossibility  of  speaking  of  a  past  History  of  Mankind. 
(II)  The  Best  the  Future  can  bring  is  the  Diffusion  of  European  Civil- 
ization over  the  whole  Earth. 


CHAPTER  V. 


The  Development  of  History. 

An  Attempt  to  trace  the  External  Course  of  Human  Development  by  giving 
the  Characteristics  of  the  Civilizations  of  the  Chief  Periods  and  Peoples,  showing 
a  Progressive  Advance  but  no  Clear  Goal. 

General  Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  1-2. 

A.  The  Stationary  Civilization  and  Nomadic  Life,  and  General  Characteris- 
tics of  the  East.     §  i. 

(I)  Its  Stationary  Civilization.     245-247^ 

(A)  Its  Locations.     245. 

(B)  Its  Brighter  Side. 

(C)  Its  Darker  Side.     246. 
(II)  Its  Nomadic  Life.     247. 


68 

(III)  The  History  of  Asia  is  full  of  the  Conflict  between  these  two  Forms 
of  Life.    247-249. 

(A)  Later  Conflicts. 

(B)  Earlier  Conflicts.     248. 

(IV)  These  Circumstances  have  been  Influential  in  the  Formation  of  So- 
cial Order.     249-252. 

(A)  The  Development  of  Aristocracy.     249. 

(B)  Hereditary  Callings.     250-252.  "^ 

i.  At  the  Beginning.      250. 

ii.  These  Customs  have  swayed  in  many  ways  the  Civilization 
of  Later  Times. 
(V)  Estimate  of  the  Civilization  of  the  East.     252-255. 

(A)  These  Conditions,  in  many  respects  hard,  seem  to  have  been 
needed  to  make  Men  aware  that  their  Vocation  is  not  the  mere 
Supply  of  Physical  Needs.     252. 

i.  Caste  first  brought  into  the  World  the  Idea  of  a  Vocation, 
ii.   Despotism  brought  the  Feeling  of  the  Connection  of  all 
Mankind. 

iii.  The  Petty  Priestly  Restrictions  maintained  the  Feeling  of  a 
Constant  Connection  between  Earthly  Existence  and  a  Uni- 
versal History  extending  beyond  the  Earth.     253. 

(B)  The  Characteristic  Feature  thus  of  the  Civilization  and  Philos- 
ophy of  the  East  is  the  Sense  of  being  embraced  in  a  Vast  and 
Predestined  Order. 

(C)  Yet  the  Civilized  States  of  Asia  have  not  been  without  Mental 
Revolutions,  but  they  have  been  Isolated  in  their  Influence 
254. 

B.  The  Two  Great  Families  of  the  Race  that  have  been  concerned  in  the 
Connected  Development  of  History.     §  2. 

(I)  The  Semitic.     255. 
(II)  The  Indo-Germanic.     256. 
I.  Ancient  History.     §  3-4. 

A.  The  Characteristics  of  the  Greek  Civilization.     §  3. 

(I)  Its  Environment  and  General  Development.     257. 
(II)  Its  Characteristic  Feature  is  that  it  shows  the  First  Youthful  Self- 
Comprehension  of  the  Human  Mind,  involving  both  the  Critical  Im- 
pulse and  its  Youthful  Freshness.     258. 

(A)  The  Thought  of  seeking  out  the  very  Grounds  and  Bases  of  our 
Judgment  of  Things,  and  of  combining  them  demonstratively 
and  deductively  in  a  System  of  Truths— the  Foundation  of 
Science  in  fact— is  the  Glory  of  the  Greeks.    259. 

(B)  This  Spirit  of  Investigation  is  brought  into  all  Departments. 

(C)  But  this  Spirit  of  Investigation  exerted  a  Double  Influence  on 
the  Greeks,  not  only  the  Impulse  to  Reverence  for  that  which  is 
in  itself  True,  but  also  the  Ever-busy  Search  for  a  Truth  that  is 
yet  more  True,  which  brought  an  Over-estimation  of  Pure 
Thought  and  Logical  Forms.     260. 

(D)  This  Sophistical  Excess  of  Free  Thought  came  only  gradually 
to  prevail.     262. 

B.  The  Characteristic  Contributions  of  the  Roman  Civilization.     §  4. 


i 


69 

(I)  They  combined  the  Nations  of  the  Earth  in  the  Community  of  a 
Vast  Political  Life,  and  have  permanently  impressed  themselves  on 
the  Civilization  of  the  most  Diverse  Countries.     263-264. 
(II)  The  Great  Contribution  of  the  Roman  Civilization  is  the  Develop- 
ment  of  Law.     264-267. 

(A)  The  Romans' Broad  View  of  the  Problem  involved.  They  aimed 
to  combine  in  satisfactory  practice  Respect  for  Transmitted 
Rights,  Provision  for  New  Wants,  and  the  Conditions  required 
for  the  Growth  and  Continuance  of  the  Whole.     265. 

(B)  The  Results  of  the  Unparalleled  Social  Struggle  arising  were 
not  wholly  fortunate.     266-267. 

i.  Up  to  the  Empire.     266. 
ii.  During  the  Empire.     267. 
II.  The  Middle  Ages.     §  5-7. 

A.  The  Influence  of  the  Hebrews  and  Christianity.     §  5. 

(I)  The  Hebrew  Influence,  through  their  Living  Conviction  of  the  Spir- 
itual World  of  God  and  his  Kingdom.     268. 
(II)  The  Influence  of  Christianity.     269-273. 

(A)  Its  Satisfaction  of  the  Understanding  in  its  Doctrines.     278. 

(B)  Its  Satisfaction  of  the  Heart  in  its  Characteristic  Tone  of  Humil- 
ity  and  Hope,  its  Consolations  and  its  Promises.    270-272. 

(C)  Its  Satisfaction  of  the  Will  in  its  Commands,  requiring  the  right 
Inner  Life.     272. 

(D)  The  Temporary  Service  of  Christianity's  Earlier  Formalism. 
273- 

B.  The  Germanic  Nations.     §  6-7. 

(I)  Character  and  Early  History  before  the  Middle  Ages.     §  6. 

(A)  Their  Meager  Culture.    274. 

(B)  Their  Qualities  of  Character,  especially  the  Trait  of  Willing 
Service  and  Absolute  Personal  Devotion.  275. 

(C)  The  Germanic  Movement  over  the  Roman  Empire.  276-277. 

i.  The  Blending  of  all  imaginable  Forms  of  Life  in  the  Roman 
Empire.  276. 

ii.  Its  Influence  on  the  Germans,  giving  the  Characteristics  of 
the  Middle  Ages.    277. 
(II)  The  Germanic  Nations  in  the  Middle  Ages.     §  7. 

(A)  The  Frankish  Kingdom  and  the  Influence  of  the  Empire  of 
Charlemagne,  in  the  Ideal  it  furnished.     278. 

(B)  The  Influence  of  Small  Slates.     279. 

(C)  The  Development  and  Influence  of  Feudalism.     279-281. 

i.  Its  Development.     279. 
ii.    Its  Influence. 

a.  Favorable. 

b.  Unfavorable.     280. 

(D)  A  certain  Characteristic  Sense  of  Justice  was  not  lacking.   Every 
Historical  Relation  seemed  de  facto  Just.     281. 

(E)  The  Influence  of  the  Church.   282-285. 

i.  At  first,  at  the  Head  of  Progress  and  Civilization.     282. 
ii.  At  the  End  of  this  Period,  the  Church  had  become  a  Hin- 
drance to  Progress.     283-284. 
a.  It  no  longer  led  the  Van  of  Science. 


70 

b.  Even  the  Cure  of  Souls  had  lost  its  Energy.     284, 
iii.  The  Struggle  between  Church  and  State. 
(F)  Some  of  the  Special  Influences  leading  to  the  Modern  Period 
were  Striking  Historical  Events  and  Discoveries.     285. 

III.  The  Characteristics,  the  Problems,  and  the  Difficulties  of  Modern  Times. 
The  Distinguishing  Characteristic  of  the  Age  is  Revolution — that  Enlighten- 
ment which  sought  to  break  the  Dominion  of  all  Prejudice  and  to  undermine 
every  Ill-founded  Belief.     §  8. 

Introduction. 

A.  Revolution  in  Religion.     The  Reformation.     287-288. 

B.  Revolution  in  the  State.     288-291. 

(I)  The  Successive  Changes.  288-290. 
(II)  The  Spirit  of  Criticism  here   has   triumphantly  maintained   many 
General  Principles,  but  has  not  been  very  happy  in  finding  satisfac- 
tory Forms  for  the  Principles.     290-291. 

(A)  What  has  been  Established.     290. 

(B)  There  is  still  Great  Mistrust. 

C.  Revolution  in  Science.     291-292. 

IV.  Conclusion.     The  Basis  of  Hope,  and  the  Goal  of  Civilization.     §9. 
Introduction.     292. 

A.  The  Basis  of  Hope.  There  are  Greater  Safeguards  than  there  were  in 
Antiquity  against  Unjustifiable  Excesses  and  against  the  External  Forces 
which  might  endanger  the  continued  Existence  of  Civilization.    293-297. 

(I)  Civilization  is  more  established  against  External  Forces.      293. 

(II)  And  Internally  in  Modern  Humanism.     294-297. 

(A)  An  Intensification  of  Self  Control  is  the  Distinguishing  Charac- 
teristic of  Modern  Civilization.     294. 

(B)  This  Refined  Conscience  of  Modern  Society. 

i.  Is  felt  inevitably, 
ii.  And  is  the  Basis  of  Hope.     296. 

B.  What  as  to  the  Goal  ?    297-301. 
Introduction.     The  Question.     297. 

(I)  In  the  Small  Fragment  of  History  we  know,  we  can  tiace  a  Progress. 
(II)  But  we  know  Little  of  the  Remoter  Past.     298. 
(Ill)  And  can  know  Little  of  the  Future.     299-301. 

(A)  The  Probable  Spheres  and  Extent  of  Progress.     299. 

(B)  But  Human  Nature  will  not  change  and  Life  will  always  remain 
a  long  way  behind  its  Ideals.     300. 


71 

BOOK  VIII. 
PROGRESS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Truth  and  Science. 

An  Attempt  to  trace  briefly  the  Gradual  Development  of  Scientific  Kowledge, 
in  those  Greatest  Steps— Mythologic  Fancy,  Cultured  Reflection,  Scientific  Cog- 
nition— which  have  furnished  Humanity  New  Aims,  and  given  a  Different  Color- 
ing to  Man's  whole  Philosophy;  showing  especially  the  Progressive  Self  Com- 
prehension of  Scientific  Cognition,  in  the  Development  of  a  definite  Conception 
of  Truth  and  in  Enlightenment  concerning  the  Intellectual  Means  to  the  Ends  set 
forth,  thus  bringing  out  the  three  Great  Stages  in  Scientific  Cognition— Logical, 
Scientific,  and  Philosophic. 

General  Introduction.     305-306. 

A.  To  the  Book.     305. 

B.  To  the  Chapter.     Its  Subject.     305-306. 

(I)  Reasons.     306. 

(II)  Limitation  of  the  Theme. 
I.  Mythologic  Fancy.     §  i. 

A.  In  Antiquity.     306-308. 

B.  In  Modern  Times.     308-311. 

(I)  The  World  of  Perception  is  not  taken  as  the  World  of  Truth.    308, 
(II)  Thus  we  often  share  the  Conviction  of  Mythology,  that  that  alone 
which  is  W^orthy  truly  exists,  and  so  seek  only  the  Whole  of  an  In- 
dividual Phenomenon,   not   the  Universal  Conditions  upon  which 
alone  any  Ideal  can  be  realized.     309-311. 
II.  Cultured  Reflection.     §  2-3. 

A.  In  General.     §  2. 

(I)  A  Period  of  Active  and  Inquisitive  Reflection  naturally  follows  the 
Mythologic  Fancy,  and  gradually  works  out  to  greater  clearness  the 
Idea  of  a  Nature  of  Things — a  Necessary,  Self-Existent  Truth.  311. 
(II)  Thus  Cultured  Reflection  is  naturally  opposed  to  the  Mythologic 
and  Youthful  View,  is  still  Fragmentary,  but  has  greater  Reverence 
for  Truth.     312-314.  y 

(A)  Its  Hostility  to  Mythologic  Fancy.     312. 

(B)  Its  Fragmentariness.    313. 

(C)  Yet  Greater  Reverence  for  Inherent  Truth.     314. 

B.  Cultured  Reflection  among  the  Greeks.     §  3. 
Introduction.     314. 

The  Main  Stages  of  Greek  Thought. 
(I)  The  Meagerness  yet  Worth  of  the  Infancy  of  their  Science.     314— 

(A)  In  the  Study  of  Human  Life.     314-316. 
i.  Its  Meagerness.     314. 
ii.  Its  Worth.     315. 


-x^ — '- 


(11) 


72 

(B)  In  the  Sfudy  of  Nature.     316-317. 
i.  Its  Meagerness.     316. 
ii.  Its  Worth. 

iii.  Still  shows  the  Mythologic  Tendency  in  the  Desire  to  see 
Principles  embodied  in  Phenomena.    Transition.    ,16-717 
In  general  this  Stage  of  Greek  Thought  shows  a  special  Reverence 

ITT    e.     ../''I  ^""""''"'"^""^^^y^^^^i^^l  Forms  of  Occurrence.     317 
III.  Scientific  Cognition.     §4-8.  *^   '* 

General  Introduction.     318-321. 

(I)  The  M«i„  Cbaracteris.ic  of  this  New  Period  is  theDiscernment  of  a 
l/n,r,rsai  Truth,  through  the  Idea  of  the  Concept.     3.8. 
,11!    I      !"'?<»•'»''«  of  this  Discovery  of  Socrates.     3,9 

(!)  Th«  Task  Of  becoming  conscious  of  the  Forms  and  Principlesof 
the  Procedure  of  Thought  in  order  to  reach  Tru.h-llgicai 
Science.     320.  ---^K'^a' 

(2)  The  Inquiry  as  to  the  Worth  which  all  these  Laws  of  Thought 

witTThin^'t^h^'^  ":  Comprehension  of  Truth  and  Acquaintance 
With  Ihings  themselves. 

A.  The  Logical  Stage.     Antiquity's  Overestimation  of  Logical  Forms  and 

Introduction.     321-324. 

^^^  tie  Vr-^""r 'r  "'  "'  ^'"-Ph-.icated  Consciousness  as  to 
,  h    Re lafon  of  Thought  to  its  Object,  in  view  of  the  W^^,/.. 

0'^*~3'^3* 

i.  Th^P^cesses  of  Thought  must  be  determined  by  the  Nature 
of  the  Thinking  Subject.     321. 

ii.  But  also  by  the  Nature  of  its  Objects.     322 

"■  1^1'/'  f7  '''''"  ""  ''"P  '"  """<>  «•■«  complicated 
mo/,  of  the  entire  Relation  of  Thought  to  its  Object. 

b.  But  does  not  seem  to  hold  for  the  Separate  Elements  of 
(R^  A«      ;^''°;«'"-"'e  Concept,  the  Judgment,  the  Syllogism. 
(B)  Assurriing  for  the  present  the  Illusiveness  of  this  more  detailed 
Semblance  of  Thought  and  Things,  its  Injurious  Consequen  es 
are  evident,  since  it  leads  to  the  Attempt  to  Answer'  Met! 

(I)      "ihe  Case  of  Concepts.     Plato-s  Attempt  to  grasp  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing  in  General  Concepts.     Rest  of  §  4 

'^^  luempT"";™"'  '"•'"""'^"'^  °f  ■-  kinds  to  make  such  an 

i.   Observation  of  Animal  Species, 
ii.  The  Fact  of  the  Moral  Ideas 

*^*  ?t"t'hem  ""  ""  °'^""  "'  ''"'""°"  ^"^^  ''''''  ^''y  of  '""■''"g 
(C)  The  Mutual  Relation  of  Thought  and  Existence  does  not  con- 
SIS.  in  this,  that  a  fixed  number  of  Concepts  ..  ^.,,„„^  ,„  to 
us  Things,  and  as  Thought  are  the /,/.,,.<,/  ryS,„^,      f 


*    w   > 


v» 


73 

(II)  In  the  Case  of  Judgments  and  Syllogisms.     Aristotle.     8  c 
Introduction.  ^  ^* 

i.  The  Deficiencies  of  Plato's  Views.    328. 
ii.  Aristotle's  Partial  Correction  of  Plato.     329 
iii.   He  is  still  involved  in  the  Confusion  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics. 

(A)  The  Treatment  of  Judgments.     329-333. 

i.  It  is  not  recognized  that  Properties  inhere  in  and  are  con- 
nected  with  the  TAin^  quite  otherwise  than  the  Marks  are 
related  to  the  Concept.     329. 
ii.   He  still  really  reasons  directly  from  Concepts,  as  in  the  case 

of  the  Concepts  of  Potentiality  and  Actuality.     331 
in.  Even  where  he  seems  to  do  more,  he  is  really  only  offering 
the  Analysis  and  Comparison  of  Concepts  as  Real  Explana- 
tions  of  their  Content.     332. 
(B)  The  Treatment  of  the  Syllogism  and  System.     Z33-33<, 

1.  The  Confusion  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  continues  here 
also.     333. 

ii.  This  Kind  of  Overestimation  of  Logical  Forms  is  perhaps 
not  the  least  injurious,  but  it  is  the  most  Excusable,     -i-ix^ 
335- 
B.  The  Scientific  Stage.     The  Limitation  of  Thought  to  the  Elaboration  of 
Experiences.     The  Characteristics  of  the  Exact  Sciences.     8  6 
Introduction.     335-338. 

(A)  Recapitulation.     The  Hindrances  to  the  Advance  of  Knowledge 
in  the  Point  of  View  of  Antiquity.     335. 

(B)  The  Transition   to  the  new  Scientific  Period  through  Christian 
Thought,  which  gave  a  Renewed  and  Powerful  Impulse  to  In- 
vestigations  as  to  the  Capability  of  a  Knowledge  of  the  Truth 
33^33^' 

i.   Christian  Thought  developed   the   Contrast   between    the 
Phenomenal  World  of  mere  Opinion  and  the  Real  World  of 
Knowledge  almost  entirely  from  Moral  Points  of  View.  336. 
ii.  It  therefore  only   made  the  Conflict  the  more   Pressing* 
331-33^. 
(I)  Respect  for  Experience,  in  the  Exact  Sciences.     338-340. 

(A)  This  meant  a  Deeper  Reverence  for  Truth.     338. 

(B)  And  the  Investigation  of  Nature  had  marked  Advantages  over 
the  Examination  of  the  Inner  Life.     339. 

(H)  The  Development  of  the  Idea  of  Universal  Natural  Law.     340-342. 

(A)  In  Antiquity.     340. 

(B)  In  Later  Times.     341. 

(Ill)  The  Resulting  Limitations  which  Science  imposes  on  itself.  342-345. 

(A)  Its  Dependence  upon  Experience.     342. 

(B)  It  restricts  itself  to  a  Mathematical  not  a  Speculative  Develop- 
ment of  given  Data. 

(C)  It  restricts  itself  to  Phenomena.     344. 

C.  The  Philosophic  Stage.    Its  Principal  Standpoints  and  its  Efforts  in  trying 
to  reach  a  Knowledge  of  the  Nature  of  Things.     §  7-8. 
Introduction.     345-347. 


jj! 


74 

(A)  The  Problems  which  remained  still  inexplicable  fell  to  Philoso- 
phy.    345- 

(B)  Philosophy's  Three  Great  Problems.     346. 

(C)  The  Necessary  Conviction  of  the  Certainty  of  our  Cognizing 
Truth. 

(I)  An  Insufficient  Realism.     §  7. 

(A)  A  Real  World  is  assumed.     347. 

(B)  But  this  does  not  make  our  Ideas,  Copies  of  Things.     348. 

(C)  Yet  this  Knowledge  is  not  devoid  of  all  connection  with  what 
really  exists. 

(D)  The  Resulting  Realistic  Philosophy  which  starts  only  from  Phe- 
nomena, but  fails  to  satisfy  the  Idealistic  Bias  of  the  Soul.  350. 

(II)  A  False  Idealism,  which  maintains  the  Identity  of  Thought  and 
Being,     g  8. 
Introduction.     351. 

The  Meaning  of  its  Thesis. 

(A)  Idealism  leaves  Being  itself  quite  unexplained. 

(B)  It  is  particularly  beside  the  point  to  speak  of  Thought  as  that 
with  which  Being  is  Identical.     352-355. 

i.  This  Attempt  really  rests  upon  a  widespread  Error  of  re- 
garding as  a  Product  of  Thought  anything  for  which  lan- 
guage has  furnished  a  Name,  although  Thought  may  have 
contributed  very  little  to  its  Content.  353. 
ii.  It  would  be  more  Simple  and  True  to  say  that  Being  con- 
templates itself.     354. 

(C)  Idealism  really  only  Knows  the  Import  of  Things,  but  believes 
that  this  is  their  Essential  Nature.  Like  Realism,  it  still  re- 
mains at  the  Phenomenal  Point  of  View.     355. 

i.  Religious  Belief  had  cherished   and   expressed    the   same 
Conviction  in  another  way.     356. 

ii.  Philosophic   Idealism  tried   to  surpass  this  Faith  in  two 
ways. 

a.  It  replaced  the  Personal  God  by  "  the  Idea."     357. 

b.  It  hoped  to  be  able  to  express  the  Whole  Content  of  this 
Idea  completely  and  systematically  in  Thought. 

(i)  This  Promise  could  be  fulfilled  only  by  breaking  off 
from  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  all' which  remained 
incomprehensible  to  Thought, 
(ii)  And  both  the  Natural  and  the  Moral  World  received 
the  Treatment  which  traced  back  the  Real  Content 
°^  ^"  Things  and  Events  to  what  was  merely  Formal 
358. 
Conclusion  of  the  Chapter.     359-360. 

The  Nature  of  Things  does  not  consist  in  Thoughts,  and  Thinking  is  not 
able  to  grasp  it;  yet  perhaps  the  Whole  Mind  experiences  in  other  forms  of 
Its  Action  and  Passion  the  essential  Meaning  of  all  Being  and  Action; 
Thought  subsequently  serving  it  as  an  Instrument  by  which  that  which  is 
thus  experienced  is  brought  into  the  Connection  which  its  Nature  requires 
and  IS  experienced  in  more  intensity  in  proportion  as  the  Mind  is  master  of 
this  Connection. 


75 

CHAPTER   II. 
Work  and  Happiness. 

The  Bearing  of  Economic  Progress  on  Happiness.  An  Attempt  to  trace  the 
Development  of  the  Material  Civilization  of  the  Race,  by  a  special  Consideration 
of  the  varied  Historical  Forms  and  Conceptions  of  Work  (upon  Things,  and  in 
the  Use  or  Construction  of  the  Relations  of  Human  Society)  and  their  Influence 
particularly  upon  the  Happiness  of  Life ;  showing  that  there  has  been  no  clear 
General  Advance  in  Happiness,  proportioned  to  the  Material  Development. 

Introduction.     §  i. 

A.  The  Subject  of  the  Chapter.     361. 

B.  Consideration  of  the  Relation  of  Pleasure  to  the  Means  of  Pleasure.  362- 
368. 

(I)  What  does  the  manifest  Increasing  Dominion  of  Mind  over  Nature 
signify  for  Happiness?     362-365. 

(A)  It  may  seem  doubtful  whether  this  Increasing  Dominion  over 
Nature  does  not  really  result  for  us  in  Greater  Dependence  upon 
Nature,  since  Leisure  appears  continually  to  gro-^'-  less.    363. 

(B)  Yet  it  is  Erroneous  to  try  to  divide  Labor  and  Enjoyment.  364. 
(II)  Still  it  is  not  Indubitable  that  the  Internal  Progress  of  a  State  of 

Culture  involves  in  itself  a  continuous  Heightening  of  the  Enjoy- 
ments of  Life.     365. 

(A)  The  Patriarchal  State  e.  g.  seems  to  show  an  unusual  Concen- 
tration and  Intensifying  of  Consciousness  and  Life.     366, 

(B)  Hence,  though  not  without  Limitations,  it  is  an  Attractive 
Type  of  Life,  to  which  it  often  seems  desirable  to  return.    367. 

I.  The  Forms  and  Conceptions  of  Work  in  Antiquity.     §  2, 

A.  In  the  Heroic  Age.     368-369. 

(I)  The  Facts,     Labor  was  held  in  Contempt.     368. 
(II)  Estimate  of  the  Age.    In  part  right,  they  forgot  that  it  is  only  Labor 
which  can  develop  a  coherent  Character.     369. 

B.  The  Liberal  Culture  of  Antiquity,  and  its  Substructure  of  Slavery.    369- 

376. 

(I)  Among  the  Greeks.     369-375. 
Introduction.     369. 

The  Change  in  the  Estimate  of  Labor  as  the  Greeks  came  to 
their  Brilliant  Period.     369. 

(A)  The  Greek  Idea  of  Education  contrasted  with  the  Modern,  in 
its  View  of  Labor :  Many-sided  and  Self-contained  Develop- 
ment vs.  the  Accomplishment  of  some  Individual  Life- Work. 

370- 

(B)  The  Consequent  Place  given  Work  in  Greek  Life.     371-373. 

i.  Varied   and  Interesting  Tasks  were  afforded  the   Leisure 

Class.    371. 
ii.  But  there  was  Contempt  for  all  Common  Labor,  exercising 
Injurious  Influences. 

a.  As  to  the  Love  of  Work. 

b.  As  to  Public  Duty. 

c.  As  to  the  Family  Life. 

iii.   Hence  the  Problem  of  the  Relation  between  Labor  and  the 
liberal   Enjoyment  of  Life  is  solved  by  them  only  super; 


ficially  and  mechanically— by  the  Institution  of  Slavery.  372. 

a.  Aristotle's  Theoretical  Defense  of  Slavery.     373. 

b.  The  Real  Causes  of  Slavery. 

c.  The  Harshness  of  the  Theory  was  only  partially  miti- 
gated in  Practice.     374. 

(C)  The  Liberal  Culture  of  the  Greeks  rested  therefore  upon  a  Foun- 
dation of  Slavery.    375. 
(II)  Among  the  Romans.     The  Roman  Empire  (in  this  sphere)  only  de- 
veloped  further  the  pernicious  Germs  already  found  in  the  Greek 
Life.     375. 

II.  The  Growth  and  Preponderance  of   the  Industrial  Classes  in  the   Middle 
Ages.     §  3. 

Introduction.    376. 

The  Contrasted  Characteristics  of  the  Ancient  and  Medieval  Period. 

A.  The  Historical  Circumstances.    377. 

B.  The  Effects  on  Labor.     All  Labor  became  systematized  into  Guilds.  378. 

(I)    The  apparent  resulting  Arbitrary  Restrictions  were  largelv  justified 

379. 
(II)  The  Results  of  this  Relation  were  of  Advantage. 

(A)  To  Labor,  in  Gain  in  Honor  and  Earnestness. 

(B)  To  Public  Life,  in  Prosperity  and  Beauty. 

(Ill)  To  this  View  of  Life,  blending  Work  and  Enjoyment,  was  due  nearly 
the  whole  Content  of  the  Life  of  the  Times.     380. 
HI.  The  Modern  Forms  of  Labor  and  their  Social  Consequences.     §  4-5. 

A.  The  Indirect  Influence  of  Historical  Circumstances  upon  the  Forms  of 
Labor.     §  4. 

(I)  The  Influences  directly  connected  with  Geographical  Discoveries. 
381-382. 

(A)  The  Discoveries  themselves.     381. 

(B)  The  Help  of  Science. 

(C)  Commerce. 

(D)  Political  Projects. 

i.  Restrained  by  the  Circumstances, 
/TTA  -r       "*  ^^^  Discoveries  gave  a  new  Field  of  Experiment.     382. 
(II)  The  Influence  of  Physical  Science,  making  Greater  Tasks  possible 
by  making  all  possible  Applications  of  a  Discovery.     382. 
(Ill)  The  Growing  Influence  of  Political  Science.     384. 

B.  The  Direct  Influence  of  the  Development  of  Machinery  upon  Labor     8  c 
Introduction.     385.  -SO* 

(I)  Economic  Advantages  of  Machinery.     386. 
(II)  The  Disadvantageous  Effects.     386-391. 

(A)  Even  upon  External  Conditions.     386. 

(B)  Upon  the  Mental  Development  of  the  Individual  Workers,  since 
for  moderate  capacities  Labor  is  no  longer  either  Enjoyment  or 
a  Means  of  Culture.     388-389. 

(C)  Upon  Social  Relations,  preventing  mere  Faithful  Work  from 
attaining  Independence.     389-391. 

(Ill)  In  another  direction  Labor  has  broken  through  the  Restrictions  of 
the  Guild  Life  with  much  Advantage,  and  not  without  some  Disad- 
vantage.    391-393- 


rf«L- 


\ 


i  > 


17 

(A)  The  Gain,  in  a  Free  Field  of  Labor. 

(B)  The  Loss  is  in  part  met  by  Voluntary  Combinations  for  definite 
Objects.     392-393. 

Conclusion  of  Section.    393-395. 

(A)  Thus  the  Age  shows  everywhere  a  tremendous  Reliance  upon 
the  Trustworthiness  of  Machinery.  All  Activity  as  far  as  pos- 
sible is  made  mechanical,  and  so  there  is  Little  Enjoyment  of 
Work.     393' 

(B)  And,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  Little  Enjoyment  of 
Leisure.     395. 

Conclusion  of  Chapter.     395-397. 

A.  Human  Life  seems  to  be  turned  more  and  more  into  a  Struggle  for  Exist- 
ence.    Labor  does  not  contain  in  itself  its  own  Reward.     395. 

B.  There  is  no  General  Advance  in  the  Happiness  of  Life,  proportioned  to 
the  Increase  of  External  Goods.     396 

CHAPTER   in. 

Beauty  and  Art. 

An  Attempt  to  set  forth  the  Characteristic  ^Esthetic  Ideas  and  Art  of  the  Main 
Periods  of  History,  especially  in  their  Influence  upon  Life ;  showing  that  the 
Echo  of  Art  in  Modern  Life  is  much  less  than  in  Antiquity,  and  of  a  less  Satis- 
fying Kind. 

Introduction.     §  i. 

Art  is  to  be  treated  bere,  not  as  an  "Organism,"  but  as  an  Expression  of 
Human  Feeling. 
I.  Eastern  Vastness.     The  most  Ancient  Nations  of  the  East  found  Beauty 
chiefly  in  what  was  Vast.     §  2. 

A.  The  Evidences  of  the  Fact.     399. 

B.  Vastness  was  for  them  a  Real  Esthetic  Notion,  setting  forth  the  Imper- 
ishableness  of  the  Race.     400. 

C.  Hebrew  Sublimity.  Only  the  Hebrews  have  left  us  speaking  Monu- 
ments of  the  Mental  Life  of  the  Individual^  and  so  made  Sublimity  possi- 
ble.   401-404. 

(I)  ^Esthetic  Characteristics  of  the  Hebrew  Language  and  Literature. 
402. 
(II)  The  Resulting  Sublimity  in  both  Descriptive  and  Lyric  Poetry. 
(Ill)  The  Defect.     The  Earnestness  of  this  Religious  Bias  of  Mind  to- 
wards Sublimity  did  certainly  pervade  Life,  but  could  not  endow  it 
with  harmonious  and  many-sided  Beauty.     403. 
II.  Greek  Beauty.     §  3. 

A.  The  Greek  Language,  as  showing  the  admirable  Richness  and  Flexibility 
of  the  Mental  Life  of  the  Greeks,  especially  by  its  independent  Indication 
of  Relations  by  separate  words.     404-407. 

(I)  In  General.     404. 
(II)  In  Homer's  Time.     405-406. 

(A)  The  Language  of  Homer.     405. 

(B)  Homeric  Discourse. 

(Ill)  The  Greeks'  High  Estimate  of  Language.     406. 

B.  The  Greek  Attitude  toward  Nature.     407-410. 


/" 


78 

(I)  In  General.     Nature  affected  them  chiefly  as  the  Setting  of  their  own 
Lives.     For  them  the  Value  of  Human  Society  was  far  above  any  ab- 
sorption in  the  Beauty  of  Nature.     407. 
(II)  The  Influence  of  their  Environment.     408. 

(A)  The  Favoring  Physical  Conditions.     408. 

(B)  Their  Intellectual  Possession  of  their  Country.     409. 

(C)  The  Favoring  Natural  Environment  itself  aids  greatly  in  seem- 
ing  to  confer  upon  Greek  Life,  Artistic  Foim.     410. 

C.  The  Influence  of  Greek  Art  on  Greek  Life.     411-416. 
Introduction.     411. 

The  Mobility  of  Greek  Fancy. 
(I)  The  Diff"erent  Forms  of  Greek  Art  characterized.     411-416. 

(A)  In  Music,  it  was  chiefly  Measure  and  Harmony  which  was  es- 
teemed, and  there  was  a  probable  Poverty  of  Artistic  Con- 
tent. 

(B)  The  Greek  Lyric  has  two  peculiar  Features-  a  Predilection  for 
the  Picturesque  Presentation  of  Events,  and  the  Habit  of  Stor- 
ing up  the  Outcome  of  Poetic  Excitement  in  some  general 
Proposition  or  some  Proverb.  It  does  not  exhibit  much  of  the 
true  Spirit  of  Song.     412. 

(C)  The  Greek  Drama  aims  to  illustrate  some  universal  Truth  of 
Practical  Experience  by  reference  to  great  Examples;  and  had 
a  steady  Educative  Influence  upon  the  People.     414. 

(D)  Painting  seems  to  have  had  least  Influence  upon  the  National 
Life. 

(E)  The  masterly  Perfection  of  Greek  Sculpture  had  a  vastly  more 
important  Influence  on  Life. 

(II)  From  what  was  finest  and  most  beautiful  in  this  World  of  Art    the 
People  were  not  excluded.     The  Greek  Life  was  permeated  with 
Beauty,  as  no  other  Age  has  ever  been.     416. 
III.   Roman  Elegance  and  Dignity.     §  4. 

A.  A  Comparison  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  Languages,  showing  th-^   natural 
Esthetic  Influence  of  the  latter.    The  Latin  has  a  Sterner  Aspect,  group- 
ing  together  more  simply  and  concisely  the  items  of  fact  with  fewer  par 
tides,  thus  giving  the  Idea  of  a  Life  full  of  Power,  and  using  its  Power 
with  calm  Mastery.     416-418. 

B.  The  Historical  Significance  of  the  Esthetic  Contributions  of  the  Romans 
418-423. 

(I)  The  Defect  in  the  Greek  Instinct,  in  the  Lack  of  Warmth  and  In- 
tensity of  Feeling.     418. 

(II)  The  Contrasted  Roman  Instinct.  Passionately  stirred,  they  yet  took 
the  path  of  Self-Suppression,  and  so  were  led  to  the  development  of 
a  Style  of  Esthetic  Representation  which  has  permanent  Historic 
Value.     418-423. 

(A)  Producing  a  Literary  Style  which  aimed  at  an  Ideal  of  Correct- 
ness.    419. 

(B)  And   making   Elegance   the   distinguishing   Characteristic    of 
Roman  Art.     420. 

(C)  Illustrated  in  Horace.     421. 

C.  The  Contribution  of  the  Ideal  of  Roman  Elegance  to  Life.     423-424 
(I)  It  gave  an  air  of  Grandeur  to  the  Prose  of  Life.     423. 


..f 


ii 


Jl 


79 

(II)  And  left  to  the  Men  of  succeeding  Centuries  a  large  part  of  that 
which  gave  Beauty  to  their  Life.     424. 

IV.  The  Individuality  and  Fantasticalness  of  the  Middle  Ages.    §  5. 
Introduction.     424. 

A.  The  Contrasted  Spirit  of  Antiquity  and  of  the  Mi-Idle  Ages.    425-427. 

(I)  For  Antiquity,  Harmony  with  Nature  was  the  One  Aim  ;  there  were 
no  recognized  Aims  beyond",  and  the  Involved  Contradictions  were 
overlooked.     425. 
(II)  For  the  Middle  Ages,  Christianity  had  demolished  the  calm  Self- 
Sufficingness  of  the  Secular  World.     426. 

B.  The  Resulting  Characteristics  of  the  Middle  Ages.     427-430. 

(I)  They  grasped  with  vigor  a  High  Ideal  but  lacked  all  thoroughly  de- 
veloped Insight  into  the  Means  necessary  to  realize  it,  and  so  at- 
tained to  no  Clear  Views  concerning  the  Earthly  Tasks  of  Human 
Life.    427. 

(II)  They  thus  show  everywhere  the  Emphasis  on  the  Individual  and  the 
Whole,  but  a  Neglect  of  the  General — the  Universal.     429. 

C.  The  Consequent  generally  Unfavorable  Influence  on  Art.     430. 

D.  The  Connection  of  their  ^Esthetic  Characteristics  with  Life.     431-432. 

(I)  They  lived  a  Life  full  of  Poetic  Impulses  from  the  very  Strength  of 
which  they  suff"ered.     431. 

(II)  But  left  the  very  important  Legacy  of  Dissatisfaction  with  what  is 
merely  Phenomenal,  and  that  Longing  for  the  Infinite  which  gives 
the  Keynote  to  the  -Esthetic  Temper  of  Modern  Times  and  to  its 
Poetry.     432. 
V.  Beauty,  Art,  and  i^stheticism  in  Modern  Times.     §  6. 

A.  The  ^Esthetic  Characteristics  of  the  Modern  Age.     432-435. 

(I)  The  Echo  of  Art  in  Life  is  much  Less,  and  of  a  less  Satisfying  Kind. 

432. 

(II)  The  General  Barbarism  of  our  Attitude  toward  Art.     433. 

(III)  The  Manifest  Present  Tendency  is  to  a  still  completer  Divorce  of 
iEsthetic  Elements  from  Social  Life,  reserving  all  Excitement  and 
Enthusiasm  for  the  retirement  and  solitude  of  the  Private  Life  of 
Individuals.     435. 

B.  The  Consequent  Influence  upon  Art.     435-439- 

(I)  On  Art  Appreciation.    The  living  Emotion  of  the  Beautiful  is  rarer, 

(II)  On  Art  Production.     436-439. 

(A)  There  have  not  been  wanting  Great  Geniuses.     436. 

(B)  But  Modern  Art  has  lacked  the  Advantage  of  Ancient  Art  in 
its  Possession  of  Artistic  Forms  generally  established  by  Tradi- 
tion and  Constant  Practice ;  and  hence  has  had  the  double  Task 
of  finding  first  an  Ideal  and  then  the  Form  in  which  to  embody 
this  Ideal.     437. 

C.  The  ^Esthetic  Element  in  Modern  Life.     439-443* 

(I)  This  showed  itself  first  in  Italy,  in  the  Cultivation  of  Formal  Excel- 
lence in  all  the  Dexterities  and  Refinements  of  Style,  both  in  Lan- 
guage and  in  the  Intercourse  of  Life.     439. 

(II)  Then  in  France,  in  the  Employment  of  their  Intellectual  Strength 
upon  Problems  of  Social  Intercourse,  first  giving  to  the  Spirit  of 
Modern  Times  a  characteristic  ^Esthetic  Expression,  especially  in 
the  Production  of  the  French  Prose  Style. 


8o 

(III)  Seen  also  in  the  Rococo  Style.     441. 

(IV)  And  at  the  Present  Day  in  a  Mathematical  Element  of  Exactness, 
Neatness,  Conciseness,  Clearness,  and  Simplicity,  which  has  an  ele- 
ment of  Hope  for  Art.     442. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

The  Religious  Life. 

An  Attempt  to  trace  the  Religious  Development  of  the  Race;  pointing  out  the 
Characteristic  Contributions  of  the  East  and  the  West  in  their  different  Emphasis 
on  the  two  Sources  of  Religious  Ideas,  Nature  and  Social  Life;  showing  the  Pre- 
ponderance of  the  Cosmological  Element  in  Heathendom  (having  no  gain  for  Life) 
and  of  the  Moral  Element  in  Judaism  and  Christianity  ;  disclosing  in  the  Present 
a  returning  Preponderance  of  the  Cosmological  Element  in  Dogmatic  Theology, 
and  a  less  close  Connection  than  formerly  of  the  Christian  Doctrine  and  Church 
with  Life. 

General  Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  1-2. 

A.  Comparison  of  the  Religious  Life  of  the  East  with  that  of  the  West.    §  i. 

(l)  The  Religious  Life  of  the  East  is  Distinguished  from  that  of  the 
West.     444-446. 

(A)  By  a  Permanent  Difference  of  the  Course  of  Development;  the 
Thought  of  the  Supersensuous  World  pervades  all  Life.     444. 

(B)  By  a  Permanent  Difference  of  Disposition.  The  Early  Survey 
of  all  Goals  led  to  a  marked  Quietism— a  repose  of  cosmic  con- 
templation, for  which  there  is  no  real  Development  possible. 
445- 

(II)  The  Religious  Life  of  the  West  developed  a  Contrary  Bias.     446- 
448. 

(A)  Its  Disposition  is  to  emphasize,  not  the  World  as  a  Whole,  but 
its  Universal  Laws,  which  at  once  opened  the  Prospect  of  re- 
constructing both  Nature  and  Human  Life — the  Prospect  of  a 
Real  Development.     446. 

(B)  Its  Course  of  Development  has  tended  toward  an  Alienation  from 
God  and  from  what  is  Divine  in  all  Departments  of  Thought. 
446-447. 

(C)  Hence  arise  the  apparently  Discouraging  Signs  of  the  Times  as 
to  Religion.     447. 

B.  Nature  and  Social  Life  as  Sources  of  Religious  Ideas.     §  2. 

(I)  Nature.     44S-451. 

(A)  The  Ways  in  which  Nature  may  lead  to  Religious  Conceptions. 
448. 

(B)  Yet  these  Cosmological  Elements  have  contributed  Little  to 
any  useful  Progress  in  Life  and  Humanity.     449-451. 

i.  Usually  only  very  Small  Sections  of  Nature  are  known.  449. 
ii.  And  even  the  Fullest  Cosmological  Insight  is  not  fruitful. 
450. 

iii.  Especially   can    no    Observation   of  Nature    teach   Moral 
Truths. 
(II)  Social  Life  as  a  Source  of  Religious  Ideas.     451-453. 


1 


81 

(A)  Under  Meager  Social  Conditions,  no  Coherent  and  Comprehen- 
sive View  of  Nature  and  the  Order  of  Events  is  possible,  and  no 
Coherent  Maxims  of  Conduct, 

(B)  And  this  Danger  from  the  Cosmological  Element  is  a  Perma- 
nent One  at  all  Stages  of  Civilization.     451-452. 

i.  For,  even  if  there  were  a  Just  Perception  of  the  Facts,  it 
would  not  involve  a  Just  Estimation  of  their  Worth.     451. 
ii.   And  even  where  there  is  Undisturbed    Reverence  for  the 
Content  of   Moral  Ideas,  there  is    still  Danger  in   Men's 
Preference  for  a  Cosmological  Construction  of  Philosophy, 
452. 
Conclusion  of  the  Introduction,  and  Transition.     452-453. 
I,  Preponderance  of  the  Cosmological  Element  in  Heathendom.     §  3-4, 

A.  The  Eastern  Nations.     §  3. 

(I)  The  Earlier  Incoherent  Foreshadowings  of  a  Supersensuous  Woild, 
arising  in  a  Meager  Social  Development.     453-456. 

(A)  Fetich  Worship.     453. 

(B)  Presentiments  of  Immortality.     454. 

(C)  Paying  Divine  Honors  to  Animals. 

(D)  The  Idea  of  the  Transmigration  of  Souls.     455. 

(II)   The  Later  Comprehensive  Religious  Systems,  in  which  the  Thought 
of  fully  developed  Civilizations  culminated.     456-460. 
Introduction.     456. 

(A)  In  Egypt,  Religion  was  not  overgrown  with  Cosmological 
Speculations  (which  had  nothing  for  Life)  and  cherished  valu- 
able Elements  of  Moral  Conviction.     456-457. 

(B)  In  India,  an  Excess  of  Cosmological  Speculation  took  away  all 
Meaning  from  Human  Life.     457-459. 

(C)  The  Iranian  Races  obtained  better  Results,  but  finally  devel- 
oped a  Superfluity  of  External  Forms.     459. 

B.  The  Greeks.     §  4. 

(I)  The  Development  of  their  Religious  Life.     460-461. 

(A)  The  Influences  of  Nature  were  Less  Controlling.     460. 

(B)  The  Larger  Share  is  undoubtedly  contributed  by  a  successful 
Development  of  Moral  Life  in  Society. 

(II)  The  Popular  Religion  never  attained  Coherent  Unity.     461-464. 

(A)  In  General.     461. 

(B)  The  Elements  of  their  Common  View  of  the  Gods.     462. 

(C)  The  External  Forms  of  Worship.     464. 

(Ill)  The  Greek  Religion  never  attained  any  real  Conception  of  a  King- 
dom of  Heaven.     464-465. 

II.  ThePreponderanceof  the  Moral  Element  in  Judaism  and  Christianity.   §  5-6, 

A.  In  Judaism.     §  5. 

Introduction.     465. 
(I)  Cosmological  Speculation  is  almost  wholly  absent  from  Judaism. 
(II)  The  Danger  was  thus  avoided  of  regarding  first  Natural  111  and  then 

Moral  Evil  as  Necessary  Constituents  of  the  Cosmic  Order.     467, 
Conclusion  and  Transition. 

B.  In  Christianity.     §  6. 

(I)  Christian  Doctrines  contain  exclusively  Religious  Truth  conveyed 
in  a  Form  of  Expression  which  is  also  exclusively  Religious.     Chris- 


82 

■ 

tiahity  developed  directly  neither  Cosmological  nor  Social  Theories. 
468. 
(II)  As  to  the  Connection  between  Earthly  Reality  and  the  Kingdom 
of  Heaven,  Christianity  offers  not  Detailed  Knowledge  but  Cer- 
tainty, establishing  a  new  Life  upon  a  Foundation  of  Truth.  469. 
(Ill)  Some  Aspects  of  the  Relation  of  the  Christian  to  other  Philosophic 
Views.     470-476. 

(A)  Points  in  which  Christianity  might  seem  to  offer  Nothing  New, 
though  really  Differing. 

i.  Christianity  finds  the  Summary  and  Ground  of  Morals  in 
the  Will  of  God,  giving  a  Meaning  to  Life,  such  as  other  re- 
ligions do  not.  471. 
ii.  With  the  Christian  Precepts,  Promises  are  always  conjoined. 
Any  complete  Philosophy  must  require  that  Good  should 
not  vanish  out  of  the  Universe  unrequited.     472-474. 

(B)  Points  in  which  Christianity  goes  distinctly  beyond  all  other 
Religions — in  the  Worth  it  ascribes  to  each  individual  Man. 
474-476. 

III.  Christian  Life  and  Thought  in  the  Present.     §  7-8. 

A.  Returning  Preponderance  of  Cosmology  in  the  New  Philosophical  Dog- 
matism.    §  7. 
Introduction.     476-477. 

(A)  The  Demand  of  the  Church  for  Faith  in  the  Whole  Historical 
Account  of  Revelation  is  met  with  Growing  Opposition.      476. 

(B)  Though  the  Providential  Relation  of  God  to  the  History  of  the 
World  may  be  freely  admitted.     477. 

(C)  But  Difficulty  arises  as  to  the  Acceptance  of  (l)  the  whole  Bib- 
lical History  and  (2)  the  Doctrines  of  Dogmatic  Theology. 

(I)  The  Difficulties  in  Accepting  all  Biblical  History.     477-481. 

(A)  Its  Figurative  Form.     477. 

(B)  Doubts  arising  from  the  Change  in  Men's  Conception  of  Na- 
ture.    478-479. 

i.  The  Change.     478. 

ii.  Yet  the  general  Possibility  of  Miracles  may  be  freely  ad- 
mitted. 
(C}  Doubts  arising  from  the  Way  in  which  we  take  the  Spiritual 
Meaning  of  the  Record  of  the  Events.     480.     e.  g. 
i.   The  Ascension, 
ii.   The  Resurrection. 
(II)  The  Difficulties  in  the  Acceptance  of  the  Doctrines  of  Dogmatic 
Theology.     481-4S8. 
Introduction.     481. 

(A)  Its  Failure  clearly  to  determine  the  Content  of  its  Doctrines. 
482. 

(B)  Its  Present  Tendency  to  Emphasize  Cosmological  Elements, 
with  no  Gain  for  Life.     483-488. 

Introduction.     Reasons  for  the  Tendency.     483. 
i.  Dogmatic  Investigations  seldom  make  a  Conscientious  Use 
of  even  the  Modest  Results  which  Modern  Philosophy  has 
»  obtained.      484. 

ii.  And  no  Gain  Accrues  to  Life.     485-488.     c.  g. 


I 


I 


I 


83 

a.  As  to  the  Doctrine  of  Creation. 

b.  As  to  Eschatology. 

c.  As  to  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 

(i)  The  Slight  Biblical  Basis  for  the  Speculations.  486. 
(ii)  And,  though  there  is  a  Natural  Need  which  leads 
men    to    make    these   Attempts,  still  Philosophy 
seems  able  practically  to  contribute  Nothing  here 
that  can  help  a  Living  Faith. 
B.  The  Less  Close  Connection  of  the  Church  with  Life.     §  8. 
Introduction.     489. 

(I)  The  Church  is  an  Institution  peculiar  to  Christianity. 
(II)  The  Development  of  the  Organization   of  the  Church,   becoming 
finally  in  Claim  a  Cosmic  Power.     490. 

(III)  The  Injurious  Effect  on  Life  of  this  Colossal  Attempt  to  establish  a 
Cosmic  Order.     491. 

(IV)  The  Protestant  View  of  the  Church,  and  the  Present  Tendencies 
separating  the  Church  and  Life.     492. 

Conclusion.  As  to  the  Future.     493-494. 

(A)  What  is  to   be   Hoped,  looking  to  Closer  Connection   of  the 
Church  with  Life.     493. 

(B)  This  may  necessitate  a  Temporary  Overthrow  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  the  Church. 

CHAPTER  V. 
Political  Life,  and  Society. 

An  Attempt  to  trace  the  Development  of  the  Political  Constructions  of  An- 
tiquity in  their  Influence  on  the  Life  of  their  own  Times,  and  in  their  Later  Ef- 
fects; and  to  consider  the  Leading  Political  Questions  of  the  Modern  Age,  thus 
arising  from  the  Recognition  both  of  Abstract  Natural  Right,  and  of  Historic 
and  Legitimate  Right. 

I.   Political  Life,  and  Society  in  Antiquity  and  the  Middle  Ages.     §  1-4. 
A.  The  Political  Constructions  of  Antiquity.     §  1-3. 

(I)  The  Earlier  Political  Constructions,  which  were  not  True  States.  §  I. 
Introduction.     495-499 

The  Family  Relations  in  themselves  are  not  sufficient  to  insure 
Social  Progress, 
i.   Reactions  of  Bad  Surroundings  on  the  Family.     496-497. 

a.  As  to  Relations  of  Husband  and  Wife.     496. 

b.  As  to  Relations  of  Parents  and  Children. 

ii.  Even  apart  from  such   Crude    Misinterpretations,   Family 
Life  does  not  teach  Social  Morality.     497-499. 

a.  The  Relations  of  the  Family  are  Special  and  Unique. 

497- 

b.  They  do  not  therefore  tend  directly  to  the  Development 
of  a  Strict  Sense  of  Justice.     498. 

iii.  Hence  the  States  most  directly  founded  on  the  Family  Re- 
lation have  lacked  some  of  the  Qualities  of  True  States. 
(A)  Tribal  States,  whether  Greek  or  Semitic,  in  the  excessive  Em- 
phasis on  the  Bond  of  Consanguinity  greatly  retarded  their  own 
Social  Development.     499-501. 


84 


(B)  The  Kingdoms  of  the  East.     501-504. 

i.  Their  Origin.     501. 

ii.  The  Ground  of  their  Possible  Continuance  lies  chiefly  in  the 
Uncertainty  of  each  man  concerning  the  Views  of  others. 
502. 
ill.  Illustrated  by  the  Asiatic  Despots  with  their  empty  Arbi- 
trariness.    503. 

(C)  The  Paternal  Despotisms  of  China,  Mexico  and  Peru.   504-505. 

i.  All  had  the  Thought  of  an  Ordered  Administration.    504. 
ii.  Yet  none  were  Promotive  of  Progress  for  long,  since  Soci- 
ety did  not  rest  on  the  Recognition  of  Individual  Personal 
Rights. 
(II)  The  Political  Constructions  of  the  Greeks.     §  2. 

(A)  The  Political  Constitution  of  Sparta.     506-509. 

i.  All  Individual  Powers  were  exhausted  in  keeping  up  the 

Whole.     506. 
ii.   Yet  Sparta  was  not  destitute  of  Mental  Wealth  and  Happi- 
ness, though  both  lacked  Content.     507. 
iii.  And  their  Mental  Progress  was  chiefly  due  to  their  Sur- 
roundings, and  in  spite  of  their  Constitution.     508. 

(B)  The  Political  Constitutions  of  the  Ionic  Tribes.     509-511. 

i.  The  Wish  to  take  a  Personal  Part  in  Government  and  the 
Nature  of  the  Country  favored  the  Independent  Develop- 
ment of  Small  Communities.  509. 
ii.  This  Participation  of  the  People  in  the  Course  of  Public 
Affairs  is  free  from  Danger  only  at  Times  when  Political 
Development  is  just  beginning,  or  when  it  is  fully  Accom- 
plished.   510. 

(C)  The  Bearings  of  the  Greek  Political  Constitutions  on  the  Polit- 
ical Development  of  the  West.     511-520 

i.  The  State  becomes  a  Construction  of  Human  Reason.  511— 

515. 

a.  This  is  the  Great  Contribution  of  the  Greeks.     511. 

b.  The  Danger  involved  in  this  Theory,  of  diminishing  the 
Sense  of  Obligation  to  the  Institutions  by  which  Justice 
is  carried  out.     512-514. 

c.  The  Tendencies  to  this  Sophistic  Consideration  of  the 
State  in  Greek  History.     514. 

ii.  The  Greeks'  View  of  the  State  lacked  the  Modern  Sensitive 
Consciousness  of  the  Significance  of  Human  Personality, 
and  completely  subjected  the  Individual  Life  to  the  State. 

515-517. 

a.  The  Natural  Impulses  toward  this  Subjection  of  the  In- 
dividual.    517. 

b.  Society  and  the  State  became  thus  almost  wholly  Coin- 
cident, and  both  suffered  from  the  Admixture.    518-520. 

(i)  The  State  as  distinct  from  Society  was  needed  as  an 

Articulate  Conscience.     518. 
(ii)  The  Greeks  suffered   from   this  Deficiency,  and  so 
were  guided  by  no  Respect  for  any  developed  Sys- 
tem of  Universal  Law.     519.  , 


85 

(III)  Civil  Life  and  Law  in  Rome.     §  3. 
Introduction.     520. 

The  Development  of  Law,  of  Jurisprudence,  and  of  a  general 
Sense  of  Right  in  Modern  Society  is  a  Legacy  from  Rome. 

(A)  The  Roman  Tendencies  as  contrasted  with  the  Greek.  521-524. 

i.  The  Greek  Tendencies,  of  a  strong  Impulse  to  Sociability, 
and  a  Predilection  for  Speculative  Knowledge,  neither  of 
them,  favored  the  Development  of  a  strong  Sense  of  Right. 
521-522. 
ii.  The  Contrasted  Roman  Tendencies.     522-524. 

a.  An  Inductive  Temper  in  Questions  of  Conduct  as  against 
the  Speculative  Tendency  ol  the  Greeks.     522. 

b.  A  lively  Consciousness  of  Personal  Rights,  as  against  an 
Extreme  Social  Tendency.     523. 

(B)  These  Predominant  Tendencies  led  to  a  Splendid  Development. 
524-526. 

i.  Of  the  Sense  of  Private  Right.     524. 

ii.  Of  Public  Law ;  but  in  such  a  way  that  Private  Right  came 
to  seem  Immutable,  and  in  contrast.  Public  Law  to  seem 
the  Result  of  Convention.     525. 

a.  This  did  not  involve  a  less  Devotion  to  the  Common- 
wealth in  Rome  than  in  Greece.     526. 

b.  And  the  Political  Development  of  Rome  was  in  Har- 
mony with  an  even  more  Accurate  View  of  the  Origin  of 
Personal  Rights.      527. 

(C)  Effects  of  Roman  Law  on  Later  Legal  Customs.     528. 
B.   Political  Life,  and  Society  in  the  Middle  Ages.     §  4. 

(I)  The  Growing  Absolutism  of  Kingly  Power  first  delivered  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  from  a  wholly  Fragmentary  Social  Life.     529. 
(II)  This  Absolutism  was  very  far  from  being  a  Return  to  Oriental  Des- 
potism.     530. 

(III)  It  was  itself  based  upon  Historical  Tradition,  and  helped  to  de- 
velop the  Notion  of  Historic  and  Legitimate  Right.      531. 

(IV)  Yet  the  Struggle  between  Absolutism  and  those  Powers  which  were 
at  once  Barriers  lo  it  and  to  Social  Progress  brought  out  still  more 
strongly  the  Contrast  between  Absolute  Natural  Right,  and  His- 
toric and  Legitimate  Right.     Transition.     532. 

II.  The  Leading  Political  Questions  of  our  Modern  Age.     §  5-10. 

A.  The  Two  Practically  Settled  Fundamental    Convictions    of  our   Time. 

§  5-6. 
(I)  The  Autonomy  of  Society.     Absolute  Natural  Right.     §  5. 

(A)  The  Modern  Conception  of  Society  makes  the  Individual  both 
Goal  and  Point  of  Departure.     533. 

(B)  The  Defense  of  this  View.     533-540. 

i.  The  charge  against  the  View,  that  it  threatens  Opposition 
to  nearly  all  the  Forms  under  which  Human  Life  must  go 
on,  may  be  met  by  the  Answer  that  all  these  Forms  are  in- 
deed called  in  question,  but  not  in  order  to  be  denied  but 
in  order  that  they  may  be  reaffirmed  and  for  better  reasons. 
533-535- 


86 

ii.  To  the  Further  Charge  that  the  View  recognizes  no  Inherent 
and  Absolute  Right  in  these  Forms  to  fashion  Human  Ex- 
istence, and  shows  only  a  one  sided  Desire  for  Material 
Prosperity  it  is  to  be  said  : 

a.  The  latter  Statement  is  not  true.     536. 

b.  And  the  Demand  for  a  Worship  of  Empty  Forms  is  ut- 
terly vain.     536-540. 

(i)  It  is  unbearable  when  Social  and  Political  Life  are 
attempted  to  be  forced  into  Forms  which  signify 
something  or  other,  but  help  men  not  at  all.  537- 
538. 
(ii)  The  only  Order  that  can  be  Obligatory  for  us  is  that 
which  is  indispensable  or  helpful  for  the  Accom- 
plishment of  our  Human  Destiny.  538. 
(iii)  The  whole  Influence  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Idea 

here  has  been  bad.     538-539. 
(iv)  Conclusion.     There  is  no  real  Subject,  no  Substance, 
no  Place  in  which  anything  worthy  or  sacred  can  be 
realized  except    the  Individual  Ego;    the    Personal 
Soul.     539-540. 
(II)  National  and  Historical  Law.     Recognition  of,  but  not  Domination 
by.  Historical  Law.      Historic  and  Legitimate  Right.     §  6. 

(A)  The  Assumption  of  Radicalism,  that  the  Past  may  be  treated  as 
of  no  Account,  is  entirely  Unwarranted  and  Impracticable, 
since  an  Isolated  Man  cannot  be  a  Subject  of  Rights.     540. 

(B)  An  Attempted  Intermediate  Position— that  Rights  are  made 
effective  first  in  Society. 

i.  This  would  require  a  clear  Demarcation  between  the  Law 

of  Private  Rights  and  Legal  Determinations.     541. 
ii.  This  Distinction  is  Untenable.     542. 

a.  As  to  the  Individual. 

b.  And  as  to  Society  as  a  Whole.     543. 

(C)  A  Double  Attitude  only  is  Practicable.     543-544. 

i.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Laws  of  one  Age  can  neither  furnish 
irrevocable  Rules  for  the  Future,  nor  have  the  unconditional 
Majesty  of  the  Moral  Commands  themselves.     543. 
ii.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand.  Positive  and  Grave  Injustice  may 
result  from  unthinking  Radicalism. 
B.  Practicable  and  Impracticable  Postulates  for  the  Carrying  out  of  these 
Convictions.     §  7-10. 
Introduction.     544. 

The  Men  of  the  Present  Age  are  seeking  for  Legal  Forms,  which 
may  admit  of  Necessary  Progress  being  made,  without  breach  of 
Legal  Continuity. 
(I)  As  to  the  Duty  of  Society  to  its  Members.     §  7. 

(A)  Society  should  not  formally  exercise  its  Power  over  its  indi- 
vidual Members  as  a  Right  belonging  to  it,  nor  systematize  this 
in  permanent  Institutions  further  than  is  necessary.  Public  In- 
stitutions should  rest  on  the  sober  Ground  of  Reciprocal  and 
General  Interest.     545. 


%   » 


87 

(B)  The  Return  Services  of  Society  consist  chiefly  in  the  Natural 
Reactions  of  the  Interests  which  it  embraces.  546. 

(C)  The  Amount  of  Limitation  which  Society  can  impose  upon  In- 
dividual Wills  must  itself  be  but  limited.     546-548. 

(II)  As  to  the  Relations  of  the  State  and  Society.     §  8. 

(A)  Reasons  for  Considering.     549. 

(B)  The  Possibility  of  a  Universal  Society,  replacing  States.   550. 

i.  Tendencies  to  Cosmopolitanism. 
ii.  Difficulties. 

(C)  Our  Aim  is  the  Discussion  of  Principles  not  Details,  and  hence 
only  to  ask  (i)  what  the  State  is  and  must  remain  for  Modern 
Society,  and  (2)  what  advantageous  Transformations  of  Forms 
are  possible.     551-560. 

i.   What  the  State  is  and  must  remain.     552-557. 

a.  It  needs  Community  of  Origin,  Language,  and  Custom. 

b.  Only  Stationary  Peoples  are  able  to  furnish  the  complete 
Conditions  for  a  Real  State.     553. 

c.  It  is  neither  to  be  Desired  nor  Expected  that  the  Con- 
trasts involved  in  States  should  disappear  (as  the  Exam- 
aniples  of  mere  Federations  show).     554-556. 

d.  Conclusion.  How  the  State  is  developed  from  Society. 
The  Four  Elements  which  go  to  form  the  State  are  (i) 
Community  of  Language  and  a  Natural  Unity;  (2)  a 
sufficient  Inherited  Territory;  (3)  a  Government  repre- 
senting the  Historical  Continuity  of  the  National  Mind; 
and  (4)  the  General  Conviction  that  all  Freedom  of  In- 
dividual Development  must  result  from  the  Possibility 
of  Legal  Harmony  between  the  People  and  the  Govern- 
ment.    556-557. 

ii.  The  Best  Form  of  the  State.  Hereditary  Monarchy  is  the 
Form  of  Government  which  in  itself  and  under  present 
Conditions  offers  the  greatest  Security  for  Steady  Develop- 
ment.    557-560. 

a.  The  Danger  in  all  Republican  Constitutions. — The  Nat- 
ural  Struggle  between  Different  Classes  of  Society  be- 
comes a  Struggle  for  Political  Power.     557-559. 

b.  The  Argument  for  Hereditary  Monarchy.     559-560. 
Transition.     560, 

(III)  As  to  Constitutional  Monarchy.     §  9. 

(A)  While  its  Fundamental  Thought  is  true,  the  System  has  two 
great  Lacks.     560-563. 

i.  Its  Low  Estimation  of  the  Corporate  Element — Combina- 
tions representing,  partly  the  most  important  Callings,  partly 
the  especial  Local  Interests  of  diff"erent  Districts.     561. 
ii.  Its  Tendency  to  regard  the  State  as  a  rigid  Framework  to 
which  all  National  Life  must  accommodate  itself.    561-563, 

(B)  For  the  Working  out  of  the  Corresponding  Reforms. 

i.  Existing  Institutions  are  not  adapted.     563. 
ii.  Socialism,  and  the  Theory  of  the  Abstract  State   have  no 
Promise.     564. 
(IV)  As  to  International  Relations.     §  10. 


88 

(\)  As  to  the  Permanence  and  Obligation  of  Treaties.     565. 
(B)   Impracticableness  of  International  Arbitration.     565-567. 
i.  The  Natural  Repugnance  to  it.     565. 

ii.  The  Conditions  necessary  to  make  it  practicable  are  want- 
ing. 
(C)  The  Final  Principle  in  International  Politics.     567. 


BOOK    IX. 


THE    UNITY    OF   THINGS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  Being  of  Things. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Being  of  Things,  showing  that  their  Being  is  not  Self- 
Dependence  but  a  State  of  Relatedness  ;  that  the  Natures  of  Things  are  at  least 
so  far  Comparable  as  to  admit  of  One  Universal  Truth  being  valid  for  the  entire 
Manifold  of  Reality  ;  and  that  their  Reciprocal  Action  requires  their  Substantial 
Connection  in  the  Unity  of  the  Infinite. 
Introduction  to  the  Book,  and  to  the  Chapter.  571-579. 
A.  General  Introduction  to  the  Book.     §  1-2. 

(I)  The  General  Purpose  of  the  Author  in  the  Book,     g  i. 
Introduction.     571. 

(A)  The  Aim  is  to  present  the  Coherent  Results  of  Long  Reflection, 
concerning  the  great  Ultimate  Questions.   572. 

(B)  And  so  to  bring  together  into  their  Final  Results,  the  scattered 
Lines  of  Investigation  which  have  preceded.     573. 

(C)  Bringing  out  thus  the  Real  Coherence  of  these  Scattered  Views, 

574. 
(II)   Limitations  of  the  Task  of  the  Book.     §  2. 

(A)  The  Three  Elemental  Forms  of  Knowledge,  and  the  Problem  of 
their  Connection.  An  Indication  of  the  Limitations  of  the  Pos- 
sible Accomplishment.     574-576. 

i.  The  Three  Elemental  Forms  of  Our  Knowledge — necessarily 
valid   Truths,  immediately  given  FactSy  Determinations  of 
Worth.     574. 
ii.   The  Incoherence  of  these.     575. 

iii.  This  Incoherence  both  hinders  our  Knowledge  and  is  also 
the  Source  of  the  Doubts  which  oppress  our  Life. 

iv.  Hence  our  Possible  Task  is  much  limited.  Assuming  that 
there  is  but  one  Origin  of  the  World — that  which  is  most 
Worthy,  we  seek  for  this  One  Origin  a  more  exact  Expres- 
sion, and  such  Verification  as  it  is  capable  of.     576, 

(B)  The  General  Method  of  the  Task.     576-578. 

i.   To  show  that  the  Earlier  Mechanical  Mode  of  Thought  con- 
strains to  this  Later  Ideal  Mode.     576. 


•'  i 


89 

ii.   By  the  Recovery  of  the  Links  between  the  Finite  and  the 
Infinite— the  Many  Things  and  the  One — by  showing  that 
the  Finite  requires  the  Infinite.     577. 
B.  Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     578-579- 

(I)  Our  Immediate  Inquiry  thus,  is  for  the  Being  of  Finite  Things — 
that  Nature  by  virtue  of  which  Things  are  similar  and  are  Things. 
578. 

(II)  And  involves  Two  Questions: 

(i)  What  is  the  Being  which  we  require  in  Things,  in  order  that  our 
Theory  of  the  World  may  find  in  them  a  firm  Foundation?  (§  3.) 
(2)  What  may  and  must  Things  be,  in  order  that  they  may  partici- 
pate in  this  Being?    (§  4-5.)    579. 
I.  The  Being  of  Things  is  not  Self-Dependence  but  a  State  of  Relatedness.  §  3. 

A.  The  Answer  even  of  Ordinary  Thought  affirms  that  Being  is  a  State  of 
Relatedness.     579-580. 

B.  The  Answer  of  Some  Philosophical  Reflection  is  that  Being  is  a  wholly 
Self-Sufficing  Self-Dependence.     580-587. 

(I)  Such  "Pure  Existence"  is  a  Product  of  Abstraction,  without  real 
Independent  Existence,  as  is  shown  by  the  Use  of  the  Terms — 
Affirmation  and  Positing.     581. 

(A)  Affirmation,     582. 

(B)  Positing. 

(II)  Nor  is  there  Existence  before  all  Relations.     583-^85. 

(A)  The  Theory.     583. 

(B)  The  only  Priority  here  is  Logical  not  Metaphysical. 

(C)  In  fact,  there  is  no  Real  Existence  when  all  Relations  have  been 

denied.    584~585' 
i.  A  completely  Unrelated  Thing,  even  if  admissible,  could 

never  enter  into  Relations.     584. 
ii.  And  no  Existing  Thing  could  get  rid  of  all  Relations.  585. 

(III)  The  Theory  of  the  Self-Sufficing  Self-Dependence  of  Things  still 
objects,  that  then  there  is  nothing  Stable  at  all.     585-587. 

(A)  This  is  the  most  Erroneous  of  all  Objections,  since  it  wholly 
mistakes  the  Business  of  Philosophy,  which  is  not  to  state  a 
Mode  of  Procedure  for  a  Creation  of  a  World  not  yet  existent, 
but  only  to  understand  the  Connection  of  the  World  which 
already  exists,  which  does  show  just  this  Continuous  Arch  of 
Mutually  Related  Things.     585. 

(B)  If,  then,  there  is  Nothing  that  is  Unrelated,  we  are  entitled  to 
say  that  it  belongs  to  the  Notion  and  Nature  of  Existence  to  be 
Related.     586. 

II.  What  Things  may  and  must  be  in  order  that  they  may  participate  in  Being, 
as  a  State  of  Relatedness.     §  4-5. 
Introduction  to  §  4-5. 

The  Relation  of  Thought  to  the  Relations  of  Things.     587-588. 

(I)  This  Relation  is  not  Arbitrary;  Thought  finds,  it  does  not  invent, 
the  Relations.     587. 
'      (II)  But  it  finds  Two  Kinds  of  Relations: 

(I)  Relations  which  must   hold  between  Things,  in  order  to  affi^rd 
the  Ground  of  any  Future  Event— the  Comparability  of  Things. 

(§4.) 


/ 


!! 


go 

(2)  Relations  which  are  the  Aciua/  Connections  of  Reciprocal  Ac- 
tion between  Things.     (§  5.) 
(Ill)  The  Immediate  Question  of  §  4  thus  becomes:    What  must  be  as- 
sumed as  to  the  Natures  of  Things,  in  order   to   understand  how  a 
Law  can  be  not  only  a  Valid  Truth  in  the  Realm  of  Thoughts,  but 
also  a  Determining  Power  in  the  World  of  Things?     588. 
A.   The  Comparability  of  the  Natures  of  Things  is  a  necessary  Condition  of 
the  Possibility  of  One  Truth— Universal  Law— being  valid  for  the  Mani- 
fold of  Reality.     §  4. 

(I)  No  General  Law  could  be  stated  of  Things  of  which  such  Compar- 
ability did  not  hold.  588. 
(II)  This  underlying  Assumption  of  Comparability  as  to  the  Natures  of 
Things  is  everywhere  tacitly  made  even  by  those  who  formally  deny 
it,  but  its  Significance  is  not  adequately  perceived,  viz.,  that  it 
makes  impossible  any  Self-Dependence  of  Things,  but  constrains  us 
to  regard  the  Specific  Nature  of  Everything  as  being  a  definite 
Member  of  an  all-embracing  Series  in  the  Existable  World.    589-594. 

(A)  Those  who  formally  deny  this  Assumption  reach  the  same  Re- 
sult in  a  Roundabout  way,  and  in  any  case  are  obliged  to  admit 
that  in  point  of  fact  all  that  exists  is  Comparable.     590. 

(B)  Yet  the  significance  of  this  Assumption  is  misunderstood,  since 
^it  is  regarded  as  far  more  natural   and  Self- Evident  than  it  is. 

591. 
i.   It  is  only  because  we  have  already  assumed  that  the  World 
is  a  Coherent  Whole,— that    there  is    One    Truth   which  is 
valid  amid  the  Multiplicity  of  Reality,— that    the  Assump- 
tion of   the    Comparability  of  Things  seems  Self-evident. 
592. 
ii.   The  Seeming   Self-Evidence  of  the   Assumption  rests  also 
on  the  Mistaken  Conception  of  a  Realm   of  Laws  existing 
Prior  to  Things,  and  Controlling  them.     593. 
(Ill)  Conclusion.     Comparability  is  not  to  be  made  to  mean   more  than 
it  does.     594. 

B.  The  Relations  which  are  the  Ac/ua/  Connections  of  Reciprocal  Action 
between  Things.  The  Reciprocal  Actions  of  Finite  Things  are  explica- 
ble only  by  their  Substantial  Connection  in  the  Unity  of  the  Infinite.  §  5. 
Introduction.     594. 

(I)  The  Thought  of  an  Objective  Connection  between  Things  is  impos- 
sible; only  in  as  far  as  two  Beings  cause  some  Passion  in  one  an- 
other can  they  be  Reciprocally  Acting  Causes.     595. 
(II)  Upon  what  Assumption  is  the  Fulfillment  of  this  Requirement  Think- 
able?    596-598. 

(A)  Not  by  the  Idea  of  Some  Influence  passing  from  One  Thing  to 
Another.     596. 

(B)  Nor  by  the  Assumption  of  a  Pre-established  Harmony.     597. 

(C)  Nor  by  the  Continual  Mediating  Activity  of  God,  so  long  as 
God  and  Things  are  separated  from  one  another  in  the  same 
way  as  Individual  Things  used  to  be. 

(D)  But  only  by  the  Assumption  of  a  Substantial  Community  of 
Being  between  all  Things,  as  Parts  of  one  Single  Infinite  Sub- 
stance.    598. 


91 

(III)  How  this  itself  is  thinkable,  is  reserved  for  later  Consideration  ;  and 
no  Explanation  is  attempted  of  Direct  and  Immediate  Relations. 

598-599. 
III.  Summary  of  the  Conclusions  of  the  Chapter.     §  6. 

A.  Proposition  I.  All  Intelligibility  of  the  Cosmic  Course  depends  upon 
Universal  Relations  which  connect  all  Things  together,  and  really  make 
them  what  they  are.     (§3.) 

B.  Proposition  II.  The  Natures  of  Things  are  at  least  so  far  Comparable 
that  there  can  be  One  Universal  Truth  valid  for  all  Things,     (§  4.) 

C.  Proposition  III.  The  Reciprocal  Actions  of  Things  must  be  understood 
by  reference  to  a  Continuous  and  Substantial  Unity  of  All — One  Infinite 
Being.     (§5.) 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Spatial  and  Supersensuous  Worlds. 

An    Investigation  of  the  Nature  of  the  Spatial  and  Supersensuous  Worlds  ; 
showing  the  Ideality  of  Space,  the  Correspondence  of  the  Real  Intellectual  and 
of  the  Apparent  Spatial  Places  of  Things,  and  that  the  Sole  Reality  is  the  imme- 
diate Reciprocal  Action  of  Things. 
Introduction.     602. 

I.   The  Spatial  World.     The  Ideality  of  Space.     §  i. 
Introduction. 

(I)  Connections  with  the  Results  of  the  Previous  Discussions. 
(II)  Connections  with  Kant's  View.     603. 

A.  The  Nature  of  Space  cannot  be  determined  by  Psychological  Investiga- 
tions.    604-606. 

(I)  These  show  indeed  that  Spatial  Intuition  arises  in  us  from  the  Re- 
ciprocal Action  of  Non-Spatial  Impressions.     604. 
(II)  But  this  proves  nothing  as  to  the  Spatial  or  Non-Spatial  Character 
of  the  External  World.     605. 

B.  But  the  Nature  of  Space  can  be  determined  only  by  a  Metaphysical  Dis- 
cussion as  to  the  Kind  of  Reality  Space  could  have  on  account  of  its 
Signification.     606-610. 

(I)   Its  Signification.     606-609. 

(A)  Unsatisfactory  Statements  of  its  Signification.    606. 

i.  An  Infinite  Something  or  Property. 
ii.  Form,  Order,  or  Relation. 

iii.   Even   "Background"  or  Possibility  of    Juxtaposition  in- 
volves a  Circle  in  Proof. 

(B)  The  Better  Method  of  reaching  its  real  Signification  seems  to 
be  to  examine  the  Law  of  Juxtaposition,  which  is  seen  to  be 
peculiar  in  that  it  is  not  like  the  Formative  Law  which  a  Con- 
cept imposes  on  its  Examples.     607-609. 

i.  These  give  no  real  Coordination — establish  no  significant 

Connection  between  the  Examples.     607. 
ii.  But  it  is  exactly  this  that  the  Law  of  Juxtaposition  does 
do;  it  combines  all  the  different  Instances  of  its  Application 
into  one  Whole;  hence  here  for  the  first  time  Coordination 
has  a  special  meaning.     608 


92 

iii.  We  come  thus  to  the  Real  Signification  of  Space,  as  an  In- 
tuition, which  appears  to  us  as  the  all-embracing  Whole,  in 
which  and  through  which  is  possible  the  Multiplicity  of  all 
those  Relations,  from  the  Summation  of  which  it  has  itself 
really  originated. 
(II)  The  Consequent  Kind  of  Reality  which  Space  can  have.    609-610. 

(A)  Not,  even  on  former  Views,  Pre-existing  Real  Empty  Form; 
nor  Pre-existing  Real  Relations.     609. 

(B)  Still  less,  on  our  View  can  Space  have  its  Existence  elsewhere 
than  in  the  Mind. 

(C)  The  exact  Kind  of  Reality  which  it  can  have  is  to  be  found  in 
its  Existence  as  Intuition  in  Ideating  Beings.     610. 

II.  The  Supersensuous  World.     §  2-3. 

A.  The  Correspondence  of  the  Real  Intellectual  and  of  the  Apparent  Spatial 
Places  of  Things.     §2. 
(I)  It  is  probably  impossible  either  to  prove  that  Space  is  a  Subjective 
Form  of  only  Human  Intuition,  or  to  prove  the  Universal  Necessity 
of  the  Intuition  of  Space.     611. 
(II)  But  even  the  most  extreme  Views  of  the   Phenomenal  Nature  of 
Space  can  only  explain  the  Applicability  of  Space  to  the  World  by 
the   Assumption   of  some  Correspondence   between    the  Apparent 
Spatial  and  the  Real  Intellectual  Relations.    612. 
(Ill)  The  Development  of  this  Standpoint  of  Correspondence.    613-617. 

(A)  The  Observed  Natural  Capacity  of  Spatial  Images  to  give  sensi- 
ble form  to  Intellectual  Relations.     613. 

(B)  But  these  Intellectual  Relations  have  still  a  recognized  special 
Meaning  of  their  own,  which  is  only  reflected  in  their  Spatial 
Form,  without  being  bound  to  it.     614. 

(C)  The  Spatial  Appearance  of  the  World  does  not  altogether  re- 
sult from  the  mere  Existence  of  the  Intellectual  Order  among 
Things  ;  it  is  only  complete  when  this  Order  has  exerted  its  In 

fluence  upon  those  to  whom  it  is  to  appear.    615. 
i.  Hence  the  Spatial  Appearance  of  the  World  cannot  be  the 
Same  to  all  by  whom  it  is  intuited. 

ii.  Yet  these  Different  Appearances  are  not  without  Connec- 
tion. 

iii.  Under  these  Conditions  of  merely  subjectively  intuited 
Space,  we  have  in  point  of  fact  exactly  what  would  be 
afforded  us  by  a  real  Objective  Existence  of  Space  if  such 
were  possible.     616. 

iv.   The  Fundamental  Notions  of  Natural  Philosophy,  however, 
must  be  here  left  out  of  account. 
B.  Removal  of  even  the  Intellectual  Relations  between  Things.    The  Imme- 
diate  Reciprocal  Action  of  Things  is  the  Sole  Reality.     §  3. 
(I)  Things  do  not,  in  fact,  constitute  a  Motionless  Organization  of  a 
Manifold  ;  hence  either  the  Nature  or  Relations  of  Things  must  be 
mutable.     617-622. 

(A)  The  Relations  are  not  Mutable  ;  indeed  even  in  the  Real  In- 
tellectual World  there  are  no  Relations  between  Things.     618. 

(B)  But  the  Sole  Reality  is  the  Reciprocal  Action  of  Things,  exer- 


11. 


111. 


93 

cised  directly  without  Mediation,  i.  e.,  the  Natures  of  Things 
are  Mutable.     619-622. 
i.  Some  Immediate  Reciprocal  Action  is  a  Necessity.     619. 
The  only  Process — Mediation — which  can  take  place  is  a 
Process  of  the  gradual  Completion  of  Causes  as  yet  incom- 
plete.   620. 

Hence  Reciprocal  Action  is  not  rendered  less  thinkable  by 
our  not  allowing  of  anything  between  Things,  and  is  itself 
the  Sole  Reality.     621. 
(II)  This  asserted  Mutability  of  Things  is  entirely  in  harmony  with  their 
real  Unity,  as  that  Consistency  of  Meaning  of  which  the  changing 
States  of  a  Thing  are  only  the  varied  Expressions.     622. 
III.  Summary.     §  4. 

A.  Proposition  IV.  The  Nature  of  a  Thing  is  One  as  regards  its  Consist- 
ency, but,  within  the  limits  of  this  Consistency  of  Meaning,  Mutable. 
(Last  part  of  §  3.) 

B.  Proposition  V.  The  Objective  Relations  of  Things  do  not  consist  in  Spa- 
tial Movements.  Space  exists  only  in  Things  as  the  form  of  an  Intuition 
through  which  they  themselves  become  conscious  of  their  Supersensuous 
Relations  to  one  another.     (§  1-2.) 

C.  Proposition  VI.  Even  the  Supersensuous  Order  of  the  World  does  not 
consist  in  a  tissue  of  complicated  Relations  between  Things,  but  only  in 
the  Totality  of  the  Reciprocal  Action  of  Things.     (§  3.) 


CHAPTER   III. 
The  Real  and  the  Ideal  (Spirit). 
A  Closer  Determination  of  the  Nature  of  the  Real,  showing  that  the  Contra- 
dictions involved  in  the  Common  Notion  of  Things  allow  us  to  give  Realness  only 
to  that  which  is  of  the  Nature  of  Mind — that  which  exists  for  Self. 
Introduction.     626-628. 

A.  The  Preceding  Results  have  been  of  essentially  Formal  Significance.  We 
have  not  determined  that  Real  What  of  Things — that  Nature  by  which  each 
is  differenced  from  others.     626. 

B.  This  Question  cannot  be  evaded  by  a  simple  Confession  of  Ignorance,  for 
this  is  not  merely  an  Ignorance  about  Particulars,  but  we  have  not  even  a 
General  Notion  of  the  Essential  Nature  of  a  Thing,  which  should  show 
the  Possibility  of  Things  at  all.     627. 

C.  This  is  manifest  from  the  Fact  that  the  Formal  Conditions,  which  we 
have  required  from  all  Being  and  Action,  cannot  be  satisfied  by  Things  as 
they  are  commonly  thought. 

I.  The  Contradictions  in  the  Notion  of  Things  (as  commonly  thought)  and 
their  Formal  Determinations,  which  show  that  these  make  Demands  which 
Things  thought  as  Self-less  cannot  fulfill.     §  I. 
A.  Difficulties  as  to  the  What  of  Things.    628-632. 

(I)  We  have  found  that  the  Being  of  Things  is  not — 

(A)  Sensible  Qualities.    628. 

(B)  Supersensible  Intellectual  Qualities. 

(C)  Unknown  Qualities.     629. 

(D)  Simply  Unknown. 

(E)  Merely  a  Significant  Thought.     630. 


94 

i.  The  Theory, 
ii.  The  Defect. 

(II)  But  we  seem  to  need  to  think  of  the  What  of  a  Thing  as  an  Opera- 
tive Idea.     631-632. 

(A)  But  it  is  we  who  give  this  Reality  to  the  Idea.     631. 

(B)  Hence,  Things,  as  commonly  thought,  cannot  meet  this  De- 
mand.    632. 

B.  Difficulties  as  to  the  Unity  of  Things.     632-634. 

(I)  We  have  found  the  Unity  of  Things  to  consist  in  the  Logical  Con- 
nection  between  their  Internal  States,  and  the  only  applicable  Case 
of  such  Unity  we  know  is  in  our  own  Inner  Life.  632. 
(II)  And  in  our  own  Inner  Life  it  is  only  because  vi^  appear  to  ourselves 
to  be  Unity,  that  in  truth  we  are  Unity.  The  only  Real  Unity 
therefore  that  we  are  able  to  think  depends  on  Consciousness ;  and 
hence,  Things,  as  commonly  thought,  cannot  meet  this  Demand 
633- 

C.  Difficulties  as  to  the  Mode  of  Existence  of  Things.     634-636. 

(I)  We  have  found  that  the  Reciprocal  Action  of  Things  must  take  the 

place  of  all  Relations  between  Things,  as  the  Sole  Reality.     634. 
(II)  But  such  Reciprocal  Action  implies  a  Suffering  or  Passion  in  a  Being, 
which  can  take  place  only  where  there  is  Feeling  and  Conscious- 
ness, and  hence  Things,  as  commonly  thought,  cannot   meet  this 
Demand.     635. 

II.  Three  Possible  Inferences  from  these  Contradictions  which  seem  to  exclude 
each  other,  and  which  yet  all  confirm  the  Invalid  Conception  of  Things   as 
commonly  thought.      §  2. 
Transition  and  Introduction.     636. 

A.  Subjective  Idealism  must  still  presuppose  Things  in  some  sense,  and  Re- 
ciprocal  Action  between  them  and  us.     637-638. 

B.  Objective  Idealism.     Only  Minds  are  Real.     638-641. 

(I)   Its  Negative  Ground.     The  very  Content  of  our  Idea  of  the  World 
forbids  us  to  concede  its  Reality  except  as  Appearance.    639-640. 

(A)  The  Reality  of  other  Minds  is  granted.     639. 

(B)  But  not  the  Reality  of  the  Phenomenal  World  which  is  Com- 
mon  to  all  Minds. 

i.  This  i-  not  to  be  taken  as  due  to  Individual  Minds, 
ii.  And  we    cannot  rationally    ascribe   it    to    a    Multitude   of 
Things,  since  the  Assumption  of  Things  has  no  other  use 
for  us  than  this,  that  Things  mark  for  us  fixed  Positions  in 
the  Real  World.     640. 
(II)  Its  Positive  Ground.     Its  Explanation  of  the  Phenomenal  World 
Things   are  Acts   of  the  Infinite  wrought  within  Minds  alone  or 
States  which  the  Infinite  experiences  nowhere  but   in  Minds-  the 
Unity  of  the  Infinite  itself  thus  bringing  to  pass  the  Phenomenal 
World  which  is  Common  to  all  Minds.     640-641. 
C.  The  Third  Path.     All  that  is  Real  is  Mind. 
Introduction.     642. 
(I)  The  View  has  many  Grounds. 

(II)  The  Real  Distinction  between  this  View  and  Objective  Idealism 
643-646. 


ij 

I 


95 

(A)  Not  that  Idealism  denies  that  Things  are  "External"  to  God, 
and  that  this  View  asserts  it,  thus  assuming  that  Realness  is  a 
definite  Formal  Relation  to  God.     643. 

^^^  <  "Ir?"  1\'°'^  °^  ^^''^''"  ^^''^^'  "^^^  ^°"1^  be  gained  for 
Self-less  Things  by  such  Externality,  and  what  could  be  the 
real  Meaning  of  such  Externality?     644-646. 
i.  Nothing  whatever  could  be  gained  for  Self-less,   Uncon- 

scious  Things  ;  they  would  only  lose  in  Reality.     645 
II.  Hence  it  is  seen  that  this  very  Existence  for  Self  is  the 
* 'Externality"  or  Realness  wanted. 
(C)  Conclusion.     646-647. 

i.   Realness  is  the  special  Kind  of  Reality  which  we  ascribe  to 

Ihings  (not  to  Actions).     646. 
ii.  This  Realness  is  the  Being  of  that  which  exists  for  Self, 
lii.  But  as  there  are  Degrees  of  Consciousness,  so  there  are  De- 
grees  of  Realness  in  Things,  while  all  continue  to  be  imma- 
nent in  the  Infinite. 

iv.   Hence  the  Distinction  between  Idealism  and  the  View   that 
Ail  that  IS  Real  is  of  the  nature  of  Mind,  is  that  Idealism 
convinced  of  the  Selflessness  of  Things,  on  this  account  wili 
not  allow  that  they  are  more  than  States  of  the  Infinite  • 
while  the  other  View  leaves  undecided  the  question  whether 
this  Assumption  of  Selflessness  is  appropriate,  holding  how- 
ever, that  It  is  far  more  likely  to  be  ^appropriate,  and  so 
^^'at  Things  are  all  of  the  nature  of  Mind.     647 
III.  What  It  is  that  we  must  seek  to  Construct,  and  What  it  is  that  we  have  to 
Recognize  as  immediately  Given.    §  3-4. 
Introduction.     647-649. 

''^  I^^''?"x,'"^  Considerations  seem  nt  least  to  show  that  there  is  in 
Mind  the  Nature  of  a  Real  Being.     647. 

(II)  But  a  Demand  for  the  further  Explanation  of  Mind  will  still  be 
made.     648. 

(Ill)   But  to  attempt  this  seems  to  us  to  be  to  take  a  decided  step  into  the 
perverse  region  of  those  Investigations  which  seek  to  know  by  what 

Machinery  Reality  is  manufactured.     Hence  arises  the  Question  of 
S  3~4' 
A.  Only  so  far  as  Changing  Action  depends  upon  Altering  Conditions  has 
Prlb'lems.'"t  Psychology,   to  solve  Explanatory  and  Constructive 

(I)  Illustrations  of  the   Constructive   Mania  which  would  end   by  de 
duc.ng  the  whole  Positive  Content  of  Real  Things  from  mere  Mod- 
ihcations  of  Formal  Conditions.    649. 

(A)  The   Tendency  to   regard    the   Sensations   of  Light,    Colors 
Sound,  etc.,   as  no  more  different  than   their  External   Occa- 
sioning Causes,  i.  e.   as  really  determined  in  Nature  by  these 
mere  Occasions.     649-650. 

(B)  The  Similar   Tendency  to  the  merely  Formal  Explanation  of 
Feelings,  and  Stirrings  of  the  Will.     650. 

(II)  All  such  Explanations,  even  if  correct,  teach  us  only  the  Occasion 

ing  Conditions  of  the  Changing  Action  of  Things,  not  the  Produc- 


96 

ing  Causes  of  the  real  Content  of  Things.  Science  cannot  therefore 
hope  to  make  out,  from  any  data,  how  it  can  happen  at  all  that 
there  can  be  Ideas,  Feelings,  and  Volitions,  and  that  one  Inner 
State  can  influence  another.  It  can  only  accept  all  this  as  Given. 
651. 

B.  TheExjlanation  of  this  Mania  for  Constructing  what  is  most  Real  and 
hence;.nnust  be  accepted  as  simply  Given.     §  4. 
Introduction.     652. 

(A)  It  will  be  insisted  that  there  is  still  a  Constructive  Task  within 
the  Mind. 

(B)  This  is  due  particularly  to  the  Ineradicable  Inclination  to  regard 
the  "Contingent  Aspects,"  the  Auxiliary  Notions  and  Relations 
by  which  we  succeed  in  thinking  the  Connection  between  Real 
Things  when  they  already  exist,  as  Actual  Machinery  by  means 
of  which  those  Things  come  to  exist. 

(I)  The  Process  by  which  the  Mind  really  reaches  its  Ontological  No- 
tions from  itself,  and  then  applies  them  in  Explanation  of  itself.  653. 
(II)  This  is  an  Inevitable  Process  of  our  Thinking,  but  it  is  possible 
nevertheless  to  be  conscious  that  all  those  Ontological  Notions  are 
but  Products  of  Thought ;  and  this  True  State  of  the  Case  forces 
itself  upon  us  on  different  Occasions,  with  different  degrees  of  clear- 
ness.    654-656. 

(A)  In  the  Thought  that  "Our  Ego  possesses  Self-Consciousness." 
654. 

(B)  In  the  Conception  of  Substance  and  Attributes.     655. 

(C)  In  the  Conception  of  Excitation  and  Reaction. 

(D)  In  the  Conception  of  the  Homogeneity  of  reciprocally  acting 
Elements. 

(Ill)  It  is  especially  in  those  Cases,  in  which  we  are  constrained  always 
to  return  to  the  same  Modes  of  conceiving  Reality,  that  these  in- 
evitably appear  to  us  as  Conditions  which  not  only  make  our  Knowl- 
edge of  the  Thing  possible,  but  make  the  Thing  itself  possible.  656. 
IV.   Summary  of  the  Chapter.     §  5. 

A.  Proposition  VII.  The  Demands  made  by  the  Notion  of  Things  and  their 
Formal  Determinations  can  be  fulfilled  only  by  that  which  is  of  the  nature 
of  Mind.     (§1.) 

B.  Proposition  VIII.  Hence  either  only  Minds  exist,  or  Things  are  Beings 
which  share  with  Minds  in  various  degrees  the  general  Characteristic  of 
Mentality,  namely  Self- Existence.     (First  Part  of  §  2.) 

C.  Proposition  IX.  The  Realness  of  Things  and  their  Self-Existence  are 
notions  which  have  precisely  the  Same  Significance.  (Last  Part  of  §  2, 
§3-4.) 

(1)  A  Mind  which  continues  immanent  in  the  Infinite,  directly  that  it  ex- 
ists for  Self,  has  in  this  very  Self-Existence  the  fullest  Realness. 

(2)  Realness  is  not  to  be  understood  as  a  Consequence  attached  to  Self- 
Existence.  It  is  only  the  Living  Mind  that  is,  and  nothing  is  before 
it  or  external  to  it;  but  it  exists  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  only  make 
its  own  Existence  and  Action  Objects  of  Reflection  by  giving  to  their 
manifold  Content  a  Framework  of  Abstractions,  Connections,  etc., 
which  easily  come  to  appear  as  being  Conditions  of  its  own  Reality. 


f 


97 

CHAPTER   IV. 

The  Personality  of  God. 

An  Investigation  of  the  Question  of  the  Personality  of  God,  showing  that  the 
Common  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  God  do  not  bring  us  to  the  Personality  of  the 
Infinite  ;  that  the  Theories  of  the  Impersonal  Form  of  the  Supreme  Being  are  un- 
tenable ;  that  the  Objections  to  the  Possibility  of  the  Personality  of  the  Infinite 
are  not  valid;  that,  in  fact.  Personality  is  Complete  only  in  the  Infinite. 

Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §  i. 

Faith  and  Thought.     Answers  to  Objections  to  Philosophical  Investigation 

here. 

Introduction.  .   659. 

A.  The  First  Objection  and  its  Answer.     660. 

(I)  The  Objection.  Concerning  the  Ultimate  Questions  of  Faith,  Phil- 
osophical Investigations  must  remain  resultless. 

(II)  The  Answer.  Whatever  the  View  of  the  Origin  of  Religious  Truths, 
unquestionably  something  will  be  left  to  be  done  by  Scientific  Cog- 
nition. Reason  must  be  able  at  least  to  have  some  Understanding 
of  the  Revealed  Truth.  A  Religion  cannot  consist  simply  of  Mys- 
teries. 

B.  The  Second  Objection  and  its  Answer. 

(I)  The  Objection.     But  Religious  Faith  like  Scientific,  affords  a  Cer- 
tainty of  that  which  no  Cognition  can  grasp. 
(II)   The  Answer.     There  is  a  germ  of  Truth  here,  but  there  is  an  essen- 
tial Difference  between  Scientific  and  Religious  Faith.     661. 

(A)  Scientific  Faith  is  only  in  Universal  Propositions,  which  are  at 
bottom  but  the  very  Nature  of  Cognizing  Reason  itself. 

(B)  Religious  Faith  is  essentially  in  the  Reality  of  some  Being  or 
Event  or  Series  of  Events— Facts.  But  not  more  than  its  own 
Being  can  be  known  to  the  Mind  in  immediate  consciousness. 

C.  The  Third  Objection  and  its  Answer. 

(I)  The  Objection.     Religious  Faith  is  rather  comparable  to  the  Intui- 
tion by  which  Content  is  given  to  Universal  Principles. 
(II)  The  Answer.     There  is  Truth  here  ;  but  every  sensuous  Impression 
regarded  in  itself  is  but  a  way  in  which  we  are  affected  ;  in  itself  it 
gives  no  knowledge  of  any  Matter  of  Fact.     So  also  the  Divine  In- 
fluence would  produce  merely  a  feeling,  a  mood,  a  mode  of  affec- 
tion; what  is  thus  experienced  becomes  a  Revelation  only  through 
some  Work  of  Reflection.     662. 
Conclusion  of  Section.     The  Consequent  Limitations  of  Philosophical  Inves- 
tigation in  the  Religious  Sphere. 
I.  An  Examination  of  the  Common  Proofs  for  the  Existence  of  God,  showing 
their  Failure  fully  to  reach  a  Personal  God.     §  2. 
Introduction.     663. 

The  Inherent  Difficulty  of  the  merely  Syllogistic  Proofs  of  the  Uncondi- 
tioned.    They  presuppose  the  Absolute  Validity  of  a  Truth  which  Knits 
all  the  World  together.     663. 
A.  The  Cosmological  Proof.     664-666. 

This  concludes  from  the  Contingent  and  Conditioned  Character  of  every- 
thing in  the  World  to  the  Existence  of  a  Necessary  and  Unconditioned 
and  hence  absolutely  Perfect  Being. 


98 

(I)  Examination  of  the  Notions  "Contingent"  and  **Necessary."    664- 
665. 

(A)  In  their  strict  Speculative  Meaning,  * 'Contingent"  and  "Con- 
ditioned" are  contradictory,  as  are  also  ''Necessary"  and  "Un- 
conditioned."    664. 

(B)  As  Determinations  of  Value. 

Taken  thus,  ''Necessary"  connotes  such  unconditional  Value 
that  it  seems  in  virtue  of  this  Value  to  deserve  also  uncondi- 
tional Existence.  Only  in  such  a  sense  can  it  be  required  that 
the  Supreme  Principle  of  the  Universe  should  be  necessary.  665. 
(II)  Examination  of  the  Notion,  "Perfection." 

"Unconditioned"  is  not  confined  to  a  Perfect  Being. 
(Ill)   Conclusion.     The  Cosmological  Proof  can   not  attain  to  the  Relig- 
ious Conception  of  God,  but  to  the  Metaphysical  Conception  of  the 
Unconditioned,  and  is  not  even  able  to  establish  the  Unity  of  this 
Unconditioned.     666. 

B.  The  Teleological  Proof.     666-669. 

This  Proof  is  Unable  to  fulfill  the  four  Requirements   necessarily  made 
upon  it. 

(I)  It  is  unable  to  show  that  there  is  in  the  World  a  Purposive  Connec- 
tion which  cannot  result  from  an  undesigned  Cooperation  of  Forces 
666. 

(II)  It  is  unable  to  show  that  Purposiveness  pervades  the  whole  World 
harmoniously  and  without  Exception.     667. 

(III)  Not  only  the  Defectiveness  of  Scientific  Knowledge,  but  also  the 
Internal  Difficulties  of  the  Idea  of  Design  itself  when  applied  to 
God  hinders  the  Argument  in  showing  that  Creative  Wisdom  in 
carrying  out  its  Designs  never  experiences  Opposition. 

(IV)  The  Proof  is  unable  to  show  the  Unconditional  Worth  and  the 
Sacredness  of  the  Designs  which  we  plainly  see  pursued  in  the 
World.     668. 

Conclusion  on  the  Teleological  and  Cosmological  Proofs.     668-669. 

(I)  The  Teleological  Proof  is  destitute  of  all  Demonstrative  Force,  and 

what  it  seeks  is  better  stated  in  the  Ontological  Proof. 
(II)  The  Cosmological    Proof  is  better    replaced  by  the  Proof  of  One 
Infinite  Substance  from  the  possibility  of  Reciprocal  Action. 

C.  The  Ontological  Proof.     669-671. 

(I)   The  Various  Forms  of  putting  it.     669. 

(A)  The  false  Scholastic  Form. 

(B)  Anselm's  Form  is  more  suggestive.     670. 

(C)  The  Fundamental  Thought  involved  is  that  that  which  is  most 
Worthy  must  exist.  It  would  be  intolerable  to  think  other- 
wise. 

(II)  Plainly  this  Conviction  is  not  logically  Demonstrable.  The  Real 
Force  of  the  Ontological  Proof  is  in  its  Expression  of  the  Imme- 
diate Certainty  of  this  Conviction,  and  it  is  this  Conviction  which 
carries  the  Teleological  Proof  far  beyond  its  logical  inferences. 
(Ill)  But  even  this  Conviction  gives  no  formal  Determinateness  to  the 
Nature  of  God.     671. 


Vrf 


/ 


y 


\ 


\\ 


99 

II.  The  Untenableness  of  the  Theories  of  the  Impersonal  Form  of  the  Supreme 
Being.     §  3. 
Introduction.     672-673. 

(I)  The  Limitation  of  our  Theme  to  the  Defense  of  the  Notion  of  a 

Personal  God.     672. 
(II)  How  the  Theories  of  the  Impersonal  Forms  of  the  Supreme  Being 
arose  against  Natural  Instinct. 

A.  The  Supreme  Being  as  a  Moral  World  Order.     673-676. 

(I)  No  Order  can  precede  the  ordered  Material.     673. 
(II)  The  Conception  of  an  Aciivg  Order  either  is  without  meaning,  or 
leads  back  inevitably  to  the  Conception  of  an  Ordering  Being.     674. 

(III)  And  the  Conception  of  a  Moral  Order,  to  be  thinkable,  really  in- 
volves the  Conception  of  a  Personal  God.     676. 

B.  The  Supreme  Being  as  Infinite  Substance— Pantheism;  its  Relation  to 
our  View.     676-677. 

(I)  Pantheism  makes  the  Spatial  World,  Existent  Being.     677. 
(II)   Regards  the  inexhaustible  Force  of  the  Unconditioned  as  manifest- 
ing itself  in  Extended  Figures. 
(Ill)   Makes  the  Spiritual  World  a  Development  from  the  Material. 

(IV)  Suppresses  all  that  is  Finite  in  favor  of  the  Infinite. 

C.  The  Supreme  Being  as  Self-developing  Idea  will  be  treated  later. 

III.  Answers  to  Objections  to  the  Possibility  of  the  Personality  of  the  Infinite.  §  4. 
A.  The  Conceptions  of  the  Relation  of  the  Ego  and  Non-Ego,  as  the  Basis 
of  Objections  to  the  Personality  of  God.     678-685. 
The  Three  Interpretations: 

(1)  What  the  term  Ego  denotes  can  be  comprehended  in  Reflective  Analy- 
sis only  by  reference  to  the  Non-Ego. 

(2)  It  is  not  conceivable  that  this  Content  of  the  Ego  should  be  experi- 
enced without  that  contrasted  Non-Ego  being  experienced  at  the 
same  time. 

(3)  The  Existence  and  Active  Influence  of  a  Non-Ego  is  the  Condition 
without  which  the  Being  upon  which  this  Influence  works  could  not 
be  an  Ego. 

(I)  As  to  the  First  Two  Interpretations.  We  admit  that  the  Ego  is 
thinkable  only  in  relation  to  the  Non-Ego,  but  we  add  that  it  may  be 
experienced ^x^yxoM's,  to  and  out  of  every  such  Relation,  and  that  to 
this  is  due  the  Possibility  of  its  subsequently  becoming  thinkable  in 
that  Relation.  678-680. 
(II)  As  to  the  Third  Interpretation.     680-685. 

(A)  That  Form  of  the  View,  which  rests  on  ill-chosen  Analogies 
which  are  supposed  to  show  how  an  Activity  originally  directed 
entirely  outwards,  by  the  Resistance  of  the  Non-Ego  becomes 
transformed  into  Self-Consciousness,  may  be  set  aside  at  once. 
680. 

(B)  A  more  respectable  Form  of  the  View  holds  that  Self-Con- 
sciousness could  never  be  developed  even  in  a  Being  whose 
Nature  is  capable  of  it,  without  the  Cooperation  and  Educative 
Influences  of  an  External  World. 

i.  It  is  not  sufficient    to    answer  that    this  Educative   Stimu- 
lation is  not  necessary  for  the  Nature  of  God,  since  that  is 


IV 


lOO 

Self-cognizant  Idea,  eternally  unchangeable.  For  Person- 
ality can  never  belong  to  any  Idea  but  only  to  something 
which  changes,  suffers,  and  reacts.  682. 
ii.  Yet  the  Transference  of  the  Conditions  of  Finite  Person- 
ality  to  the  Personality  of  the  Infinite  is  not  justified  68^- 
685.  '       ^ 

a.  That  which  is  only  approximately  possible  for  the  Finite 
Mind— the  Conditioning  of  its  Life  by  itself— takes  place 
without  limit  in  God,  and  therefore  no  Contrast  of  an 
External  World  is  necessary  for  Him.     683. 

b.  As  to  the  Primary  Impulse  in  God,  every  Theory  of  the 
Universe  must  somehow  and  somewhere  recognize  the 
Actual  Movement  itself  as  an  originally  given  Reality. 
684. 

B.  Personality  is  really  Complete  only  in  God.     685-687. 

(I)  Since  the  Finite  Being  always  works  with  Powers  with  which  it  did 
not  endow  itself,  and  according  to  Laws  which  it  did  not  establish. 

(II)  The  Limitations  which  arise  in  the  case  of  the  Finite  Being  from  its 
being  a  Part  in  a  Whole.     686. 
(Ill)   Still  less  do  Finite  Beings  exist  wholly  /or  themselves  in  a  temporal 
point  of  view.     Much  disappears  from  Memory. 
Summary  of  Results.     §5. 

A.  ProposiUon  X.  Sel'fhood,  th«  Essence  of  all  Personality,  does  not  depend 
on  any  Opposu.on  of  the  Ego  to  a  Non-Ego,  but  it  consists  in  an  imme- 
diate  Self-Existence. 

B.  Proposition  XI.  For  the  Infinite  only  is  there  possible  a  Self  Existence 
wh.ch  needs  neither  to  be  initiated  nor  to  be  continuously  developed  by 
something  not  itself.  v       "] 

C.  Proposition  XII.     Perfect  Personality  is  in  God  only. 


CHAPTER  V. 
God  .\nd  the  World. 
An  Investigation  of  the  Difficulties  connected  with  the  thought  of  the  Relation 
between  God  and  the  World:  Dilficulties  as  .„  the  Source  of  Iternal  Truths    as 
.0  Creafon    Preservation,  and  Government;  as  to  the  Possible   Harmony  o'th^ 
Spheres  of  Actuality,  Necessity,  and  Ideality-Reality,  Laws,  and  the  Good 
Introduction  to  the  Chapter.     §1.  /  ,  c  oooa. 

^A.  Transition.     689. 
B.  The  Theme  of  the  Chapter. 

^'  J^l^^T  '^  '^'  ^'''"'^  '^'"'^^^  ""^  '^^''  R^I-t'^n  to  God.     8  2 

A.  T^he  Relation  of  the  Laws  of  Cognition,  and  of  the  Course  of  Events  to 
the  Being  of  God.     690-698.  ^^venis  10 

(I)  Inadequate  Theories  of  the  Relation.     690-693. 

(A)  The  Recognition  of  the  Eternal  Truths  as  Primary  and  Uncon- 
ditioned, as  being  an  absolutely  valid  Necessity,  to  which  even 
the  Living  Reality  of  God  is  subject.     690-692. 
i.   This  would  not  only  involve  a  Contradiction  as  to  the  Un- 
conditionedness  of  God.    69a 


) 


^ 


lOI 

ii.  But  also  involves  another  Contradiction  as  to  the  Nature  of 
Truth.  The  whole  body  of  Truth  cannot  precede  the  whole 
of  Reality  or  that  One  Supreme  Being  from  which  it  flows, 
as  though  it  were  a  power  existing  in  vacuo;  for  of  Truths, 
we  can  only  say  that  they  are  valid,  not  that  they  exist. 

(B)  The  Theory  that  the  Eternal  Truths  are  Creations  of  God.  692. 
This  View  too  involves  Contradiction  in  the  Notion  of  Truth; 
for  Truths  can  no  more  be  made  than  they  can  exist  independ- 
ent of  Reality.  Still  more  impossible  is  it  to  imagine  Creative 
Activity  directed  to  such  an  impossible  Aim  as  the  Original 
Production  of  all  Truth. 

(C)  The  Middle  View,  that  these  Eternal  Truths  are  the  Necessary 
Consequences  of  God's  own  Being.     693. 

This  is  also  impossible,  for  the  Conception  presupposes  some 
universal  intrinsically  Valid  Standard. 
(II)  The  Resultlessness  of  all  these  Views  is  due  to  the  Fact  that  they 
use  the  name  God  as  merely  a  provisional  anticipatory  designation 
of  a  Being  thought  of  as  not  yet  full  and  complete  in  his  Reality. 
That  this  is  unthinkable  may  be  shown  by  considering  two  typical 
Questions  representing  the  Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Difficulties  of 
the  Subject.     693-699. 

(A)  The  Representative  Metaphysical  Difficulty  involved  in  the  Ori- 
gin of  Eternal  Truths.    694-698. 
i.  What  is  the  Real  Meaning  of  Creating  Truth?    694-695. 

a.  The  Misleading  though  Common  Mathematical  Form  of 
the  Question  as  to  the  Metaphysical  Difficulty  presup- 
poses the  Prior  Validity  of  the  Law  of  Identity.  694. 

b.  Hence,  more  generally  expressed,  the  Question  would 
run  thus:  Can  the  Will  of  God  establish  the  Law  of 
Identity,  so  as  by  means  of  it  to  make  true  some  Indi- 
vidual Relation  which  contradicts  it?   695. 

(i)  The  Second  Clause  of  the  Question  again  really  pre- 
supposes an  Existing  Standard  of  Truth,  and  more- 
over looks  to  seeking  in  God  an  Omnipotence  devoid 
of  Intelligence, 
(ii)  Hence  the  Question  becomes  :     Whether  the  Trutb 
which  is  not  yet  can  be  established  by  God — whether 
God  can  bring  about  the  Production  of  the  whole 
unnameable  Region  within  which  there  is  a  Distinc- 
tion, not  previously  existent,  between  the  True  and 
the  Untrue,  the  Possible  and  the  Impossible. 
Now  if  this  is  the  Real  Meaning  of  Creating  Truth,  who  is 
the  God  to  whom  we  ascribe  this  Creation?     Is  He  not  the 
Perfect  and  Complete  God  in  whose  Being  we  imagine  that 
all  Truth  already  is?    The  Divine  Power  cannot  be  thought 
as  without  Content  and  without  Direction. 
Hence  just  that  which  we  know  as  the  Sum  of  the  Eternal 
Truths  is  the  Mode  of  Action  of  Omnipotence,  but  not  its 
Product.     697. 


11. 


111. 


Conclusion, 


1 02 

(B)  The  Representative  Ethical  Difficulty  in  the  Question:    How 
can  God  himself  be  True,  if  not  subject  to  Truth?     698 
It  IS  impossible  to  understand  Truth  as  an  Object  of  Recoeni- 
t|on  for  any  Being  that  does  not  by  its  own  Nature  participate 

,„  -r    .1.    ^'j' '''f^^°"  *"  ""y  "ay  impossible  to  set  up  in  opposition 
to  Truth  a  God  for  whom  Truth  has  as  yet  no  Validity,  whether  we  re 
gard  H.m  as  ,ts  Creator,  or  as  Accommodating  Himself  to  it.     It  is  only 
through  God's  ExisUm,  that  Truth  subsists  ^ 

^'  IXiT""  °'  ''^'"'""^"'•"^  °f  ^'-'"  ^^""h  'o  the  Being  of  God. 

ject  of  Recognuton,  unless  that  Will  already  contains  that  Good  in  the 
same  way  as  we  have  said  that  Truth  must  be  contained  by  the  Mind 
which  apprehends  it.     698.  ^ 

"■  IXlT^^  Conditions  of  the  Relation  between  God  and  the  World    8  ,  ^ 

Introduction. 

The  Question  concerns  only  the  Meaning  and  Religious  Worth  of 
the  Permanent  Relation  between  Creator  and  Creature  established 
by  Creation,  regarded  as  having  taken  place. 
(1)  Creation  is  not  an  Act  of  God.     700-703 

'""^  rTHr.  ^"'^"7,  '^''''°"  '"'  ""'  ^''*  '^  ""''  "-^  '"ink  we  di- 
rectly  feel  in  Movement  the  transmission  of  Active  Will  into 

our  Limbs,  and  wish  to  find  the  same  Self-Enjoyment  of  Living 
Energy  m  God.     700.  ** 

(B)  But  a  well-known  Psychological  Illusion  has  here  misled  us ;  in 
fact,  the  essential  Characteristic  of  an  Act  is  that  it  is  the  col 
sequence  of  a  Volition  which  willed  it  and  nothing  else.     70" 

(C)  Moreover,  ,n  the  sense  in  which  we  use  Work  of  Men    it  can 
not  be  ascribed  to  God.   He  will  be  directly  conscious 'of  ,.,.; 
consequence  of  h  s  Will  as  being  what  it  is,  and  so  there  wlu 
he^nc.  ..m.t_at.ons  tn  the  Self-Enjoyment  of  his  own  Vitality  J 

(II)  Creation  is  not  an  Emanation  from  the  Divine  Intelligence.     703- 

Introduction.     The  Question  of  Insight  as  preceding  Will  in  God. 

(A)  There  is  a  Possibility  of  Distinction  between  the  Realized  and 
Unrealized  Thoughts  of  God.  Our  thoughts  concer  g  h"^ 
Creative  Action  must  set  out  not  from  the  equal  Possib  if.y  of 
that  which  was  Uncreated,  but  from  its  Impossibility  which 
was  originally  recognized  by  Him.     703-70C  ' 

^^j'.'^'j^  ^'""^^^-"  ""-^^  -"e  Correction  'and  Explanation. 

i.  It  cannot  mean  that  the  Images  of  different  Worlds  were 
pr^ent  to  and  known  by  God.  as  being  .„  M,W.«  pos" 
ible  or  impossible.     705. 


103 

ii.  But  the  Thoughts  of  the  Non-Existent  are  Thoughts  which 
on  account  of  their  Content— of  their  own  Resultlessness, 
their  Incoherence  and  the  Incapacity  of  Development  of 
their  Constituents— could  neither  form  Worlds  nor  enter 
into  connection  with  those  Thoughts  of  Existing  Things 
which  are  connected  and  logically  consistent.  Hence  Will 
and  Intelligence  are  not  here  to  be  separated.  705-706. 
(Ill)  Conclusion  as  to  Creation.  The  World  proceeds  from  the  Will  of 
God.     706-707. 

(A)  We  do  not  use  the  expression,  the  World  is  the  Product  of  His 
Will.     706. 

(B)  But  yet  we  say  the  World  was  willed  by  God,  since  the  Real 
Nature  of  Will  is  only  the  Approval  by  which  the  Being  that 
wills  attributes  to  himself  that  which  he  wills.  It  is  such  an 
uniform  and  Unchanging  Will  that  we  have  regarded  as  con- 
nected with  or  eternally  based  upon  the  Divine  Thought  of  the 
World.     706-707. 

B.  The  Conception  of  the  Relation  between  God  and  the  World  implied  in 
Preservation  and    Government.     How    does   the    Freedom  of  the  Finite 
consist  with  the  Unconditionedness  and  Omniscience  of  the  Infinite?  §4. 
Introduction.     The  Question.     707. 
(I)  Our  Inquiry  can  end  only  with  a  Po.stulate.     708. 
(II)  The  Ideality  of  Time,  as  the  Ground  of  the  Answer.     708-712. 

(A)  Must  we  not  presuppose  at  least  an  actual  Temporal  Succession? 
709-711. 

i.  Much  may  be  said  in  answer  to  this  natural  Objection  with- 
out invalidating  it.     709-711. 

a.  There  are  Considerations  tending  to  show  that  the  true 
Reality  in  any  Succession  is  only  the  conditioning  Force, 
unaffected  by  Time.     709. 

b.  The  Whole  of  Reality  may  thus  be  considered  as  a 
Whole  of  xMembers  which  condition  one  another,  and  is 
comparable  to  a  System  of  Truths;  Finite  Beings  being 
themselves  members  of  this  Whole,  and  hence  always 
seeing  events  in  Time.     7  to. 

ii.  This  View  may  be  said  to    disprove   the  Existence  of  Un- 
ending Empty  Time,  but  it  cannot  by  any  ingenious  torture 
of  thought  really  avoid  the  temporal  Succession  of  Events. 
711. 
(B)  But  the  necessary   Recognition  of  the  Course  of  Time  is  con- 
nected in  us  with  a  strong  feeling  that  the  Recognition  cannot 
contain   any   Final   Utterance   on  the  subject.     In  some   real 
sense  the  Past  and  Future  are  held  still  to  exist. 
(Ill")  Conclusion.     712-713. 

(A)  As  to  the  Omniscience  of  God.  God  Himself  is  not  a  Member 
of  the  Whole  of  Reality,  but,  as  its  all  embracing  Essence,  is 
as  near  to  any  one  part  of  the  Reality  as  to  any  other,  and  so 
knows  the  Infinite  Whole  as  Present.     712. 

(B)  As  to  the  Freedom  of  the  Finite.  Free  Actions  also  find  their 
place  in  this  Timeless  Reality,  not  as  non-existent  and  future. 


104 

but  as  Existent.     Hence  Omniscience  can  observe  Eree  Action 
as  something  real.     713. 
III.  The  Relation  between  God  and  the  World  implied  in  the  Inventive  Thought 
by  which  God  has  given  Content,  Order,  and  End  to  the  World.     The  Re- 
lation of  the  Spheres  of  the  Actual,  the  Necessary,  and  the  Good.  §  5-7. 

A.  The  Relation  of  Content  and  Order — Reality  and  Laws.     713-715. 
Introduction.     713. 

(I)  That  Direction  of  the  Eternal  Power  which    led   to  the   Existing 

World  of  Forms  is  the  Original,  First,  and  Only  Reality.     714. 
(II)  But  we  are  not  able  to  show  just  how  the  Universal  Laws  are  con- 
nected with  Reality. 

(A)  We  know  only  a  very  Small  Part  of  Reality. 

(B)  And  this  Question  really  becomes  absorbed  in  the  more  impor- 
tant one.  In  what  connection  both  stand  to  that  which  has 
Eternal  Worth?     715. 

B.  The  Relation  of  the  Three — Content,  Order,  End — Reality,  Laws,  and 
the  Good.  The  Postulate  of  their  Harmony  :  There  is  only  the  One 
Real  Power  appearing  to  us  under  the  threefold  image  of  an  End  to  be 
realized — namely,  some  definite  Good — then  on  account  of  the  definite- 
ness  of  this,  a  formed  and  developing  Reality,  and  finally  in  this  Reality 
an  unvarying  reign  of  Law.     715-726. 

(I)  The  Insurmountable  Difficulty  in  the  way  of  carrying  out  scientifically 
this  Postulate — in  the  Existence  of  Evil  and  of  Sin  in  Nature  and 
History.     716-719. 

(A)  Inadequate  Explanations.     716. 

(B)  Faith  only  is  here  possible.     717. 

(C)  Additional  Considerations.     §  6. 

i.  We  may  appropriately  emphasize  the  Smallness  of  our  View 

of  the  World. 
ii.  Our  Struggle  here  is  against  the  Confidence  of  Views  which 
impoverish  Faith  without  enriching  Knowledge.     718. 
(II)  The  Unity  of  the  Three  Principles  in  a  Living  Love.     §  7. 

(A)  The  Conceptions  of  Good  and  of  Good  Things  reached  through 
Conscience  and  Feeling.     719. 

i.  In  the  Case  of  the  Agreeable  and  Useful,  we  regard  '*Good" 

here  as  merely  a  Generalization. 
ii.  In  the  Case  of  the  Morally  Good,  there  is  hope  of  reaching 

some  Universal  which  actually  exists  in  such  Universality — 

the  Good-initself.     720. 

(B)  The  Conception  of  the  Good-in-itself.     720-721. 

i.  The  Popular  View  ends  in  the  Recognition  of  a  Formal  Re- 
lation of  Wills  as  the  Supreme  Good, 
ii.  The  True  View  holds  that  Good  and  Good  Things  do  not 
exist  as  such,  independent  of  the  feeling,  willing  and  know- 
ing Mind.  What  is  Good  in  itself  is  some  felt  Bliss ;  what 
we  call  Good  Things  are  Means  to  this  Good ;  the  only 
Thing  that  is  really  Good  is  that  Living  Love  that  wills  the 
Blessedness  of  Others.     721. 

(C)  This  Living  Love — the  Goodin-itself—As  Reality,  Law,  Worth. 

(D)  This  Postulate  cannot  be  scientifically  proved.     722-726. 


10s 

i.  It  would  require  that  all  the   Moral  Ideas  should  be  ex- 
Plnmed  from  Love.     This  can  be  done  with  fair  Success. 

ii.  It  would  require  that  Existing  Reality  should  be  explained 
from  Love.     This  is  possible  only  i„  a  very  modes,  degree 

iii.  It  would  require  that  the  Eternal  Truths  should  similarly  be 

explained.     This  involves  detailed  Requirements  which  arl 

impossible  of  Fulfillment.     724-726  wnicn  are 

(E)  Hence   we  ca„  only  end  in  Faith  in  the  Ultimate  Harmony  of 

all  in  Living  Love.     726.  ^ 


CONCLUSION   OF   THE   ENTIRE   WORK.      S  8 
Introduction.     727. 

I.  The  Scientific  Attitude  which  has  guided  the  whole  Ta.W  >,,«  k 

one  hand  a  Struggle  ngainst  Veneration  of  meTe  e'Tv  For^s        I  "  'I' 
other,  a  Struggle  against  all  Fanaticism.  ^  '  ™''  ""^'  "'^  ^^^ 

II.   The  Consequent  Double  Attitude  towari  Mechanism       R.c       *r      re 

tific  Worth  of  Mechanical  Investigation  in  Nat    andlS  o^T'^nd  R^f    "." 

Hig'^Isl'Rea'lir  •"^'"  '"""  ^^  "^  '"  '^  --^-^^!^ 
in.  Hence  the  Sum  of  Wisdom  has  seemed  to  be  neither  to  neelect  Me.h     • 
nor  to  make  it  other  than  Subordinate.     728  ^         Mechanism 

A.  The  Universal  is  everywhere  inferior  to  the  Particular. 

L       r-      '"'^  "*^'  '^  ^"^  ""Slit  to  be.  is  not  Matter  and  is  still  W 
Idea   but  ,s  the  Living  Personal  Spirit  of  God  and  the  World  of  P 
sonal  Spirits  which  He  has  created  ^  ^"' 


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